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Propositions 
1. The relationship between groundwater irrigation and social differentiation 
starts with the basic inequality in the ownership of land (This thesis) 
2. In Sangpura, two parties - the landlord and the tenant- contribute to cover the 
costs of a production process in certain proportion but benefits differently and 
disproportionately. The 'partnership perspective' does not problematise the 
social relations underlying the sharecropping arrangements and do not question 
the issue of disproportionate right in land and water (This thesis) 
3. A system is class efficient if the more powerful class can maintain a higher 
income in its favour, despite the lower production efficiency of the system 
(Bhaduri 1997) 
4. The rule o f caste obeys the rule of power (Gupta 1991) 
5. Caste is crucially concerned with determining access to the means of 
production, control over resources and institutions and forms of surplus 
extraction (Chakravarti 2001) 
6. While farmers have long been dependent on the state for essential inputs to 
agriculture, in recent years politicians in the state governments have also 
become dependent on farmers (Dubash 2002) 
7. There is a particular way in which the state has identified the problem (of 
resource depletion) and created programmes reflecting their political 
constituency (This thesis) 
8. Knowledge, the object of knowledge and the knower are the three factors 
which motivate action; the senses, the work and the doer comprise the 
threefold basis of action. Bhagavad Geeta, Hindu Text 
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Preface 
In 1997, I joined the groundwater programme of V I K S A T soon 
after graduating from Tata Institute o f Social Sciences (ITSS), 
Mumbai. Along with my colleagues, we were researching the socio-
economic impact o f groundwater irrigation in an agriculturally 
prosperous village o f north Gujarat The fieldwork was planned for 
three days with a long questionnaire. We travelled everyday for 
hours to reach the village in the morning and came back after dusk 
to relax in the hotel room. In three days o f fieldwork, I filled 
numbers of questionnaires asking straight questions and seeking 
short answers, sometimes in yes and no. We did not have much 
time! While analyzing the data we concluded that groundwater 
irrigation had a positive impact on income and employment 
However, something inside me did not approve o f the 
methodology adopted for the study. It was different from my 
earlier teaming where I was taught that the Svhole is always greater 
than the sum of its parts'. The present work stems from this 
critique o f quantitative social research methods. 
My close interaction with village social life started back in 1993 
as a student of rural development However, a prolonged stay was 
only feasible while working on the present project Many people 
facilitated this process. I am thankful to Hiteshbhai who invited m e 
to his village to stay and research issues o f groundwater depletion. 
Joitaram and Dayeeben Prajapati, opened their home and heart for 
me and provided the social space to stay. Joita Kaka (as I call him) 
also accompanied me to places when I needed help and introduced 
me to the whole village community. He helped m e to read old 
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Gujarati script while looking at land and tax revenue records in the 
village and in Mehsana town. This research would not have been 
possible without his active support, understanding and help. Masi 
(Dayeeben) cooked for me and waited until I returned from the 
field. I am also indebted to the residents o f Sangpura village who 
shared their knowledge, history and life with me without hesitation. 
Some individuals were interviewed with the condition of anonymity 
and therefore their names and the name of the village have been 
changed to protect their privacy and identity. I would also like to 
state that I do not want to personally offend any one and that my 
concerns are purely academic for raising certain fundamental 
questions related to the process o f resource exploitation. 
My association with VUCSAT has been what I call the 
grounding o f my ideological flight. Working with an 
interdisciplinary group helped to strengthen my own arguments. I 
am immensely thankful to Srinivas Mudrakartha for guiding me 
through this process. 
This book is my P h D dissertation at the Irrigation and Water 
Engineering (TWE) Group, Department of Environmental 
Sciences, Wageningen University and Research Centre under the 
programme Matching Technology and Institutions (MTI). I am 
deeply indebted to Peter Mollinga for his supervision and guidance. 
H e not only helped me to re-conceptualise the work, but also 
supported me through detailed methodological, theoretical and 
practical inputs. His responses were quick and direct, which taught 
m e how to be concise, concrete and crisp in analysis and writing. 
N o words can ever thank him for his encouragement and direction. 
I am immensely indebted to Dik Roth who was meticulous in 
appraising notes, checking on my writing apart from providing 
detailed conceptual inputs. Discussions with him for hours and 
over endless cups o f coffee made me more confident about my 
work. Linden Vincent has steered my thoughts by what she says, 
being the 'devil's advocate'. She constantly questioned my idealism 
and taught me to look through technology and institutions beyond 
my ideological biases. I take this opportunity to formally thank her 
for all the support and guidance. I am also grateful to the Ford 
Foundation for granting the scholarship, which facilitated the 
fieldwork and writing in India and in the Netherlands. 
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Preface 
During my fieldwork in India, I was associated with the Institute 
o f Rural Management, Anand I am grateful to V. Kurien, 
Chairperson, IRMA and Katar Singh, the then Director o f IRMA 
for approving my candidature. Vishwa Ballabh steered my research 
and placed it in the local context His sharp skills in dealing with 
issues of agricultural economics are reflected in two of the 
chapters, which was guided though his intellectual effort Every 
time I went to discuss with him, I was not allowed to return 
without having an elaborate lunch at his house. I am also thankful 
to Binoy Acharya, Director, Unnati who provided opportunity to 
supplement the scholarship to stay in India. Interactions with J J 
Royburman of TISS generated my interest in social anthropology. 
My participation in the M T I workshops have been a motivating 
factor to consolidate research findings and present them in 
workshops held every six months. Apart from the critical 
comments on the progress o f research, these workshops were also 
helpful in building personal links with fellow PhD travellers and to 
draw strength. I am thankful to R Manimohan, Pushpa Raj Kanal, 
Vishal Narain, Jyothi Krishnan, Preeta LalL Bala Raju Nikku, 
Suman Gautam, Amreeta Regmi, Shriprakash Rajput, Pranita Udas, 
G. Mini and Sophia John for their help and support Special thanks 
to Esha Shah and R Parthasarathy for their critical comments and 
motivating discussions at various stages of my work 
I want to thank the staff o f various libraries, which I visited 
during the course of research. I have used the libraries at V I K S A T , 
Centre for Environment Education, Sardar Patel Institute o f 
Economic and Social Research, Gujarat Institute o f Development 
Research at Ahmedabad, Institute o f Rural Management, Anand 
and Wageningen University Library at The Netherlands. My special 
thanks to Gerda de Fauw and Maria Pierce o f I W E for their 
invaluable administrative support 
My stay at Wageningen for initial conceptualisation and writing 
the thesis has been memorable and pleasant Several people 
contributed to this process. I profoundly acknowledge my 
interactions with Margreet Zwarteveen, Flip Wester, Bert Bruins, 
Rutgerd Boelens, Alex Bolding, Gerrit van Vuren, Frans Huibers, 
Jeroen Warner and Kai Wegerich. Jeroen Vos helped me with 
research planning during my stay in 2000-2001.1 acknowledge the 
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Wageningen, The Netherlands, October 2004 
friendship of Foppe, Pieter, Martine and her friends. I would like 
to thank Arun, Ajay, Ganesan, Ranvir, Garima, Sharad and Anand 
for bringing me out of otherwise lonely evenings and nights. I am 
thankful to my family friends Sujit and Ranjan, Sunil and Jyothi and 
Jayant and Sudeshna for their continued support and love. Ajit has 
been a great friend who provided while sitting miles away. 
With profound memory, I remember my farther, Shiv Kumar 
Narayan whose interest in art, music and literature tuned my 
thoughts. I thank my sister Suparna, my brothers Utpal and Dewal, 
their family and my in-laws Asha Prasad and Dinesh Kumar for 
their love, care and affection. 
Last and foremost, I acknowledge the love and encouragement 
o f Swati Sinha, my friend and companion. She coped with the 
several periods of separation during the study period while I was 
away either in the field or in the Netherlands. Her compassion and 
support went a long way in completing this book on time. The 
work related to this book had the privilege o f being with me for 
many days, evenings and nights, which actually belonged to her. 
N o words can exactly match my feelings and love for her. 
This book is dedicated to my mother, Prabhawati Narayan 
Karan, who raised us with lot o f difficulties by sacrificing her own 
life. She preferred my education in better institutions to her own 
pressing necessities and made me chase the quest for knowledge. It 
is only now that I understand how hard it was to raise four 
demanding children as a single parent Her sacrifice to bring us up 
and make us stand on our own feet has been tremendous and 
remarkable. I remember how she wrote her PhD thesis in the 
kitchen while cooking for us, so much so that her supervisor 
complained about the stains and smell of spices from the chapter 
drafts. Writing my own PhD thesis while having access to the latest 
technologies, libraries and all the time for myself makes m e realise 
how hard it must have been for her to write while working and 
cooking for her growing children. Apart from seeking higher 
knowledge, her main motivation to complete the thesis was a small 
increment in her salary, which helped us study further. 'Amma, this 
goes toyou'. 
1 
Introduction 
From the second half of the last century, agriculture in India has 
gone through enormous changes because o f the introduction of 
green revolution technology. The technology demanded more 
control over irrigation, which the large canal systems were unable 
to provide. Groundwater irrigation was seen as a feasible 
alternative to the bureaucracy-controlled canal systems. In addition, 
groundwater irrigation could cover areas that were historically not 
part of the surface irrigation schemes. These advantages o f 
groundwater over surface irrigation led to sharp increase in its use. 
However, due to the large areas being irrigated by groundwater, 
over-development and depletion o f aquifer systems is becoming 
common. Gujarat is no exception to this process where 
groundwater supports more than 77 per cent o f its irrigation water 
requirements. Increased groundwater use coupled with a rising 
pollution level in surface water bodies has resulted in water scarcity, 
leading further to groundwater exploitation. The process transferred 
many regions from water abundant to water scarce areas in just four 
decades. With this increased groundwater use, a spurt in water 
markets was reported from the earlyl980s. Dense markets 
developed in alluvial central and northern regions o f Gujarat, 
which were suitable for sinking deep tubewells. The growth in 
water markets led to debates over its nature and way of 
functioning, often to the level o f rhetoric. A group of academicians 
advocated dense and competitive groundwater markets on the 
ground of efficiency and accessibility to the 
1 
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resource - but without unpacking nuances of unequal social 
relationships, and natural and historical functions that shape and 
determine groundwater access and use. Apart from a few very 
recent studies, the debate lacked detailed methodological and 
empirical inputs for understanding, how groundwater irrigation and 
markets function at the ground level 
The present study fills this gap by focussing on the politics o f 
groundwater markets and their interrelation with social 
differentiation and class-caste relations. It is based on an intensive 
village-based case study situated in the Mehsana district o f north 
Gujarat, which is famous for its widely developed groundwater 
markets, and depletion o f aquifer due to excessive pumping. The 
study shows how social relationships shape and determine access 
and use o f groundwater in the context of a specific agro-ecology, 
prevailing social relations o f production, ineffective regulation to 
check groundwater exploitation and inequality in resource 
ownership. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I 
introduce the above concerns through a snapshot o f two families 
that indicates the process of change taking place in villages o f north 
Gujarat Agricultural intensification and groundwater exploitation 
are important factors contributing to the changing prosperity o f 
these two families, and brings one into a dependency relationship 
with the other. Following this, I sketch the social geography of the 
village where the study is located. The second section locates these 
issues in the theoretical arena. I begin with a review of the literature 
on groundwater irrigation from the perspective o f agrarian change, 
showing the lack o f detailed information on internal characteristics 
o f groundwater irrigation institutions. I then locate the focus o f the 
present work through a triadic framework of the theory o f agrarian 
institutions, ecological variables in agrarian change and the domain 
o f the state in influencing institutions, nature and society. The third 
section introduces the focus o f research and the central research 
questions followed by the methodological design o f the study and 
ends with an overview of the chapters. 
Introduction 3 
Changing Prosperity: A Tale of Two Families 
Mahendtabhai Patel 1 owns 2.3 hectare o f land and a 20 per cent 
share in a tubewell in Sangpura village.2 The tubewell has nine 
other partners and together they used to irrigate 21 hectares o f land 
in 1986 at the time of its construction. Out of that, nine hectares 
worth o f water for irrigation used to be sold to buyers. With the 
depth to the groundwater table being 35 meters, a 35 horsepower 
(hp) electric engine and 16 hours o f electricity supply per day, the 
tubewell used to make a profit o f more than Rs. 50000 per year. 
The profit used to be distributed among the shareholders 
proportional to their individual shares. The land was very fertile. 
Together with high yielding variety (HYV) seeds and timely 
irrigation, the returns from agriculture were significant In 1990, 
when the electricity supply was reduced to 12 hours a day, the 
tubewell command shrank to 16 hectares. Subsequently the 
electricity supply was further reduced to ten hours a day and by this 
time the groundwater level had dropped to 88 meters. In order to 
sustain a similar level of water supply the capacity of the electric 
pump had to be increased to 51 hp. The command area o f 
Mahendrabhai's tubewell was reduced to 11 hectares. H e stopped 
the sale of water totally, as the shareholders o f the tubewell could 
barely irrigate their own land. The stop on water sales had a 
significant impact on profit, as now Mahendrabhai had to pay the 
irrigation charges for his own crops. Earlier, the cost o f irrigation 
water used to be paid largely from the profit that his share from the 
tubewell yielded. Furthermore, land productivity declined 
drastically due to three decades o f intensive cultivation, resulting in 
crop failure and reduced agricultural production. 
These problems led Mahendrabhai to take a very important 
decision. While visiting his relative's house in the neighbouring 
village, he heard about going to the USA, to where many of his 
cousin's relatives had migrated. H e could see a perceptible change 
in their lifestyle, and hence was impressed with the idea. Long-
distance migration became a strategy to be financially independent 
and diversify away from stagnating agriculture. Mahendrabhai 
contacted his relative and the agent who arranged visas for going to 
the USA. After 5 months o f struggle and constant follow-ups, he 
reached Chicago in October, 2002 paying Rs. 800000 
(approximately US$ 16842)3 to the agent The money paid to the 
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agent was borrowed from different sources at 24 per cent rate o f 
interest per annum. 
Mahendrabhai now works in a motel near Chicago, owned by 
one o f his distant relatives. H e earned U D § six an hour in 2002 
(approximately Rs. 285). H e worked for 16 hours a day and had 
repaid the entire loan in the first two years. Back home, he left his 
two sons, a daughter, wife and aging parents. His elder son has 
finished an apprenticeship course in mechanical engineering while 
the younger one is going to attend college. His daughter, the eldest 
child in the family, is married to a wealthy businessman in 
Mehsana. Mahendrabhai's sons are not interested in agriculture and 
therefore the major part o f their land has been given for 
sharecropping. A small proportion o f the land is under the family's 
cultivation and is used for growing pearl millet and alfalfa, as dry 
and wet fodder for buffaloes. The family now keeps five buffaloes 
instead o f two in 1990. The milk is sold at the village dairy 
cooperative. This gives an income of more than Rs. 10,000 per 
month. Mahendrabhai sends money every alternate month through 
illegal money transfer channels. He was the first person from the 
village to migrate to the U S A and was followed by 99 others by the 
end of year 2002. Apart from repaying the loan amount and 
marrying his daughter into a wealthy family, Mahendrabhai 
invested in another tubewelL of which he owns a 30 per cent share, 
along with five others. The new tubewell is 200 meters deep while 
the water level is at a depth o f 117 meters. The capacity of the 
electric pump is 72 hp and irrigates ten hectares o f land. They sell 
water for around two hectares and the rest is utilised for the 
shareholders' land. 
Lakhaji Thakore cultivates half o f Mahendrabhai's land through 
a sharecropping contract Lakhaji owns 0.34 hectare o f land on the 
western side o f the village. H e used to irrigate his land through 
buying water from a Patel's tubewelL but for the last five years, the 
command area of the tubewell has considerably reduced. H e could 
not buy water, as it was not sufficient even for the shareholders. 
Since then, Lakhaji and his wife have been cultivating land through 
sharecropping contracts. Lakhaji has an aging mother and two sons 
who are married. His sons are working as daily wage labourers in 
and around the village while the daughters-in-law help in 
agricultural operations. Under the contract, the total agricultural 
production is divided equally, one part each for the three major 
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inputs - land, labour and water. Two-thirds of the net production 
goes to Mahendrabhai as he owns the land and also has a share in 
the tubewell that supplies irrigation to the field.4 The 
sharecropping, however, hardly meets the need of Lakhaji's family 
as the productivity of land has gone down in recent years. 
According to him, the land does not produce what it used to 
earlier. The returns from agriculture are divided and Lakhaji only 
gets a part o f total production, which barely meets the necessities 
o f his family. Lakhaji wishes to have a share in one o f the 
tubewells, but this seems a far-fetched dream. He puts it precisely, 
I f we could afford a share in a tubewell, we would be working on 
our own land. What do we get in sharecropping - only some grains 
for the household and weeds as fodder for the buffalo?' Since his 
own land is not irrigated, he can grow only non-irrigated pulses if 
there is a good monsoon. T o feed his family, he has to grow 
irrigated crops such as pearl millet and wheat This explains his 
decision to take land on sharecropping. 
'Within the family, it is the women who bear the burden of 
work' says Taraben, wife of Lakhaji. She thanks G o d that she has 
two daughters-in-law who can work in the field that her husband 
takes on sharecropping. 'Who would do weeding, harvesting, 
gleaning, sowing and taking care o f the buffalo if not women? 
These have never been men's jobs anyway,' says Taraben. For her 
two daughters-in-law, the work is never ending. They get up in the 
morning at five and after their usual work at home such as cooking, 
cleaning, milking the buffalo and going to the dairy, they go for 
work at 8:00 in the morning. Until 12:30, they work in the field 
after which they come back and cook for the family. Their mother-
in-law looks after the children. After lunch, they again work from 
2:30 to 5:30 p m in the field. The weeds cut in the field are brought 
back and are given to the cattle as fodder before milking them. 
After milking, they go to the dairy for selling the milk. Back home, 
they cook for their family, feed the children and take up other 
household work. Their husbands go out o f the village to work in 
the brick-making factory nearby. Since they are women, they have 
to look after their children and family and work in the farm. This is 
the reason why they do not leave the village for wage work like 
their husbands. After all the hard work that the family members 
put in, they barely have enough to eat The sharecropping does give 
them food security for four months but it is not sufficient for the 
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family of six adult members and five children. Lakhaji's sons do 
not get work everyday and sometimes they come back empty-
handed. The family earns Rs. 1000 per month from the sale o f 
milk. Lakhaji admits that the burden of agriculture has been shifted 
to women, who are at the forefront of all the economic activities. 
For the family, it is an agrarian trap induced by lower productivity, 
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dependencies in agrarian relations, ever-increasing irrigation prices, 
crop failure and hard work without much return. 
The varying prosperity of these two families point towards the 
process o f transformation taking place in Sangpura village. 
Sangpura is located in the heart of groundwater-mined Mehsana 
district in north Gujarat in western India (see Map 1.1). The 
transformation has been brought about mainly through the green 
(crop) and white (dairy) revolutions, dating back to the 1960s. 
Agriculture was beginning to commercialise even a decade before 
the introduction o f the green revolution technology in the village. 
T h e agricultural produce market, started in Mehsana town during 
the same period, helped peasants to cater to an expanding market 
and determined their cropping pattern. The dairy and primary 
agricultural cooperative started in the early 1960s enhanced this 
'commercialisation' process. Ecological factors such as the large 
groundwater reserves in north Gujarat especially in the plains of 
Mehsana district, and the advent o f tubewell technology, boosted 
this growth. Apart from this, larger developmental processes such 
as the spurt of the cotton mills o f Ahmedabad from the early 20 t h 
century until the late 1970s, employment in the diamond polishing 
industries during the 1980s and employment in the diamond 
polishing industries during the 1980s and employment in small-
scale industries after the 1980s helped in creating opportunities 
outside agriculture, and created many backward and forward 
linkages. Surplus created both inside and outside the village was 
reinvested in agriculture, making the new technology stand on a 
firm footing. Tubewells were dug in the early 1980s to access deep 
aquifers as the shallow dug wells started to dry up in the village. 
The productivity o f agriculture was significant, which led to 
intensive cultivation. The 1980-1990 period, is referred to in the 
village as the 'golden years' of agriculture. 
However, the developmental process did not enhance equity in a 
village characterized by social and economic inequalities. The 
dominant classes and castes monopolised the two productive 
resources o f land and water. Through the control over labour and 
institutions such as the panchqyat (village council) and the credit and 
dairy cooperatives, that dominance was reinforced. Groundwater-
irrigated agriculture further widened this gap, as in the changing 
situation the access to water is determined through the level of 
investment and share in the tubewell. In addition to this, the 
8 The Dark Zone 
dominant class systematically shifted the irrigation costs towards 
the small and marginal farmers through their monopoly over 
tubewell irrigation. Almost all tubewells have until recently made 
profitable business through the sale o f water to non-shareholders, 
and the shareholders subsidised their own cost o f water in this 
manner. The dairy economy thrived, feeding into agricultural 
investment and vice versa. By the end of the 1990s, the dominant 
class had accumulated enough surpluses to partially move out o f 
agriculture. This era shows long-distance migration by people 
belonging to dominant classes and an increase in the prevalence o f 
sharecropping arrangements. The institutional arrangement o f 
sharecropping created new ways of shifting the price o f water to 
the sharecroppers. The context includes the decline in agricultural 
productivity, shrinking water markets due to reduction in electricity 
supply, and increasing crop failures. The burden of price was borne 
by the lower classes, who shared the risk in agriculture, paid the 
price of water and provided cheap female labour. 
A Journey through the Landscape 
Sangpura is just like any other village of Mehsana district but 
relatively small 5 (Map 1.2). In 2001, 628 families inhabited 
Sangpura (see Table 1.1). Looking at the three equally sized group 
of families, the village could approximately be divided between — 
Thakores, Patels and Iter Kaum 6 such as Prajapati, Darbar, Parmar, 
Vaghari and others. The three groups have an approximately equal 
number of families. Table 1.1 cites the major castes, the number o f 
households and their primary caste-based occupation. 7 The village 
is around 700 years old and according to the village tales, a person 
named Sanga Rabbari, belonging to a pastoral caste settled i t 
Sangpura thus derived its name. If one happens to visit Sangpura in 
the morning, the common sight would be a number o f women and 
men walking in one direction with a pot on their heads. They head 
towards the milk cooperative, an important institution o f the 
village. Later, they head towards their respective fields on foot, 
tractors or bullock carts. The village has a primary school that 
educates children until seventh standard, after which they go to 
Akhaj or Kherva, three to four kilometres away, to complete high 
school, and then to Mehsana town if they want to continue further. 
Introduction 
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The village is well connected by a concrete road to Mehsana 
town. The state transport buses come to the village in the mornings 
and evenings, with direct linkages to towns like Mehsana, Kadi, 
Kalol and Ahmedabad. For people working in and around 
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Mehsana, numerous private jeeps fill in the gap o f frequency 
between the government run buses. The old dried up tank that has 
now become a place for garbage collection welcomes visitors to the 
village at its entrance. During summer, some families who stay 
nearby tether their cattle under the trees that stand in the periphery 
o f the dried tank A small road, bifurcating from the main road, 
leads to various small settlements of the village. On the left side 
one can see the new settlement o f Prajapatis. Though Prajapatis 
have settled here, a few Patels also bought land and built their 
houses at the end of the cluster. On the right side, just across the 
dried tank, a new Patel settlement has come up to which families 
from the old Patel settlements have shifted. The new Patel colony 
stands proud with its majority of two-storied buildings, freshly 
painted houses and dish antennas. Further left towards the tank, a 
small path leads to the village cremation ground on the fringes o f 
which some Dalit families have made their houses. 
T A B L E 1.1: CASTES AND THEIR PRIMARY OCCUPATION IN SANGPURA 8 
Caste No. of 
households 
'Primary caste-based occupation 
r 
Thakore 225 Agriculturist 
Patel 200 Agriculturist 
Prajapati 70 Potter 
Parmar 60 Cobbler and agricultural labourer 
Vaghari9 25 Engaged in vegetable and fruit procurement and 
vending 
Darbar 12 Agriculturists, former feudal lords 
Rabbaii 8 Cattle rearing 
Rawal 6 Camel-Caterer 
Bawa" 4 Village priests 
Nat 4 Barber 
Suthar 4 Carpenter 
Senma 3 Agricultural Labourer 
Darji 2 Tailor 
Luhar 2 Blacksmith 
Others 3 -
Total 628 
Source: Field data collected through focus group discussions in September 2001. 
The figure represents approximate number of households. 
Further, the main road leads to three paan (betel nut wrapped in 
betel leaves with spices) shops where old and middle-aged Patels 
can be seen standing clad in spotless white kurta and pyjamas. 
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These Patels have given their land for sharecropping and have 
family members working in the USA. The spotless white clothes 
speak well for the status-conscious Patels. They discuss state and 
central politics sitting near one o f the prominent pan shops. This 
shop also provides the morning newspaper that stimulates further 
discussions. Every inch of the newspaper is read and discussed. 
Along with the Patels, a few Prajapatis also have the privilege of 
sitting with them on the same platform. Another shop owned by a 
Thakore plays devotional songs in the morning, which slowly shifts 
to new Hindi movie songs as the day progresses, to attract the 
younger crowd, who are regular customers of pan and guthkka (a 
form of tobacco). Discussions among the younger clientele range 
from jobs in Mehsana town to various sex scandals which have 
broken out in the country. 
O n the right hand side o f the main road, there is a washing ¿ ¿ 0 / 
(platform) made alongside the cattle trough. The government 
tubewell that supplies piped water for domestic use is also located 
here. In the mornings, women wash clothes in the washing ghat 
and the water flows to the open low area beside the village school. 
This area is a breeding ground for mosquitoes. Further, the road 
takes a visitor to the prominent areas of Sangpura. On the left side, 
the milk cooperative building stands portentously. On the right 
stands a two-storied building with a ration shop on the ground 
floor and the credit cooperative society on the first floor. O n the 
corner o f the milk cooperative, the government-run Balwadi 
(kindergarten) is housed. The village teashop, a barbershop and a 
general store are seen alongside. In the mornings and evenings, the 
teashop provides a concoction of milk, sugar, water and tea in a 
2:2:1 proportion popularly called chaa (tea) in the village. During 
winters, this tea is mixed with masalas (spices) to make it stronger 
and is liked by people o f all ages. 
The next destination is a conglomeration o f three temples o f the 
Lords Rama, Shankar and the Goddess Chamunda. The size and 
the maintenance o f these temples speak o f who the devotees are. 
U p o n enquiry, one would always be told that the house o f Bhagwan 
(God) is open to everyone. However, in fact these three big 
temples have only Patels and Prajapatis as usual visitors. Thakores 
come whenever there is Bhajan (devotional songs) in the village. 
Otherwise, for all practical purposes, other communities have their 
own temples in their domestic clusters. The three main temples are 
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beautifully decorated and painted every year. On the walls o f the 
temple, one can see figures o f saints including some political 
figures, like Gandhi and Sardar Patel. 
The road then divides into three parts. The right turn goes to 
the old Prajapati and Patel housing areas and at the end joins the 
settlement o f Parmars, Vagharis and Senmas. The left turn takes 
one to another important destination called the panchayat office, 
headed by the village talhati (secretary o f the village council). The 
talhati is the lowest-level representative of the state administration 
in the village. On paper, the talhati is supposed to be the secretary 
o f the village sarpanch (chairperson of village council) but in actual 
terms, every official work is done through the talhati. Without his 
(the post talhati in Sangpura was occupied by a man in 2001-03) 
consent, it is almost impossible to do any paper work in the village. 
The responsibility of the talhati includes maintaining land records, 
issuing caste certificates, ration cards, helping to conduct panchayat 
elections, issuing birth and death certificates, and dispute 
settlement. The range o f responsibilities has imbued a sense o f 
power in him. This power is manifested in many ways. Out o f six 
working days, the talhati comes only for three to four days 
depending upon the number of meetings he has to attend in 
Mehsana town or elsewhere. Every morning, people stand outside 
the panchayat office waiting for him. The talhati stays at Mehsana, 
and if he does not come by the 10:30 am bus from Mehsana town, 
this means that he will not turn up for the day. The talhati o f 
Sangpura is a man of few words. H e speaks only when he does not 
agree to a proposal or when he expects favours for a certain task. 
In any case, he does not speak for himself; an orderly does this for 
him. 
The straight road goes to Thakore settlements, where more than 
200 families live. I f one happens to follow the lane, children would 
follow too until one reaches ones destination. In the evening, 
people sit in one's group for chatting. Some of the youngsters play 
cards while betting on them. Women sit in groups around the 
Thakore temple. Thakore houses are mostly made of an un-
plastered brick structure with corrugated iron used as roofing 
material. Very few houses have a concrete roof. One such house is 
the sarpanch's house. There are no double-storied houses like most 
o f the Patels own. 
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The right hand turn of the straight road that crosses old Patel 
and Prajapati hutments leads to the comer o f the village settlement 
boundary. On the comer o f this live Parmars, Vagharis, Ravals and 
Senmas. The Parmar settlement greets one with a large painting o f 
Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar and his message for untouchable castes to 
be educated and organized. Here, there are four small and medium 
temples, divided between these four castes. Some of the Parmar 
houses are newly-built and signify the change in their economic 
status in recent years due to having government jobs. Vagharis and 
Senmas are not that lucky, they still live in mud or semi-concrete 
houses. Vagharis are mostly engaged in horticulture. Around 20 per 
cent of the village land is under horticultural crops, which are 
mostly leased by Vagharis on fixed rent basis. For chikoo (also 
called sapota, scientific name Achras Sapotd) and lemon, the lease is 
mainly for a year. The season for guava lasts four months for 
which the Vaghari family shifts to the location in order to prevent 
theft both by human beings and birds that love to peck at them. 
Senmas are mostly agricultural labourers working within and 
outside the village. 
Groundwater Irrigation and Agrarian Change 
The intricate relationship between groundwater irrigation and 
development has been widely debated and polarised. Many believe 
that groundwater irrigation has a positive impact on productivity 
and generates year-round employment due to intensification of 
agriculture, and that therefore it can be used as a weapon against 
rural poverty (Chambers 1986, Chambers, 1988, Chambers, Saxena 
and Shah 1989, Shah 1993, Vaidyanathan 1996 and 1999, 
Narayanamoorthy 2001, Roy and Shah 2003). Irrigation is 
considered a powerful factor for food security, protection against 
adverse drought conditions, increased opportunities for more 
employment, stable income offering opportunities for multiple 
cropping and crop diversification. It is argued that access to 
irrigation leads to die adoption of new technology and increase in 
cropping intensity, which leads to higher productivity and greater 
returns from farming. Besides this, it also opens up new on and off 
farm employment opportunities improving the income level o f 
farming households (Hussain and Biltonen 2001). However, unlike 
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canal irrigation, groundwater development mostly took place in the 
private arena, and in many locations access to groundwater is 
chiefly determined by water markets operating at a local level 
Wide-scale tubewell irrigation and groundwater markets have been 
reported from various parts o f India. They are mainly from states 
like Gujarat (Shah 1985, 1993, Kolavalli and Chicoine 1987, Shah 
and Raju 1987, Bhatia 1992, Dubash 2002), Tamilnadu (Janakrajan 
1992, 1994, 1997b), Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Pant and Rai 1985, 
Wood 1995, Shah and Ballabh 1997, Kishore 2004, Pant 1992, 
2003, 2004), Karnataka (Chandrakanth et al. 1998), Andhra 
Pradesh (Shah 1986, Prahladachar 1994, Satyasai and Vishwanathan 
1997) and Punjab (Jairath 1985). Most o f the academic work 
revolves around the themes covering groundwater development 
(Dhawan 1982, 1988, 1993, Vohra 1982), groundwater markets 
(Shah 1993) and management of the groundwater resource due to 
large scale depletion (Moench 1991,1994,1999) . Among them, the 
contribution and use of groundwater in irrigation development has 
been widely accepted However, questions have been raised on the 
nature and functioning o f groundwater markets and consequent 
market-based management prescriptions based on this analysis. 
The most prominent among these is Tushaar Shah's influential 
work on groundwater markets. Based on neo-classical economic 
analysis, Shah argues for dense and competitive markets on the 
ground of efficiency and equity o f water use. Shah claims that 
groundwater markets are natural oligopolies and advocates policies 
that create a situation where oligopolists behave as if they operate 
under competitive conditions making the resource available to large 
population through market mechanisms (Shah 1993). His policy 
prescription is to have flat-rate electricity pricing based on 
contracted load o f the tubewell motors, which will create incentives 
for farmers to access and sell surplus water. Shah's analysis has 
been criticised by scholars on the ground of his policy 
recommendation o f charging flat-rate electricity. It is argued that 
flat-rate electricity charges have led to wide scale overexploitation 
o f groundwater by resourceful farmers leading to deleterious 
implications on small and marginal farmers who are excluded due 
to their inability to chase the water table. Further, the issue o f 
dominant caste/class's appropriation o f an environmentally 
precious resource was not part of Shah's analysis (Palmer-Jones 
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1994, Moench 1994, Bhatia 1992).» Much of the critique o f Shah's 
work is available elsewhere and hence I do not focus on it here. 1 2 
Instead, I focus on the issue o f groundwater development from 
the perspective o f agrarian change in groundwater dependent 
societies under the broad theme of irrigation ethnography. The 
reason to take this approach is the lack o f detailed description o f 
the internal characteristics o f groundwater irrigation institutions in 
available literatures. Irrigation ethnography has been a long 
tradition in canal irrigation systems (Wade 1988, Sengupta 1980, 
Attwood 1984, 1985, 1987, Gorter 1989, Omedt 1993, 
Ramamurthy 1995, Mollinga 1998, Chakravarti 2001). It was 
influential in showing irrigation as a politically critical resource in 
societies characterised by inequitable distribution of power and 
resources. These studies showed how irrigation helped in 
transforming social and production relations and have different 
implications for different classes and actors, thus contributing in 
policy formulations for irrigation reform. 1 3 However, apart from 
few recent studies, the same has been largely missing in most o f the 
analysis related to groundwater irrigation. This is more so for 
Gujarat as its model of groundwater markets have been widely 
discussed without much sociological enquiry on the process o f 
groundwater development focussing on the question who gains 
and who loses in the course o f these developments? 1 4 Allocation of 
a scarce resource such as groundwater is looked at from a narrow 
equity and efficiency perspective, while the questions o f 
individualized appropriation of a common resource and its 
implications on an unequal society have hardly been answered. 
Further, the nature of relationships between agrarian structure and 
technological change in the context o f agrarian transformation 
hardly gets precedence in these papers. Instead, there is an 
oversimplification of the problem, which tries to connect 
groundwater irrigation with poverty alleviation without unpacking 
the nuances o f other possible linkages. 1 5 In the next few 
paragraphs, I review the available literature on groundwater from 
an agrarian change perspective understanding how local power 
structures impinge on the distribution o f groundwater resources in 
order to locate the context o f the present study. 
Meinzen-Dick (1989) analysed irrigation development and 
agrarian structure in the southern Indian state of Tamilnadu. She 
studied how differential control over the resource affected access 
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to irrigation and how access to irrigation, in turn, affects 
agricultural production and employment According to her, 
agriculture in Tamilnadu has gone through colossal changes with a 
shift from collectively managed surface water to individually 
managed groundwater. 1 6 This shift is associated with the technical 
innovation in pumping technology. While access to surface 
irrigation is related to ownership o f land, access to groundwater is 
dependent on capital investments. Her study revealed that 
households with the greatest control over land and surface 
irrigation had an initial advantage in investing in the components o f 
groundwater technology. Increasing dependence on groundwater 
irrigation reinforces inequalities based on land and surface 
irrigation resources. Irrigation development increases land 
productivity and employment opportunities due to external inputs 
and intensive cultivation. However, the increased employment is 
also supplemented by family labour for middle class peasants. 
Farmers with land but no access to water are increasingly 
dependent on wage labour. This indicates the proletarianisation o f 
this group and thus amplifies the differences between households 
in their control o f resources. According to her, 'the analysis o f 
interplay between agricultural technology and social structure needs 
to go beyond land, labour and capital, to give explicit attention to 
the implications of differential control over water resources for 
agricultural production and agrarian structure' (Ibid: 208). Further, 
she emphasised that investment in irrigation contributes to food 
security and employment, but the extent and type of benefits o f 
irrigation depend upon the household resource base. This means 
that 'irrigation development is not a substitute for redistributive 
policies to reduce inequalities in rural areas. The primary 
beneficiaries of irrigation development are the landed rather than 
the landless. Even within the landed classes, access to irrigation 
often reinforces rather than compensates for inequalities based on 
control over land. This is particularly true o f access to groundwater, 
which requires a capital investment for digging a well and mstalling 
a pump-set* (Ibid.: 210-211). 
Janakarajan (1992, 1994) studied the interlinked land-lease and 
credit markets in a village in Tamilnadu and highlighted the manner 
in which differential access to groundwater resources can be 
instrumental in precipitating an exploitative interlocking o f water, 
labour and credit markets. According to him, 'the water-sellers 
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offer water to the purchasers in exchange for a rental share of the 
produce raised by the latter on his (her) own land, and labour 
services (paid or unpaid) which must be rendered by the purchaser 
for the seller. The trader offers a production loan to the water seller 
in exchange for a transfer o f the tatter's output at a price below 
market price; further, the trader exploits the relationship between 
the sellers and the purchasers o f water by including the sellers to 
pressure the purchaser into selling his output cheap to the trader. 
H e observes that the market for water favours the water sellers and 
the tying-up of the land-lease and labour markets that one 
frequenuy encounters in the literature o f traditional landlordism is 
paralleled, to a great extent, by the interlinkage' (Janakarajan 1994: 
151-201). H e points out the unequal trading relationship that 
prevails between sellers and buyers, which results in the 
exploitation of buyers not only through price but also through non-
price mechanisms. His analysis shows that the 'transactions' in 
groundwater markets leaves little room for the buyers to negotiate. 
This leads to involuntary involvement of resource-poor farmers 
who have no other choice but to cling to an exploitative structure, 
which perpetuates inequity in resource allocation and access. 
Bhatia (1992) analysed the political economy of groundwater 
overexploitation by observing the pattern o f groundwater 
utilisation in north Gujarat and raised the issue o f inequity in access 
to resources. In a case study o f Sabarkantha district, Bhatia studied 
eight villages in the course o f distribution and ownership o f 
irrigation assets between different caste/class groups. The first 
category o f people belonged to economically well off upper caste 
such as Patels, Rajputs and Baniyas. The intermediate class 
consisted o f people belonging to 'other backward castes' as well as 
scheduled tribes. The third category o f people was o f scheduled 
castes o f Bhambis and Vankars who were landless. She found that 
ownership o f irrigation assets was overwhelmingly concentrated 
among the privileged castes, especially Patels. It was more 
pronounced with modem irrigation devices such as tubewells than 
dug wells. Her analysis showed that the move from surface or low 
cost dugwell to deep groundwater irrigation has induced 
differential access to the resource that is largely concentrated with 
the upper castes/classes. 
Dubash (2002) studied the agrarian question and 
institutionalization of groundwater exchange in north Gujarat Using 
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data collected in two villages - Ratanpura and Paldi, the study looked 
at the dynamics o f change in a groundwater dependent village and the 
emergence of institutions for the management of groundwater 
extraction and distribution. The study throws light on class-based 
categorization of study villages and observed that in both villages, 
caste corresponds closely to landowning and landless classes. Well 
ownership is closely tied to patterns o f landownership. In 
Ratanpura, large landowners have their own wells, while farmers 
with smaller land size classes share well ownership. In Paldi, almost 
all wells are individually owned and there is no distinction across 
landownership classes. Dubash observed that the class boundaries 
were starker in Paldi than in Ratanpura, one of the reasons being 
the difference in patterns o f groundwater utilisation. Further, 
groundwater irrigation brought structural forces that compelled 
technological and institutional adjustments and took the form of 
reorganisation of well ownership and deepening o f commodity 
relations. 
O f the four studies cited above, two were based in north Gujarat, 
the area of the present study. While Bhatia's (1992) work was in the 
neighbouring Sabarkantha district (see Map 1.1), one of Dubash's 
(2002) study villages is quite close to the village I studied in Mehsana 
district Bhatia's study is a much-needed corrective o f the way 
groundwater markets were portrayed in north Gujarat and was 
published when the literature was flooded with glorification of what 
was is called the 'groundwater market boom'. However, Dubash's 
work was published exactly ten years after Bhatia's monograph and 
was based on fieldwork conducted during 1995-96. My study departs 
from Dubash's work in several important ways. First, he used political 
economy as one of the approaches to understand the 
institutionalisation of groundwater exchange and discussed ways to 
curtail the 'tubewell capitalism'. However, his narratives do not 
necessarily disapprove of the groundwater resource appropriation by 
large farmers and instead this is looked at as a farmer's ability to be an 
'entrepreneur' in exploiting groundwater resources. In fact, there is 
implicit praise for the commoditisation and commercialisation of 
agriculture, without looking into its interlinkages with increasing 
resource inequity and consequent social differentiation. Dubash did 
mention the unrestrained groundwater-based accumulation, which led 
to the 'centralisation of control over groundwater and towards 
centralisation of ownership of wells' (ibid: 119-120). However, this 
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process was regarded as a 'success story in the development of 
agricultural productivity' (ibid: 120) without explaining how this 
process influenced the labour process in villages with skewed access 
to productive resources. Second, Dubash used an 'intensive' approach 
as a research method but failed to capture the detailed everyday 
practice though which groundwater exchange institutions negotiate 
the distribution o f water, and the politics that revolve around such 
intercessions. Third, though he studied social differentiation arising 
out o f differential control over access to productive resources, his 
policy recommendations surrender to the local power structure that 
reproduces groundwater mining. Criticising the Model Bill to regulate 
groundwater use, Dubash suggested that 'allocation to individual well 
owners at sub-village level should be in the hands o f the village 
community' and that 'the water allocation is not entirely determined 
by relations of power in the village' (Ibid: 255). This notion 
undermines the fact that local water markets institutions are partly 
responsible for aquifer depletion. Powerful social groups have 
cornered and appropriated the resource while the people lowest in the 
social hierarchy have paid the price of water. Further, he advocated 
increasing electricity prices as 'electricity rationing has proved a 
powerful incentive to efficient water use' (ibid: 256). Without 
safeguarding the interest o f subaltern groups, the policy change will 
have an adverse impact on small and marginal farmers and water 
buyers, as the present study demonstrates. 
Finally, much has changed in Mehsana district after Dubash's 
fieldwork in 1995-96. The electricity pricing policy of the government 
has reduced the hours of electricity supplied to the farmers, and 
slowly the water markets have shrunk. In addition, the increased 
depth at which groundwater is accessed, is leading to declining 
tubewell yield and escalating groundwater prices. The shrinking water 
markets have pushed water buyers out of the market This is coupled 
with the retarded agricultural growth of Gujarat in recent years. Since 
agricultural growth largely depends upon available environmental 
resources and their prudent use, an environmental hazard such as 
depleting aquifers limits the growth of agricultural productivity. 
How is these situations tackled at the village level and what are the 
coping strategies of different social groups? What has been the 
response of the state and how do these responses change or 
contribute to the way groundwater is extracted, used and distributed? 
In the sections that follow, I try to locate these questions in the 
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theoretical arena through a triadic framework of theory o f agrarian 
institutions, ecological variables in agrarian change and the domain 
o f the state in influencing institutions, nature and society. 
Political Economy and the Theory of Agrarian Institutions 
History is concerned with the study o f events and processes that 
lead to change in society. According to Marx, to understand change 
one needs to understand the processes by which human beings in 
society maintain themselves in existence, that is, the material 
processes o f production and distribution of food, goods and 
services. In a capitalist society, according to Marx, the principal aim 
is to accumulate capital by producing goods and services and 
setting them at a price in excess of the amount o f labour invested 
in them. Therefore, the exchange value does not correspond to the 
use value and/or labour value. Hence surplus value is created, 
which the capitalists appropriate. According to Marx, this mode o f 
surplus accumulation is highly exploitative. Therefore, change can 
only come through changes in the way economic activities are 
organized and hence in changing the mode o f production and 
economic base o f the society. 1 7 The economic structure o f society 
consists of property relations, and it corresponds to the level o f 
development of the productive forces, which include all means o f 
production technology (Marx 1970). 1 8 'Changes in the forces o f 
production, particularly technological changes, over time produce 
some tension between the existing structure of property rights and 
the productive potential o f the economy. It is through class 
struggle that this tension is resolved in history, with the emergence 
o f new institutions' (Bardhan 1989: 4). 
Applying Marx's theory of political economy 1 9 to agrarian 
institutions includes Viewing agrarian conditions as historically 
determined and changing whole It takes into account production 
relations and their dynamic connection with the productive 
forces. 2 0 Ideally, this approach establishes the interconnectedness 
between agriculture and the rest o f the society' (Pandian 1990: 10-
11). Political economy also refers to investigations that take the 
social relations o f power, their forms, reproduction, transformation 
and effects, as subject matter (Bolding, Mollinga and van Straaten 
1995). The political economy framework gave rise to many theories 
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o f agrarian institutions as applied to Indian conditions. Most 
prominent among them is the widely discussed and criticized 
model o f Bhaduri (1973,1983 and 1983a). Bhaduri's model argued 
that the presence of a 'semi-feudal' power structure has been 
responsible for the non-responsiveness o f agriculture to innovation 
impulses. His model suggested that where a landlord also serves as 
creditor, he [she] may prefer to keep the tenants indebted rather 
than invest in productivity-enhancing measures, which could allow 
the tenant to break free o f the debt trap. The inherent conjecture is 
that the returns from capitalist agriculture will be lower than from 
usury and tenancy combined. This model has been primarily 
criticised on the inconsistent use of the notion o f power that the 
landlord exercises. 2 1 It is argued that if the landlord is powerful 
enough, he [she] would also be able to grab the surplus generated 
by capitalist intervention in land to increase its productivity. 2 2 Later, 
Bhaduri (1997) himself called the semi-feudalistic model rigid but 
made a further, interesting point According to him, 'although the 
model of semi-feudalism provided a precise illustration o f how 
production relations might exert a crippling influence on the 
productivity growth in land if landlords choose their rentier role, it 
misleadingly overplays an orthodox idea. Almost mechanically, it 
placed too rigid emphasis on the idea that debt-dependence as a 
part o f the production relations belongs to the super-structure and 
that this super-structure would be changed if the base o f 
productivity growth changed significantly.... New technology 
involving high-yielding varieties was introduced through larger 
advances o f working capital loans from the landlord. The tenant 
now became indebted to his [her] landlord for both consumption 
and production loans. Old production relations involving debt-
dependence at an even higher level and crop sharing continued, 
while land productivity increased due to the application o f new 
technology. The moral o f the story is important in traditional 
agriculture, the relation between production relations on one hand 
and labour productivity, yield levels and their growth on the other 
is not hierarchical in any causal sense. This is because the 
distribution of gains from increases in productivity can be 
manipulated by manipulating institutional arrangements to suit 
class efficiency.2 3 It is essential to understand more precisely in this 
context the pressures that operate on the class distribution of 
income, as considerations o f capturing productivity gains through 
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class efficiency mediate between changes in productivity and 
production relations' (Ibid: 125). Overall, Bhaduri's explanation 
reemphasises the fact that there is a functional relationship between 
class relationships and institutional forms. Further, it means that a 
particular institutional form may help the ruling class to consolidate 
its class position in order to maintain the present level o f surplus 
extraction and increase it in future. 
Rudra (1984) examined the influence o f local power in farm-
level decision making in a model o f a self-sustaining village society. 
This village society is composed o f people who have little or no 
means o f production and who live by exchanging their labour 
power against money in the capacity o f agricultural labour. The 
labour class is in majority. The other part is the minority o f 
property owners who derive income by appropriating a surplus out 
o f the use value produced by the labourers. The relationship 
between the labourer and the property owner is o f a patron-client 
type through an unequal dependence. This relationship is not 
confined to economic exchange as can be quantified, priced and 
contracted, but extends much beyond it, covering the entire social 
life o f the village community. This relationship, according to Rudra, 
does not allow the class o f labourers to develop into a class-in-itself 
and operates on the economic system by preventing labour markets 
from coming into existence. 
Applying the classical theories o f rent to the Indian condition, 
Patnaik (1983) looked at the Indian economy in the phase o f 
transition from pre-capitalist, transitional to capitalist mode o f 
production. Patnaik considers pre-capitalist rent 'that constitutes 
the entire surplus labour of the petty producer working with his 
own and family labour and owning means of production other than 
land; and it is extracted for the use o f land by a dominant class 
monopolizing property in land' (ibid.: 76-77). Further, she 
emphasises pre-capitalist relations as 'direct relations of domination 
and subordination between the ruling classes and the direct 
producers, unmediated through the market characterised by extra-
economic coercion' (Ibid.: 77). According to her, under petty 
commodity production, prices cover the outlay on materials, 
consumption of family and pre-capitalist rent whereas under 
capitalist production prices cover the outlay on materials, wages, 
average profit and capitalist rent Thus, pre-capitalist rent 
represents the surplus o f output value over production costs 
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including customary consumption of the petty producers, while 
capitalist rent represents the surplus o f output value over the price 
o f production including average profit 
H o w does this political economy framework help in 
understanding institutions evolving in groundwater-led economies 
such as north Gujarat for this study? First, it tries to locate the 
development o f capitalist relations in agriculture accentuating class 
relations, modes o f surplus extraction and consequent social 
differentiation. Second, it analyses the labour process in the petty 
commodity production and the emergence of new institutional 
forms that mediate the process. Third, it looks into class and social 
relations and places the manifestation and effects o f different 
forms o f 'power' at the centre stage of analysis. In sum, it tries to 
answer - how do local power structures impinge on the distribution 
o f irrigation water and consequently on the different institutional 
forms o f agricultural production systems? 
The Ecological Variable in Agrarian Change 
The neo-Marxist critique of environmentalism focused on the 
failure to recognise the social and historical nature o f resource, 
development and ecological problems. This analysis has helped in 
giving rise to a stream of thought called political ecology. Among 
the early political economists, Karl Marx came close to defining the 
dialectics between individuals, their productive activities and nature 
as the main theme. However, political ecology theorists critique 
Marx's dialectic that takes a narrow view on nature and its role in 
the production process. They insist on expanding the role o f nature 
to respond to the inclusion o f cultural and political activity within 
the analysis o f political economy (Greenberg and Park 1994). 
Political ecology thus, is concerned with the analysis o f local 
environmental issues in their larger macro contexts and within the 
framework of political economy. It stresses the openness, 
complexity and contradictory nature of environmental issues that 
encompass the interactive effects between nature and society at the 
levels o f individual, households, community, state and the world. It 
explores the nature of relations o f power and production and how 
access and control over resources or property rights are defined 
and contested (Mehta 1998). Modem environmentalists, according 
24 The Dark Zone 
to neo-Marxists, ignore the importance o f the mode o f production 
in conditioning our perception o f nature and society, and they 
therefore present environmental dilemmas in terms o f fixed and 
unchanging natural limits upon human action (Pepper 1984). 
Escobar (1999) argues for three regimes o f nature - organic, 
capitalist and techno. Organic nature is characterised by the 
inseparable aspect o f nature and society with an organic view. 
Capitalist nature links nature with capitalism and commodity 
forms, which produces an alienated view of the environment The 
vision is approached through the lens o f capitalist rationality and 
control over the means of production. The techno nature regime is 
one where modem technology mediates the natural environment 
and the drive for profit for the capitalist 
Jansen (1998) provided a perspective on agrarian change and 
environmental deterioration that is located in land use and in 
historically evolving political economic relations. H e talks about the 
concept of subsumption and social differentiation to understand 
environmental deterioration in the context o f social relations o f 
production. According to him, subsumption involves the processes 
o f labour and production that end up under the control of capital, 
which is harmful to the environment The producers thus involve 
themselves into exploitative relations with nature in order to make 
short-term profit to survive in the economy dictated by the market 
Social differentiation, according to him 'refers to the emergence o f 
several classes out o f a peasantry as different producer types 
develop with different relations to labour and capital' (ibid.: 11-22). 
Jansen regards producers as not simply the objects o f the laws of 
nature or social structures, but active subjects transforming social 
structures and nature. 
Paranjape and Joy (1995) distinguish the primary and secondary 
productivity o f an ecosystem from an ecological perspective. 
According to them, primary productivity is the productivity an 
ecosystem would have if all external inputs were withdrawn from i t 
The increase o f productivity achieved with the external inputs into 
the ecosystem is the secondary productivity of the area in relation 
to that particular level o f external input It is quite possible that the 
sum of primary and secondary productivity is rising while primary 
productivity is falling. The application of increasing levels o f 
external inputs to raise productivity soon leads to diminishing 
returns. Early warning signals o f a fall in primary productivity of 
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the ecosystem are scarcity o f drinking water, and increasing 
external inputs such as irrigation and fertilizers to maintain 
productivity. The green revolution in Gujarat has heavily relied on 
external inputs in agriculture, leading to high agricultural 
production. It has also posed environmental dilemmas such as 
depleting aquifers and declining primary productivity o f the 
ecosystem. 
T o sum up, groundwater depletion problems are related to the 
question of resource management and the coalition o f powerful 
property owners protecting their interests, under a capitalist 
society. The application of a theory o f political ecology for 
groundwater irrigation, thus explores the causes o f environmental 
degradation from the perspective of agrarian change. It seeks to 
establish a relation between groundwater depletion and social 
marginalisation o f people, showing the mechanisms through which 
powerful property owners are able to appropriate environmental 
resources for private gains in an economy dictated by the market 
Irrigation Development and the State 
Irrigation development in the post-colonial period o f many third-
world countries was triggered by the intervention o f national and 
international financial institutions. The state was seen as an agent 
for irrigation development This resulted in large-scale public 
irrigation systems to be managed by irrigation bureaucracies. 
However, from the 1970s and 1980s, the state came to be seen as a 
major obstacle to irrigation modernisation. This is chiefly because 
public irrigation under-performed and the state ran out o f finances 
to maintain the irrigation structures and was unable, in the Indian 
case, to increase payment by users for water. The huge investment 
that went into building irrigation infrastructure came under 
scrutiny, as the irrigation department was unable to maintain the 
system. As a result, the 'state vs. market' debate appeared, with 
neo-classical scholars advocating a market-led approach to 
irrigation water management A 'price response o f users to 
reallocate water' was called for the reallocation o f water. This 
reallocation would involve volumetric water pricing, introduction 
o f water markets, establishment o f financially autonomous 
irrigation agencies, irrigation management transfer and promotion 
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of self-governing systems (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994: 1617). 
This aspect strengthens the neoclassical perspective and rent-
seeking analysis of public irrigation systems developed by Repetto 
(1986). According to Repetto, an economic rent is the differences 
between the values o f additional water to the farmer and the 
amount the system charges. The rent seekers appropriate this 
difference by virtue o f their control over the system. The key actors 
in his analysis are: the staff o f the state irrigation agency aiming to 
appropriate the flow of funds for their personal gains; foreign aid 
agencies that have to spend their budgets and please powerful 
engineering consultancies and construction agencies within donor 
countries; and politicians who wish to share the supplementary 
income of irrigation engineers and wealthy farmers. These 
processes are considered as limiting factor for irrigation reform. 2 4 
Repetto's analysis has been heavily criticised for its market-friendly 
policy prescriptions o f volumetric water pricing 2 5 and for the fact 
that his analysis does not take the complexities o f irrigation systems 
into account, especially with regard to irrigation systems that are 
located in developing countries. His analysis creates a paradox 
wherein promotion of the market as an alternative relies heavily on 
the effective functioning o f non-market socio-political institutions 
(Moore 1989). Despite criticism, Repetto's analysis brings out the 
rent-seeking behaviour o f the institutions representing the state, 
and explains some of the interests o f the state in the development 
o f irrigation infrastructure.2 6 This explanation is rather unique, as 
earlier only the development agenda o f the state was put forward in 
the analysis of a state's interest in irrigation policy. 
In contrast to the above, political sociologists have questioned 
the agenda-setting presumptions and the legitimising myths o f 
state-directed development led by the 'rational and modem' elites 
representing die state (Bardhan 2003). They consider the state as a 
set o f administrative and coercive institutions headed by an 
executive authority that structures relationships not only between 
civil society and public authority but also within civil society itself. 
This definition is consistent with the Weberian position and helps 
to focus on those elements o f the state, which allows political 
actors to play a significant role in civil society. In contrast to 
Weber, in this view, control over coercion is not always expected to 
be complete, centralised or legitimate (Stepan 1978, Skocpol 1979, 
Kohli 1987 quoted in Ramamurthy 1995). In actual sense, it is a set 
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of relations between the 'state-as-actual-organisation' and the 
dominant-class 'ruling coalition', which is primarily constituted by 
the agrarian bourgeoisie or rich capitalist farmer class and the 
industrial bourgeoisie led by big capital. The state's capacity to 
realise democratic principles is impaired by the power o f the 
dominant classes. This also means that the boundary between the 
state and society is permeable or indistinct, and the state is porous 
because the dominant classes and their interests can permeate it 
(Fuller and Harris 2001). Exploring the processes o f exclusive and 
inclusive citizenship within the broader theme of the state, Kabeer 
(2002) highlighted the role o f various institutions including the 
market and civil society in determining which needs and priorities 
are given high status o f right The state can mirror and reproduce 
the social inequalities prevailing in a given context, which can occur 
through active cuscrimination or unconscious bias. T h e result is 
that those who are marginalised within the wider society are also 
least likely to gain access on equal terms to the rights, resources 
and protection associated with the status of citizenship' (ibid.: 21). 
The question o f state-society relationships and the way these 
work in operational ways is documented by various case studies. 
Jeffrey and Lerche (2001) explored the relationship between state 
power and class reproduction in western Uttar Pradesh, India 
focusing on the different relationships between low-caste rural 
workers, J a t capitalist farmers and the local state. They showed that 
the access to certain forms of state power was closely 
circumscribed by the ability o f capitalist farmers to mobilise 
material resources that reproduced class power. The case study 
provided evidence o f how the interaction between local public, 
state agents and the political structures at the state level reproduces 
class divisions in agrarian societies. Looking at the agrarian class 
relations in canal-irrigated village in north Bihar, Chakravarti (2001) 
concluded that the dominant class derives power from 
preponderant control over means o f production that is intertwined 
with social power derived from belonging to a dominant caste. The 
coercive power was inextricably connected with these two 
dimensions o f power. The inequality o f social power was 
reproduced within the dominant political institutions. The nexus 
between social power and the state power led to the former's 
inability to implement its own laws in favour o f the working class. 
Ramamurthy (1995) analysed the loco-centric relationship between 
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the state and local agrarian commvinities in canal-irrigated villages 
in south India. Her analysis showed that though the local 
collectives were able to badger state bureaucracy in mobilizing 
water, they could not and did not change the local power structure. 
In fact, the 'differential privileges related to pre-existing inequalities 
in the distribution o f resources were perpetuated through the local 
collective irrigation organisations' (ibid.: 283). 
From the perspective described above, how do I locate the 
emergence o f groundwater irrigation institutions? First, the law 
relating to the exploitation o f groundwater favours the landed class. 
Many tubewell cooperatives in Gujarat have been registered under 
the State Cooperative Societies Act and have been functioning 
under the legal system approved by the state. Village-level irrigation 
cooperatives in Sangpura are informal collectives o f people and 
have not been registered under any ac t As a result, in law they are 
non-existent other than in the status of an agreement between the 
members under the Contract Act (Shah and Bhattacharya 1993). 
Even under the Act, the role o f a cooperative is restricted to 
maintenance o f organisation and does not encompass the 
regulation of groundwater extraction. 2 7 Apart from this, many 
tubewells are functioning in a privatised regime, which is very 
difficult for the state to regulate. This leads to the second concern 
where the overexploitation of groundwater resources is also linked 
to liberal state policies o f flat-rate electricity charges and availability 
o f institutional finance. I agree with critics' argument here that the 
state refrains from stringent rules against over-exploitation of 
groundwater due to the lobbing of large farmers, who have a direct 
stake in agriculture and who form an important base of the political 
parties. These farmers can defy regulations and indulge in 
competitive deepening o f tubewells for actively participating in 
groundwater markets. This calls for reflection on the political 
nature o f decision-making on groundwater management (Moench 
2000). Third, the state influences local politics and politico-
economic institutions and in-turn, gets influenced by i t A 
particular social characteristic o f the state helps in consolidating the 
agenda o f politically dominant social groups and hence the state 
has interest in maintaining a particular type o f institutional 
arrangements. The control over various village-level institutions as 
different arms of the state by dominant social groups and 
groundwater exploitation could be viewed from this perspective. 
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Focus of Research 
This thesis focuses on the agrarian transformations taking place in 
groundwater dependent economies such as north Gujarat First, it 
seeks to understand how groundwater depletion and inequity have 
become intrinsically related elements o f this process. In addition, it 
investigates the factors that have shaped unrestrained use o f 
groundwater and the responses o f various social groups 
characterized by class and caste, to this process of social change. 
These factors range from the issues of access and control over 
productive resources such as land and groundwater, a local ecology 
that enabled groundwater development and institutions such as 
groundwater markets and sharecropping, which have mediated the 
change process. Together they present a new social differentiation 
between those who are able to escape the agrarian trap and the 
ones who are forced to bear the consequences. The present work, 
thus, examines the ability o f dominant classes to maintain control 
over groundwater in such a way that it allows transfer o f surpluses 
even in case o f water scarcity. 
Second, the overexploitation of groundwater and its social 
consequences are the result o f certain processes o f development in 
irrigated agriculture that occurring at the cost o f depletion o f 
aquifers and sustainable farming systems. The state intervened 
initially through agrarian reforms, and later by providing credit 
facilities and indirecdy supporting milk and tubewell cooperatives. 
It has also interceded in creating law for limiting groundwater 
overexploitation. However, the state also became ineffective in 
checking depletion o f groundwater resources largely due to the 
interest of a large farmers' lobby. The various institutions o f the 
state and their control provide impetus to an agrarian politics that 
tilts toward the interest o f dominant social groups. These 
mechanisms work right from the lowest panchayat and dairy 
cooperative level to the level o f the state, reflecting the overall 
political economy. On the ground, they help the dominant classes 
to consolidate their position and determine differential access to 
groundwater resources through various sources o f legitimacy and 
power. Thus, the process o f groundwater exploitation is viewed 
from the framework where agrarian institutions, ecological 
variables and domains o f state functioning interact and define the 
course o f social change. 
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Thus the central concerns of this research raises the question: 
What are the mechanisms that connect overexploitation o f 
groundwater and social differentiation, and how have the different 
institutions o f the state reacted and played a role in controlling 
agrarian institutions and ecological variables? 
The Methodological Design 
After doing a broad survey o f 17 villages in five districts o f north 
and south Gujarat, I decided to focus on Sangpura village for a 
detailed village-based study. Sangpura is situated in the heart of 
groundwater-mined Mehsana district in north Gujarat, a focus of 
India and Gujarat-centred debates over depleting groundwater. I 
stayed in the village from September 2001 to November 2002 and 
then visited on and off until March 2003 before I concentrated 
fully on writing. 
The study design largely follows the sodo-anthropological 
traditions of village-based case studies for deeper understanding of 
village society and changes around them (Dube 1958, Mayer 1958, 
Nair 1961, Beteille 1965, Djurfeldt and Lindberg 1975, Hardiman 
1987, Chakravarti 2001). Patron (1980), while discussing qualitative 
methodology in evaluation research, describes it as a tool to 
understand phenomena and a situation in totality with emphasis on 
the Svhole being greater than the sum of its parts'. The tools and 
techniques used were in-depth interviews, case studies and 
participant observation. In-depth interviews are a form of non-
directive, unstructured, non-standardised and open-ended 
interviewing. It means repeated face-to-face encounters with the 
interviewee, directed towards understanding their perspective on 
life, experiences or situations as expressed in their own words 
(Tylor and Bogdan 1984). A case study tries to illuminate a decision 
or a set o f decisions, and is a preferred strategy when the 
investigator has little control over events in a real-life context It 
involves deep and detailed study of individuals or families by 
exploring and analysing life as a social unit (Yin 1984). Participant 
observation typifies a society from 'inside' by participating in the 
way of life o f the social actor concerned, professing that the 
description of a social phenomenon should be more securely 
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grounded in the point of view of the actor rather than the 
researcher (Benson and Hughes 1983). 
The initial objective o f the study was to understand the process 
o f change in a groundwater-irrigated village situation. However, the 
interactions and observations at the village level started to point 
towards a larger process of transformation where agriculture was a 
prominent but not the only driver of change. The dairy cooperative 
started to take shape in the early 1960s, followed by the larger 
industrialisation of the state that contributed towards the process 
o f change. The green revolution changed the cropping pattern, 
which was tuned towards catering to the market through 
establishment o f an agricultural produce market yard in Mehsana 
town. The challenge o f the fieldwork was to capture this process o f 
transformation through the groundwater question. 
During the first few weeks, I spent time meeting key people 
including the village sarpanch, prominent individuals, the village 
talhati, chairpersons and officials o f the milk and credit 
cooperatives and leaders o f all the castes in the village. Sangpura 
was visited first through a friend who worked for an N G O in 
Mehsana and hailed from the village. His family provided the 
much-needed social base and helped me in getting acquainted to 
village life. Having been b o m and brought up in urban locations, 
this was the first time that I had actually stayed in any village. 
Initially, I was the centre of attention of the villagers, which was a 
difficult thing to cope with. On the other side, the village had never 
experienced a resident researcher before, which made the task o f 
introducing my intentions in being there more difficult However, 
in the first month, the problem was sorted out slowly as my stay 
prolonged and villagers accepted me as time went by. I utilised this 
time to make friends among youngsters, roaming around the village 
with them to understand the geography and settlement patterns, 
plucking guavas, drinking tea and watching the latest Hindi movies 
on my laptop with groups o f women, men and children. 
After these activities, I obtained a village map from the land 
record office in Mehsana and doing a base-line survey of all the 
tubewells in the village. The location o f tubewells was mapped with 
the help o f the village map. The exhaustive base-line survey o f the 
36 tubewells o f the village gave important insights into the social 
ownership of tubewells and the socio-economic inequality in access 
and control over the most productive resource of the village. The 
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outcome of the survey was not surprising, the dominant caste o f 
Patel monopolised a large part o f village resources, including land 
and water. Their decisive role in village-level institutions such as 
the panchayat, dairy and milk cooperative were evident After the 
initial base-line survey o f all tubewells, it became evident that social 
ownership of the tubewells was a prominent issue and hence 
needed to be enquired about in depth. I then decided to make 
tubewell operation a point o f entry to know the larger process o f 
transformation in the village and skewed resource endowments. I 
selected four tubewells that were primarily managed by people o f 
four castes — Patels, Prajapatis, Thakores and Parmars. The 
purpose was to see the point o f difference between the four 
tubewells with different social ownership. However, I was initially 
mistaken on many assumptions, as mixed caste groups shared 
many tubewells and my perception of caste identities did not match 
with local reality. What followed from this was my greater interest 
in an emergence o f class-based ownership and control o f tubewells, 
and that how this had close relationship with caste and historical 
control over the means o f production. Some boundaries o f caste 
are fading but that phenomenon is limited to the upper castes o f 
Patels and Prajapatis. Intermingling was not observed between the 
upper and lower castes. 
Collecting information was a Herculean task especially from 
Patels and some influential Prajapatis who were very secretive 
about their income from tubewells, dairy or otherwise. Interviewing 
families whose members had migrated to the USA was viewed with 
suspicion. The only answer to this was to stay in the village as long 
as possible, which helped in the end. Information used to come in 
bits and pieces, and the task o f maintaining detailed field notes with 
markings to add new information started to be a tough exercise as 
the research progressed. The family history sheet would prolong 
for months, as fresh information would chip in every time some 
new developments took place. Interviewing Thakores, Parmars and 
Vagharis was always easy as, in my view, they had nothing to lose 
from sharing the information. Initial problems occurred because I 
stayed in a Prajapati house and was moving around, initially, with 
them. However, as time passed, they also understood my interest 
from the kind o f questions I raised. U p to a point, it became rather 
political to discuss situations with lower caste communities 
especially on the domination in institutions such as the panchayat 
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and the dairy cooperative. Similarly, I had to be listening quietly 
(showing that I am non-opinionated) when Patels discussed these 
issues and I happened to be there. This was more so during the 
panchayat elections, when Patels wanted their candidate to win the 
sarpanch seat and the strategy for the same was being carved o u t 
These were the points o f discomfort that I had to overcome or 
minimise for the sake o f research. What came out of the process is 
presented now for the readers. 
Another, important turning point during the time of research 
was the communal strife that broke out in Gujarat at the end of 
February 2002. The violence and hatred experienced by the people 
was unprecedented in recent history. The society was sharply 
divided on the issue, leading to a feeling o f despair and 
helplessness. Sangpura was not visibly affected by the riots, as there 
were no Muslim households in the village. However, the communal 
strife had spread to some of the urban and rural locations in 
pockets o f Muslim-dominated areas of Mehsana district I used to 
travel by motorbike from Ahmedabad to Sangpura, using rural 
roads to avoid the busy highway, and could hear news about 
massacres in villages close to the route. I had to postpone the trips 
to the village for around two months due to the increasing 
incidence o f violence and mistrust The responses of the people in 
Sangpura towards the riots were divided between the upper and 
lower segments o f society. An analysis of the causes o f these riots 
acknowledges to the history, sociology and realpolitik of m o d e m 
Gujarat showing sharp contradictions in mtermingling identities o f 
caste, class and religion (Prakash 2002). Communal strife should 
also be seen in the context of capitalist development and 
globalisation taking place in recent years. This has introduced a 
yawning gap between aspirations and reality. Every riot brings extra 
hardship for the poor whose livelihoods are threatened and cannot 
ever be justified on any grounds. 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 sketches the distribution and causes of groundwater 
scarcity in different eco-regions o f Gujarat, which is grounded in 
local ecology. The causes of water scarcity are seen in the historical 
context o f agricultural development that relied heavily on 
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groundwater irrigation. The chapter looks into the various 
responses o f the state for the management o f groundwater. It also 
updates information on the famous Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) 
and its distribution networks, and shows how it will not address the 
problem of groundwater scarcity in north Gujarat as it covers only 
part o f the scarcity zones. 
Chapter 3 analyses the organization o f tubewell irrigation 
cooperatives as shareholders and water buyers. It shows how the 
pattern o f groundwater irrigation is embedded in prevalent social 
relations of production and where the class structure closely 
coincides with the caste structure. The small dominant minority 
controls the groundwater irrigation institutions and defines the 
manner in which groundwater is accessed and distributed in the 
village. This control, which stems from the differential access and 
control over groundwater resource for different classes, leads to a 
much sharper social differentiation. 
Chapter 4 maps the responses o f increasing irrigation costs due 
to decreasing supply of electricity and groundwater depletion. 
Through the entry point of four tubewells, this chapter provides 
the worm's eye view of the organisation o f tubewell cooperatives 
and their coping mechanisms in meddling with increasing 
groundwater prices. The cases provide information on the broader 
dynamics and strategies o f different social groups in confronting 
the declining trend of groundwater and rising input costs in 
agriculture. It shows how unsustainable resource use does not 
generate contestation in relation to declining groundwater but 
shapes and structures responses towards the progression o f water 
mining. 
Chapter 5 documents the rise in sharecropping contracts in the 
village and illustrates how this is a part o f its changing history, 
rooted in social and economic contingencies. It also looks at the 
aspects o f production relations where sharecropping becomes the 
preferred form of contract Powered by the new economic might 
generated through long distance migration, the dominant classes 
define the manner in which labour is appropriated. Through the 
description o f the basic features o f sharecropping in Sangpura such 
as historical evolution, coverage and types o f contracts, the chapter 
outlines the social relations o f production in sharecropping 
arrangements. It focuses on the rationale o f landlords and tenants 
for taking up sharecropping and shows how dominant classes 
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transfer the burden of resource depletion to people other than 
themselves. 
Chapter 6 closely examines the everyday village politics of 
Sangpura, which contributes to the social power generated at two 
levels, in the control over economic resources and by maintaining 
and reproducing the social and economic hierarchy. It also leads to 
increased tussle over groups o f people claiming control by gaining 
more power and room to manoeuvre. The chapter shows how the 
structure o f power and politics of the village is reflected in 
controlling institutions such as the panchayat, dairy and credit 
cooperatives by dominant groups, which in turn reproduces 
legitimacy and power for them. These institutions and their control 
provide impetus to an agrarian politics helping dominant classes to 
consolidate their power positions and define the course o f resource 
exploitation and agrarian change. 
Chapter 7 summarises the major arguments o f the thesis and 
revisits the key concepts. It opens up debate on the dynamics of 
agrarian change and the process of social differentiation in the 
context of groundwater exploitation. Departing from the popular 
theories that looked at institutions and groundwater markets, the 
study shows a triadic relationship where access to resources, crop 
production systems and social relations interact and define the 
course o f social change in groundwater dependent economies. It 
also looks into the feasibility of some of the solutions to the 
problem of groundwater depletion discussed by scholars and 
activists. 
Notes 
1 The names of individuals have been changed to protect their privacy. 
2 A pseudonym for the village in Mehsana District, Gujarat that I studied 
as part of the research. 
3 Calculated at the rate of US$1 = Rs 47.5 
4 The sharecropping arrangement varies in the village but the most 
popular form involves division of the net production in three equal parts 
for land, labour and water for irrigation. A detailed description of these 
arrangements is given in Chapter 5. 
5 All the neighbouring villages of Sangpura are relatively larger with 
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populations of around eight to ten thousand people. 
6 Iter Kaum literally means "other castes" and connotes the feeling of 
others being less in number than the one in majority. It is generally used 
by Patels who sees themselves as high in the socio-economic hierarchy 
and in number, though it is rather a 'perceived' notion as it is the Thakore 
who are in majority. 
7 I have not used the original caste name of Parmars (cobblers) as Chamar 
(meaning the caste that works with animal skin). The word Chamar was 
used as a caste title in the 1960s. It was subsequently changed to Parmar 
in Sangpura's land record. Similarly, the present day Prajapatis, the potter 
caste, used to have Kumbhar (literal meaning is potter) as their title in 
1960s, which was changed to Prajapatis only in early 1980s. Prajapati is a 
synonym of Lord Brahma, the creator of the wodd in Hindu mythology. 
The potters claim to be the descendants of Brahma as their traditional 
skill is also as creators (creating earthen pots) and hence they changed 
their name from Kumbhar to Prajapati. At present, in the village, calling 
some one a Kumbhar is used with humour to pull them down in casual 
conversations. While interviewing people from the Chamar community, 
the caste identity used was Harijan and Parmar interchangeably. In the 
recent literature dealing with subaltern groups, using the word Harijan has 
been largely refuted. Harijan (son of god) is a term given by Gandhi for 
untouchables that was rejected as an 'artificially imposed term given to 
untouchables by upper castes that could not genuinely integrate them 
within their social consciousness despite its divine association and hence 
lacks discursive capacit/ (Guru 1998: 16). Instead, the word Dalit 
(oppressed) is used, which 'derives its epistemic and political strengths 
from the material social experience of the community and it is the social 
construction of dalithood that makes it authentic and dynamic' (Ibid: 16). 
Dalithood thus is the 'kind of life conditions that characterise the 
exploitation, suppression and margjnalization of Dalits by the social, 
economic, cultural and political domination of the upper caste 
brahminical order' (Ambedkar 1990: 194-98; Quoted in Guru 1998: 16). 
However, in Sangpura, this consciousness of using the word Dalit instead 
of Chamar is not found, largely due to ignorance on the 'politics of 
naming'. This is unlike Kumbhars who have changed their name to 
Prajapatis and are conscious of someone using their caste name. In 
representing people, I have thus used the name Prajapati for Kumbhar 
and Parmar for Chamars. This is mainly because, at a personal level, I do 
not want to reproduce the hierarchy. At the same time, I also try to 
capture the level of consciousness of the caste groups in larger political 
processes. 
8 The present table does not in any sense describe the social hierarchy and 
only present castes in terms of their population. 
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9 Vagbari'xt a word combined with two independent words of Vagh (tiger) 
and Art (enemy). Vagharis were known as the enemy of tigers and were 
recognized as hunters. Traditionally Vagharis gather honey, herbal drugs 
and useful plants from forests and provide them to the society (Vyas 
1998: 299). The Vagharis of Sangpura are engaged in vegetable and fruit 
procurement and sale. 
10 Baivas of Sangpura originally came from Marwar district in Rajas than 
around seven generations back In the village, they write Goswami as their 
family name along with their name. Traditionally Bawas are priests in the 
Mahadev Temple and they used to take up agriculture in the land attached 
with the temples in the past. There was no fixed caste system for Bawas in 
the past, as according to them, anyone Vho leads a pure way of life' could 
become Bawa. This system has changed in the last 50 years, and now 
Bawas follow the system where someone is bom as Bawa. There are 10 
sub-castes among them who now belong to the category of Other 
Backward Castes (OBQ in Gujarat. (Source: Interview with Goswami 
Bechargiri Shambhugiri, Sangpura Village, June 6,2002) 
1 1 Hardiman (1998) puts forward the class/caste nexus in the distribution 
of rubewell water in Gujarat According to him V/ater controlling cartels 
do not require a formal union or constitution; they operate according to a 
precise local knowledge in which each family is too aware of its standing 
within the hierarchy, its corresponding entitlements, and the bounds 
beyond which they cannot step. In the past, dominant classes controlled 
subordinate groups within a village with an iron hand, often involving 
violence. Today their political control is challenged, with members of 
lower castes voting for politicians of their own community and attempting 
to assert themselves in whole number of different ways. Increasingly, 
therefore, dominant groups have to rely on their economic power both to 
control subaltern classes and prevent them from gaining any economic 
powers themselves. This is the real rationality of the system' (Ibid: 1541, 
emphasis added). 
1 2 For detailed criticism of Shah's work, see Palmer-Jones, 1994 and 
Dubash 2000,2002. 
1 3 Mollinga (1998) discusses commoditisation and the agrarian structure in 
a south Indian canal system. He observes that the introduction of 
irrigation has led to the emergence of a group of head end farmers in the 
command area who could establish and expand water-intensive and highly 
commoditised farming systems through access and appropriation of 
water. This has resulted in class-related geographical patterns of water and 
land distribution. Further, he sketches the nexus between the 
economically and politically sound farmers, politicians and irrigation 
department officials where acquisition of extra resources such as water 
has reproduced social and political capital biased towards a class of 
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farmers. The unequal distribution of water does not lead to 'visible' 
conflicts because of interlocked systems of credit and employment 
relations and poorly defined water rights. Mollinga describes the 
phenomenon as "unequal but relatively conflict-poor water distribution". 
This can be seen as less 'visible' conflict as it does not surface due to 
unequal economic and social positions manifested in power and hierarchy 
(Ibid: 89-121, 248). He considers these sodo-geographical dimensions of 
the differentiation of agrarian producers as a constraint for management 
reform. Similar findings are reported by Gorter (1989) who studied canal 
irrigation and agrarian transformation in south Gujarat, where a trend 
towards capitalist farming has been noticed. His analysis shows that due 
to the construction of a large-scale canal irrigation system, large farmers 
could transform into commercial farmers. This has led to a reappearance 
of tenancy relations, which are otherwise associated with feudal agrarian 
relations. As a result, the dividing lines between various agrarian classes 
have become more pronounced. 
1 4 Much of the detailed account of social processes in tubewell irrigation 
comes from Tamilnadu (Janakarajan 1992, 1994, 1997a, 1997b, 1999 
Meinzen-Dick 1989). In Gujarat, apart from Bhatia's (1992) monograph 
on groundwater irrigation in north Gujarat, there was no detailed account 
of groundwater led agrarian change when this study was conceptualised. 
Dubash's (2002) detailed case study of two groundwater dependent village 
was published soon after this study was initiated. 
1 5 Groundwater irrigation intensifies agricultural operation, reduces risk of 
crop failure and creates year round wage employment. These factors do 
influence the economy and benefits may trickle down to people living 
below poverty line. However, there is an increasing trend to find simple 
correlations between groundwater irrigation and poverty decline. Moench 
(2002) looks at the state-level data from India to indicate that groundwater 
extraction rates and poverty decline between 1956 and 1991 are closely 
correlated. Similar findings are cited by Narayanamoorthy (2001) who 
looks into the inverse relationship between the availability of groundwater 
irrigation and the percentage of rural poverty. Both the studies focus on 
states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal, which is 
marked by severe poverty and where the development of groundwater 
irrigation is very low. The policy prescription is to focus more on 
developing groundwater irrigation to reduce rural poverty. First, these 
studies undermine the other poverty related variables that are at work 
apart from the development of groundwater. The availability of 
groundwater is locality specific and its use, in most cases, is subject to the 
non-availability of surface water resources. Accessing groundwater is also 
dependent on access to land and capacities of individuals to invest in 
tubewells. Apart from this, the poverty-stricken states also have high 
rainfall leading to more availability of surface water resources and 
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increased soil moisture that is used for taking winter crops without 
external irrigation. Second, due to lack of any formal property right 
system in groundwater, there is a danger of overdevelopment of the 
resource if this policy prescription is followed. The Gujarat, Tarmlnadu, 
Andhra Pradesh and Kamataka conditions are a case in a point Studies 
conducted in Tamilnadu (Janakarajan 1997a) show that the 
overdevelopment of groundwater resources has led to increased 
environmental risk for the poor and marginalised who have become 
dependent upon rich farmers who have the ability to chase the water 
table. Models of developing groundwater at the expense of the 
environment and poor people's resource base thus needs more analysis. 
1 6 Meinzen-Dick considers groundwater exploitation as a process of 
privatisation of irrigation when she compares it with the more collectively 
owned and managed tank irrigation. For more elucidation, see Meinzen-
Dick (1989). 
1 7 I n the social production which [wojmen carry on they enter into 
definite relations that are indispensable to and independent of their will; 
these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of 
development of their material power of production. The sum total of 
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society 
- the real foundation on which rise the legal and political superstructures 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. At a 
certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in 
society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or -
what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property 
relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. 
From the development of the forces of production these relations turn 
into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the 
change in the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is 
more or less completely transformed' (Marx 1970: 20-21) 
1 8 Means of production include tools, machines, access to external inputs 
such as fertilizers, HYV seeds and irrigation and skuls of the labour force. 
Control of access to these elements can be as important a source of 
surplus labour as possession of the objects of labour themselves (Pearce 
1983). 
1 9 The meaning of the expression 'political economy" is not altogether 
unambiguous. To some it simply means economics. It is indeed the old 
name of the discipline, common in the nineteenth century, and now rather 
archaic. To others, political economy is economics seen in the perspective 
that is a great deal broader than is common in the mainstream of the 
modem traditions. In this view, the influences of political and social 
institutions and ideas are taken to be particularly important for economic 
analysis and must not be pushed to the background with some stylized 
assumptions of heroic simplicity. Political economy thus interpreted can 
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appear to be rather 'interdisaplinarr' as the disciplines are not standardly 
viewed' (Dreze, Sen and Hussain 1995:14) 
2 0 Productive forces include people with their production experience and 
skill, and instruments of production (such as tractors and pumpsets). 
These elements evolve through, and are part of, the labour process, 'a 
process in which both [wo]man and Nature participate, and in which 
[wo]man on his [her] own accord starts, regulates, and controls the 
material reactions between himself [herself] and Nature' (Marx 1978:173). 
2 1 For an elaborate debate, see Bardhan 1989, Chakravarty 1984 and 
Lindberg 1997. 
2 2 Bhaduri's model played an important role in theoretical framework of 
an empirical study (Athreya et aL 1990) carried out in two talukas of 
Chinglepet district of Tamilnadu in India. This study is about how 
production relations are influenced by agricultural change coming through 
the green revolution and other technological changes. It indicated that 
usury was frequent and both landlords and merchants extended credit to 
farmers. The study found 'other' contextual factors such as ecology, 
institutional credit, infrastructure development and price policies limiting 
the productivity of agriculture in addition to forced commerce and 
interlocked markets (Lindberg 1997:130-135). 
2 3 According to Bhaduri (1997), an institutional arrangement is class 
efficient if the more powerful class can maintain a higher income in its 
favour, despite the lower productive efficiency of the system. Productive 
efficiency may be violated deliberately if it helps in manipulating 
sufficiendy the distribution of income in favour of the more powerful 
class. 
2 4 Mollinga et al. (2000) discusses the source of irrigation reform on two 
counts. First, the reform comes from vertical and horizontal divisions of 
the complex government and administrative matrix in different 
combinations and alliances. The political leadership of the state and 
irrigation bureaucracy form this part of alliance. Second, external forces 
such as NGOs, donor and international organisations and people's 
associations, also guide these policies. Even though these policies are 
consolidated within the government, the state is not necessarily an 
initiator of policy transformation. This means that the state as a set of 
institutions has been and can be influenced by the larger policy 
environment, and the role of the state differs in, and depends upon, the 
wider socio-political situation. 
2 5 Repetto (1986) propounds that irrigation systems have to be redesigned 
and water markets should be installed wherein the water could be sold in 
bulk to groups of farmers. Irrigation should no longer be subsidised and 
farmers have to pay the full economic cost of water, reflecting the 
infrastructural and the managerial costs. In this way, rent seeking would 
cease to exist and so the problem of water distribution would be solved. 
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2 6 Similar observations are made by Korten (1987) on the role of the slate. 
First, the state may be a party to building irrigation infrastructure in the 
form of ownership or being co-manager in large irrigation works. In this 
capacity, the state is a direct stakeholder. Second, the state may influence 
the costs and benefits of resource exploitation and enhance the 
productivity value of the resource through developmental programs. 
Third, the state secures property rights, creates formal user organisations 
and preserves law and order. 
2 7 Personal communication, Vishwa Ballabh, IRMA, Anand, India in 
August 2003. 
2 
The Dark Zone 
Groundwater Irrigation and Water Scarcity in 
Gujarat 
40years ago, I fetched water throng the bucket using my own hands. Does any 
one see water now? 
- A 64 years old farmer in Sangpura, November 2002 
For more than a decade, Gujarat has been at the forefront o f 
debates concerning water scarcity1 and the level o f decline o f the 
groundwater table. This is rightly so, as water for drinking and 
irrigation is o f critical concern in today's Gujarat, particularly in 
areas where groundwater recharge is low and rainfall is scanty and 
erratic. The consecutive droughts o f 1999-2001 have aggravated 
the problem. This compels analysis of the systems o f water 
management in the state. 2 This chapter looks into the causes and 
distribution of water access and how it is grounded in the ecology 
and political economy of resource management in Gujarat. The 
chapter is divided in three sections. The first section sketches the 
water reserves o f different eco-regions o f Gujarat and shows 
how groundwater overexploitation is historically grounded in 
different region's ecology. The following section focuses on 
agricultural development in the pre - and post - independence era. 
It shows how the British colonial government promoted capitalist 
farming through a land revenue and taxation programme, which 
was followed by introduction of 'the green revolution' in the post-
independence era. These developments in agriculture relied heavily 
on groundwater irrigation. The last section deals with two specific 
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responses of the state and central government The first relates to 
the policies and regulations for checking groundwater exploitation 
while the second focuses on building a high dam on the river 
Narmada to deal with the problem of water scarcity. This section 
critically evaluates whether these responses could bring positive 
changes in the groundwater ecology of Gujarat 
Gujarat is the tenth most populated state o f India with an 
estimated population of 50.6 million in 2001. 3 It has an area o f 
195984 k m 2 and lies in the western semi-arid region o f India out o f 
which about 53860 k m 2 (27% of the total area) is drought prone. 
Gujarat is the fourth most urbanised state with 37.35 percent of its 
total population living in urban areas; ten percent higher than the 
national urbanisation rate o f 27.79 percent (Hirway 2000). 
According to the 2001 census, 69.97 per cent o f Gujarafs 
population is literate, as against 65.38 percent at the national level. 
97 percent of its villages are linked by concrete roads and have 
been electrified. Gujarat is one of the most industrialised states o f 
India with concentration in chemicals, fertilisers, textiles and dairy 
products (Wood 1997). 
T A B L E 2.1: SECTORAL GROWTH RATES IN GUJARAT 
Sector 1960-61 
1970-71 
1970-71 
1980-81 
1980-81 
1990-91 
1990-91 
1995-96 
1980-81 
1995-96 
Primary Sector 2.91 4.15 1.24 0.18 0.89 
(Agriculture) (2.27) (4.22) (1.10) (0.26) (0.82) 
Secondary Sector 3.62 5.64 7.85 9.45 8.38 
(Manufacturing) (3.04) (5.55) (8.73) (11.92) (9.78) 
Tertiary Sector 3.51 5.86 6.83 10.61 8.08 
Overall State 3.32 4.95 5.30 5.41 5.67 
Domestic Product 
(SDP) 
India Gross 3.17 3.66 5.42 5.07 5.44 
Domestic Product 
Some: Hirway (2000) 
The Gujarat economy has grown faster than the Indian 
economy. This development was balanced between the primary, 
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secondary and tertiary sectors during the 1960s and 1970s but since 
1980, it is oriented towards the secondary and tertiary sector (see 
Table 2.1). Agricultural growth has shown a sharp decline from 
2.27 per cent in 1960-70 to 0.26 per cent in 1990-96/» The annual 
growth rate in agriculture fell to one per cent while the secondary 
and tertiary sector showed a big jump to around seven per cent 
during the 1980s. During the 1990s, the annual compound growth 
rate in agriculture remained at less than one per cent while 
secondary and tertiary sectors rose to 9.45 and 10.61 per cent 
respectively (Hirway 2000). Further, the share o f agriculture in the 
Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) dwindled from 19.9 per 
cent in 1993-94 to 13.6 per cent in 2002-03 while the secondary 
sector showed an increase from 35.8 to 37.2 per cent during these 
years. The tertiary sector showed the highest jump from 38.8 per 
cent in 1993-94 to 45.6 per cent in 2002-03 ( G O G 2004). Does this 
worry planners in Gujarat? Many say that in an industrialising 
economy a move away from primary to secondary and tertiary 
sector is predicted. However, the declining trend is problematic as 
agriculture employs more than half o f Gujarat's population. In 
2001 , 52 per cent of the total workforce o f Gujarat came from this 
sector and hence any decline in its growth directly affects half o f 
the state's workforce. 5 The causes o f decline in agricultural growth 
are many and complex. One of the important factors is the ever-
stressful water situation of the state that is rooted in its agro-
ecology and political economy of agricultural development, 
together with socio-economic factors. A s a prologue to an 
exploration o f the intricacies of the problem, I examine them one 
by one. 
The Agro-Ecology of Gujarat 
Within its 190000 k m 2 o f geographic area Gujarat has a uniquely 
diverse bio-climate ranging from dry desert areas to high altitude 
rain forests. According to the National Bureau of Soil Survey and 
Plarining, Gujarat can be broadly divided into eight major 
ecoregions based on variability in rainfall, potential and actual 
évapotranspiration and other ecological factors (Map 2.1). The 
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regions are marked by both erratic and uneven rainfall and periods 
o f heavy rain. Gujarat receives only one rainfall period from the 
south-west monsoon between June-July and September-October 
that ranges from 1000-2000 millimetres in the southern rocky 
highland to 250-400 millimetres in Kutch. The distribution of 
rainfall determines the water regime of the state. Around 70 per 
cent o f Gujarat's total geographic area falls in the arid or semi-arid 
region and is drought-prone (Table 2.2). Surface water is generally 
concentrated in the southern and central parts o f the state. The 
northern alluvial plain lacks a perennial source o f surface water but 
is rich in groundwater sources. However, the recharge zones o f this 
groundwater reserve fall in neighbouring Rajas than state and the 
Arawali forest ranges on the border of Gujarat and Rajasthan. 
MAP 2.1: ARID-ZONES O F GUJARAT 
Jo»w.-GEC(2000) 
T A B L E 2.2: ECO-REGIONS O F GUJARAT 
Eco-region name Area 
percentagi 
in Aridity index 
'. in percentage 
Rainfall in 
millimetre 
Water Regime 'Ecosystems 
Natural Ecosystem Agro-ecosystem 
Northern rocky 12 30-40 700-1000 Unconfined Dry deciduous forest Rabfed 
highland Semiarid 
Southern rocky 7 10-15 Sub- 1000-2000 Unconfined Moist deciduous forest Rainfed 
highland humid 
Northern Alluvial 14 20-40 450-700 Unconfined & Scrub forest water-land Rainfed, irrigated 
Plane Semiarid Confined 
Central Alluvial 8 20-30 Sub- 500-800 Unconfined & Nil Rainfed, irrigated 
Plane humid Confined 
Rann and 13 40 Arid 250-450 Saline waste Rann, wet\dry grassland -
Banni of 
Kutch 
Peninsula of 8 40 Arid 250-450 Unconfined and Scrub forest wasteland Rainfed 
Kutch Semi-confined 
Peninsula of 24 20-40 400-600 Unconfined and Scrub forest wasteland Rainfed 
Saurashtra Semiarid Semi-confined 
Coastal Zones of 14 10-40 Arid to 250-200 Unconfined Littoral and swamp Rainfed, 
Gujarat Humid forests, wetlands, irrigated, 
estuaries horticulture 
Source: Compiled from Patel (1997) 
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Most o f Gujarat's groundwater resources are concentrated in 
unconsolidated formations covering 40 per cent of the area o f the 
state. Around 70 per cent o f this potential is in the alluvial plains. 
More than 70 per cent o f the State's water need is met through 
groundwater (Patel 1997). 
For the purpose of the present analysis, the agro-ecological 
zones of Gujarat can be broadly divided into four regions: water-
abundant south Gujarat; the central alluvial plain or middle 
Gujarat; the semi-arid northern alluvial plain or north Gujarat and 
peninsular Gujarat including Saurashtra and Kutch (see Map 2.1). 
These regions are also characterised by diverse agro-ecologies 
ranging from the forested southern hills to the fertile soil o f 
northern plains in Mehsana district, the area o f the present 
research. The climate becomes semi-arid proceeding towards the 
northwest. Peninsular Gujarat consists o f two sub-regions-
Saurashtra and Kutch. Most of Saurashtra is characterised by a 
semi-arid region with hard rock geology. Kutch is the most arid 
part o f Gujarat (Wood 1997). 
The combination of climate, physiography and geology in 
different regions of the state provide different conditions for water 
resources. The north Gujarat alluvial area has low rainfall but good 
topographic conditions for recharge and high-yielding aquifers, 
making it a groundwater rich region.6 The southern hilly and 
forested areas provide perfect locations for creating surface storage 
dam reservoirs. The arid areas of Kutch have confined aquifers and 
the coastal areas o f Saurashtra are capable o f storing the rainfall 
shed from the upland rocky terrain (Hirway 2000). 
T o summarise, each eco-region has specific water resources 
available in different forms. However, in recent years, Gujarat is 
facing severe water crisis in almost all regions, but especially in 
north Gujarat, Saurashtra and Kutch. Central and southern regions 
are less affected due to the extensive canal network that feeds the 
central region, while the southern region is naturally rich in water 
resources. In the next section I illustrate the water situation in 
Gujarat showing the nature and extent of problem areas. 
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Water Scarcity in Gujarat 
Because of grossly mismanaged water resources, Gujarat has been 
racing a water crisis for more than a decade. Due to surface water 
being concentrated in the southern areas, Gujarat's water needs are 
largely met through groundwater resources. Around 80 per cent o f 
Gujarat's irrigated agriculture is dependent on groundwater, apart 
from several other needs such as industrial and domestic water 
requirements. As a result, groundwater resources have shown 
increasing signs of over-development Groundwater mining has 
resulted in areas increasingly falling into the 'overexploited' categories 
(see Map 2.2). Recent figures released by the government, show that 
while in 1984 about 162 talukas7 (88 per cent) were under the Swhite' 
category, in 1997 this fell to 95 (about 51 per cent). The number of 
overexploited sub-districts has increased from just one in 1984 to 31 
in 1997. 8 
M A P 2.2: GROUNDWATER M I N I N G IN GUJARAT 
Source:GEC(2000) 
TABLE 2.3: TALUKAWISE LEVEL OF GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT 
District Number of tahhas in each category 
1984 1991 1997 
W G D OE S w G D OE s w G D OE J" 
Ahmedabad 6 - - - - 2 - 4 - 2 - 2 3 -
Amreli 7 2 1 - 9 1 - 9 - - 1 -
Banaskantha 11 - - - - 5 2 1 } - 1 1 2 4 3 
Baroda 12 - - 11 - 1 - 10 1 - 1 -
Bhavnagar 12 - - - 12 - . - 10 2 - - -
Bharuch 11 - - - 9 1 - 6 2 3 -
Valsad 8 - - - - 8 - - 7 1 - -
Dangs 1 - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - - -
Gandhinagar 1 - - - - - / - - - - - 1 -
Jamnagar 9 1 - - - 8 2 - - - 7 3 - -
Junagadh 9 4 2 - - 8 4 2 - 3 8 2 2 -
Kheda 10 - - - - 6 1 2 i - 4 4 2 -
Kutch 9 - - - - 2 4 1 2 - 2 3 4 -
Panchmahals 11 - - - - 8 i - 10 1 -
Rajkot 8 4 - 1 - 10 2 - - 5 7 - 1 
Sabarkantha 10 - - - - 5 i 1 1 - 1 6 2 1 -
Surat 13 - - - - 13 • - - - 13 - - -
Surendranagar 8 - - - 1 4 4 - - 4 4 - 1 
Mehsana 6 2 3 - - - - 1 10 - - - 9 2 
Gujarat 162 13 6 1 1 121 26 10 24 2 95 43 8 31 7 
Source: Hirway (2000:3113) [W = White; G = Grey, D = Dark; O E = Overexploited; S = Saline] 
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TABLE 2.4: IRRIGATION POTENTIAL CREATED AND UTILISED, JUNE 2003 
Item Ultimate 
Irrigation 
Potential 
Irrigation 
potential 
created up 
to June 
2003 
Maximum 
utilisation 
up to June 
2003 
In million bectai •es 
Surface water 
Major and medium 
scheme 
Sardor Sarovar "Project 
(ifttfoinivio rn w-t/MrfiiiP 
3.94 
1.80 
1.71 
1.41 
1.48 
1.29 
ycni/taiHJiv bvfuttft(/t*vit 
use) 
Minor irrigation 
Groundwater 
1.79 
0.35 
2.55 
0.03 
0.27 
2.04 
0.03 
0.16 
2.03 
Total 6.49 3.74 3.51 
Source: G O G 2004 
Salinity ingress into the groundwater is another problem caused by 
excessive withdrawal of groundwater, especially in areas close to the 
seashore or in marshy land such as Kutch. The number of talukas 
affected by salinity ingress has increased from one in 1984 to seven in 
1997 (Table 2.3). In 1997, only 52 per cent of the talukas in Gujarat 
had groundwater that is considered potable. 
An important question is which forces have led to the present 
situation. The answer is complex and lies in the larger political 
economy of the state. The earlier land use and livelihood patterns 
were determined by the availability o f fresh water, i.e. a supply -
determined pattern of land use and agriculture-based livelihoods. 
This pattern changed due to technological innovations such as 
pumpsets and external input agriculture that increased pressure on 
natural resources like water. The increase in water demand has led 
to changes in the configuration o f water utilisation in three spheres 
- technological, institutional and distributional; each o f which has 
had significant effects on the nature and dynamics o f the resource 
and thus for its users (Prabhakar et aL 1997). 
The figures presented in Table 2.3 show that groundwater use 
reached a threshold. An estimate o f the potential o f irrigation and 
utilisation shows that in June 2003 the ultimate irrigation potential 
through surface water was 3.94 million hectares (MHa). This 
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included 1.79 MHa to be irrigated through the Sardar Sarovar 
Project However, the surface water potential created up to June 
2003 was only 1.71 MHa of which 1.48 M H a are already utilised. 
The irrigation potential through groundwater was assessed at 2.55 
MHa, out o f which a potential o f 2.04 MHa was created up to June 
2003 and almost all o f this was utilized (see Table 2.4). Altogether, 
the total irrigation potential created up to June 2003 is estimated to 
be 57.6 per cent o f the ultimate irrigation potential and maximum 
utilisation comes to 94.1 per cent of the irrigation potential created 
and 54.2 per cent of ultimate irrigation potential ( G O G 2004). 
Much of the problem of groundwater exploitation lies with the 
way water resources have been managed in the state in the past 
four decades, and the development o f agriculture. The lion's share 
o f total groundwater use in the state is siphoned off by agriculture. 
The development of agriculture in Gujarat has been shaped by its 
response to the green revolution technologies in the early 1970s. In 
the initial stages diesel pump sets met irrigation water demand but 
had limited capacity to cope with declining groundwater levels. 
Rural electrification boosted investment in electric tubewells that 
gave greater capacity to use high-powered motors to draw water 
from deep aquifers. Groundwater is considered by farmers as an 
extremely cheap and efficient alternative to surface irrigation 
networks that were non-dependable. The current overexploitation 
o f groundwater in Gujarat is closely related to this reliance (Bhatia 
1992). The increasing dependence on groundwater shows in 
considerable rise in well numbers since the 1960s, with overdraft 
and saline intrusion problems becoming major issues in some 
locations. Consequently, water tables started dropping alarmingly. 
Depletion o f static groundwater reserves became a well-known 
problem in many areas o f Gujarat, including Mehsana district 
(Moench 1991). Due to the stressed groundwater situation 
agriculture suffered because the cost o f irrigation increased 
manifold. Simultaneously the quality of land and water also 
decreased with increased salinity, which has adversely affected the 
productivity o f agriculture. In the next section I examine these 
trends for Gujarat 
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Agricultural Development and Groundwater Irrigation in Gujarat 
Agricultural development in Gujarat can be broadly divided in 
three distinct phases — pre-independence (prior to 1947), pre-green 
revolution (1947-65) and green (1965-1980) and post-green 
revolution (1980-till date). In order to understand the changes o f 
agriculture in Gujarat, I outline its phase-wise characteristics to see 
how agriculture has historically been dependent on the use of 
groundwater. 
The pre-independence phase 
Pre-independence agricultural development and revenue 
administration in Gujarat is excellently documented by Patel (1969) 
and Hardiman (1998). This section therefore draws heavily on the 
analysis of these scholars. In the British regime, the Gujarat region 
formed part o f the Bombay Presidency and covered the five 
districts o f Ahmedabad, Khaira, Panchamahals, Broach and Surat 
These districts were interspersed with 148 Princely States and 
estates like Baroda, Bansda, Dharampur, Lunawada, Deogadh 
Baria, Jambuaghoda, Limbdi, Idar, Palanpur and others that were 
under the jurisdiction o f the Western India States Agency. The 
whole o f Gujarat did not come under British rule at one stroke. 
The territorial connections commenced in commerce and date 
back to the 17 t h century with Surat, then with Broach, Ahmedabad 
and Khaira and lasdy with Panchamahals. The first territorial 
footing o f the British was in 1759 when they captured Surat 
followed by Broach, Ahmedabad and Khaira in 1772, 1817 and 
1838 respectively. Panchamahals was the last district o f Gujarat to 
come under British rule in 1877 (Patel 1969: 15-18). T o r revenue 
administration, the Bombay Presidency followed the Ryotwari 
system unlike the Zamindari system introduced in the Permanent 
Settlement in Bengal in 1793. The land revenue in the Zamindari 
system was fixed in perpetuity at 1 0 / 1 1 * of the agricultural income 
and 1 / 1 1 * o f the rent was given to the Zamindars. The British 
thought that this system would create a loyal force that would help 
them in consolidating the empire. However, they found that the 
revenue flow was not up to their expectations. Zamindars under-
reported the actual cultivated land and hence siphoned off a share 
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o f agricultural revenue. This led to the introduction o f the Ryotwari 
system in Madras Presidency that was based on the full survey and 
assessment o f the cultivable land. This system gave better revenue 
and hence was replicated in Bombay Presidency in 1851' (ibid.: 20). 
However, when the British took over Gujarat, irrigation was on 
the decline. This decline appeared to have been due to continuing 
warfare in the region with the British, the Peshwas, the Gaikwads 
and other Maratha aristocrats vying for ascendancy that caused the 
traditional forms o f irrigation such as wells and tanks to decay. The 
British did not value the excellent irrigation system built by 
previous rulers (Hardiman 1998). T o r example, the large reservoir 
near Ahmedabad, the K a m a Sagar - which had existed since the 
time of Solankis - was fed from a dam on the river Rupen. This 
was washed away in the monsoon of 1814. The British, who took 
control of Ahmedabad in 1817, never made any efforts to 
reconstruct this dam and the reservoir ceased to exist* (Hardiman 
1998: 1538). The Irrigation Commission o f 1901-03, appointed to 
look into the problems o f irrigation recommended irrigated 
projects connected with the Sabarmati, the Mahi, the Narmada and 
the Tapi. The Visvesvaraya Committee appointed in December, 
1937 observed that 'there is a keen demand in Gujarat for large 
storage works that would ensure perennial irrigation, but 
considering the meteorological conditions and the existing high 
intensity o f cropping without irrigation in this region, it is a matter 
o f doubt whether the increase in the value o f crops raised and the 
revenue expected would justify the outlay' (Report o f Irrigation 
Inquiry Committee, quoted in Patel 1969: 12-13). The suggestions 
o f the irrigation inquiry committee were dropped or postponed on 
the ground of financial exigencies. In the absence o f a network o f 
irrigation works, the cultivators mainly relied on the monsoon and 
wells for irrigating the crops. Wells accounted for over 78 per cent 
o f the total irrigated area in 1930 as against only ten per cent 
irrigated through canals. This was because o f British policies that 
promoted well irrigation through tax exemption. Tn many parts o f 
Ahmedabad district, for example, when a new well was built to a 
depth o f 200 haath (about eight meters) or more, the land thus 
irrigated was exempted from tax on rabi (spring) and unado 
(summer) crops for either a specified period of between two and 
eight years or for as long as it took to repay the cost of 
construction. The general rule was that the deeper the well the 
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longer the exemption' (Hardiman 1998: 1539). The tax-relief 
policies thus gave an impetus to well irrigation. They largely 
benefited the wealthier communities. 
The Indian Easement Acts o f 1882 passed by the British 
provided the right to appropriate water beneath the land o f the 
landowner. This change in the property rights system created 
incentives for exploiting a common resource (Bhatia 1992: 64). As 
a result, individual well construction gained momentum followed 
by development o f water markets in areas dominated by agriculture 
in the early 1 9 * century. The political position o f the elites in the 
village was strengthened through the exchange o f water in a 
sharecropping system that appropriated one third o f the produce 
for supplying water. Further, it gave rise to economic individualism 
and capitalist development in agriculture. The British also 
encouraged the production of non-food crops such as cotton to 
provide raw material to the textile mills in Manchester. T h e 
landowners, who were also the village elite, used a variety o f oral 
tenancy contracts and shifted the risks of cultivation to the lower 
classes. Kanbis, who were elevated to the status o f Patidars, were 
the main beneficiary of the changed land tenure system and 
encroached the land o f Kolis and Adivasis in the northern part o f 
the region (Shah and Rutten 2002: 27). 
The pre-green revolution phase 
After independence in 1947, Gujarat came under the jurisdiction of 
the Western India States Agency, and the princely States and 
estates were merged with the existing five districts o f Gujarat in 
1948-49. In 1956, the reorganisation o f States merged the State o f 
Saurashtra and Kutch in the bigger bilingual State o f Bombay. In 
1960, Bombay State was bifurcated into Gujarat and Maharashtra. 
Tenancy legislation was implemented in 1951 with the objective 
to increase the income of cultivators by increasing their 
landholdings. Compared to other states in India, the Tenancy Act 
was effectively implemented in Gujarat, especially in abolishing the 
Zamindari system in Saurashtra and other regions. However, the 
affluent class mainly took advantage o f the act and hence it did not 
change the basic social structure o f the village society. The land 
reform accelerated the process of commercialisation and economic 
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development especially in central and south Gujarat (Shah and 
Rutten 2002). Another development was reform in the land 
revenue system. The Taxation Enquiry Commission (1953-54) set 
up by the government to look into the land revenue system, 
recommended that the land taxation should be reduced. The report 
mentioned that Gujarat had been heavily assessed in the past as a 
part of the former Bombay State on account o f the fertility o f soil 
and the revenue legacy o f the Maratha period. Accepting the 
recommendations of the commission, the Bombay Government 
amended the Land Revenue Code by the Amendment Act X X V I I 
o f 1956 and made 1 / 1 6 * o f the average yield o f the crops, the basis 
o f normal and standard assessment o f the land. By this time, 
agricultural production was rising due to early adoption o f new 
technologies in agriculture. The burden o f land revenue on the 
cultivators decreased as the income for cultivators increased due to 
higher yields in agriculture. The benefit of this situation largely 
went to large landholders who raised commercial crops with a large 
marketable surplus (Patel 1969: 468-492). The process created a 
class o f farmers within village society who had already tested new 
technologies and were ready to adopt the green revolution 
technology that was becoming available 
During this phase irrigation was limited to the Rabi season. The 
Kharif (monsoon) season crop was mainly rainfed. Irrigation was 
used for Rabi crops such as cotton, tobacco and groundnut, which 
are non-food crops. The area under non-food crops such as cotton, 
tobacco, groundnut and sugarcane increased considerably from 
1949-50 to 1963-64. This coincided with steady decrease in cereals 
and other food grains (see Table 2.5). The figures thus show that 
Gujarat slowly moved towards a cash crop economy that was 
largely irrigated through wells. 
TABLE 2.5: AREA UNDER PRINCIPLE CROPS (IN MILLION HA) 9 
Gmp_ 1949-50 1963-64 
Cotton 
Tobacco* 
Groundnut 
Sugarcane 
Total cereals 
Total food grains 
Total oilseeds 
0.82 
0.05 
0.47 
0.01 
4.82 
5.33 
0.75 
1.69 
0.08 
1.85 
0.02 
3.90 
4.44 
2.04 
Source: Patel (1969:12) 
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In 1961 around 68 per cent of Gujarat's population was directiy 
dependent on agriculture for its livelihood. According to the 
census, the total population o f Gujarat was over 20 million and of 
the total workers, cultivators constituted 53.3 per cent while 
agricultural labourers constituted 14.8 per cent This dependence 
on agriculture led the government to invest in irrigated agriculture 
to increase its productivity and create employment opportunities. 
Under the first five-year plan, several medium and minor irrigation 
projects were initiated in Gujarat but surface irrigation was 
insignificant in the early 1960s. 1 0 In 1961 about 52 per cent o f 
Gujarat's total geographic area was under cultivation but the net 
irrigated area as a percentage of net sown area was only 7.8 per 
cent. O f this a large part was contributed by well irrigation rather 
than surface irrigation through canals or tanks. In 1961-62, around 
83 per cent o f irrigation was carried out through wells and only 9.5 
per cent through canal networks. By investment in the public 
irrigation system, canal irrigation increased up to 13.4 per cent in 
1965-66 but the dependence on wells and tubewells remained 
almost the same, although the area irrigated through them 
increased (see Table 2.6). 
TABLE 2.6: AREA IRRIGATED BY SOURCE (IN KM2) 
Source 1960-61 1965-66 
Area % Area % 
Government canals 652 9.5 1393 13.4 
(including Panchayat 
canals) 
Private Canals 6 0.1 11 0.1 
Wells (including tubewells) 5677 83.1 8625 82.8 
Tanks 128 1.9 296 2.8 
Other Sources 366 5.4 87 0.8 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Gujarat State 1985-86 quoted in Bhatia (1992:23a) 
However, the nature o f well irrigation started to change during 
this phase. While earlier water was extracted manually with draught 
power, the technology o f energised pumps started to enter into the 
village economy. The dectrification o f villages played a role in 
boosting investment in pump sets. The number o f dectrified pump 
sets was 5400 in 1960-61. It rose to 15240 at the end o f 1966, 
which is a 182 per cent increase over the preceding five years 
(Bhatia 1992: 21-23). Tubewell technology coindded with the 
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development o f external input agriculture and created an 
environment for a groundwater-based green revolution to stand on 
a firm footing. 
Green and post-green revolution 
The green and post-green revolution phases can be located in the 
years 1965-1980 and 1980 onwards respectively. During the green 
revolution phase, agriculture contributed to the state economy in 
more than one way. In 1970-71, the primary sector (including 
agriculture) contributed around 49 per cent to the net state 
domestic product (NSDP). The output in the state doubled during 
this period compared to that recorded in the 1960s. In 1981-83, 
crop output recorded an unprecedented growth rate o f 3.6 per 
cent, compared to the 2.2 per cent of the previous decades. The 
trends in agriculture over three decades starting from 1960 show 
that the green revolution influenced the cropping pattern to move 
towards cash crop production. Data released by the Directorate o f 
Agriculture of Gujarat shows that, from 1963 to 1993, the area 
under cereals declined from 42.5 per cent to 29.8 per cent The area 
under coarse cereals declined by nearly 1.11 million hectares. The 
area under food grains remained stagnant at 50 per cent o f the 
gross cropped area during 1963-83 but declined dramatically to 30-
eight per cent during 1983-93. Other crops such as mustard, 
sugarcane and cotton replaced food grains (Mathur and Kashyap 
2000). 
The change in cropping pattern affected the irrigation scenario 
in the state. Since almost all the non-food cash crops need 
irrigation, the area under irrigation increased over the years. Recent 
figures show that the percentage of net irrigated area to the net 
sown area increased from 20.91 in 1981 to 30.5 in 1996-97. In the 
1980 to 1992 period, the percentage grew from 20.9 to 27.4 
(around seven per cent) but this growth slowed down in later years. 
By 1996-97, the irrigated area had increased only three per cent as 
compared to 1991-92 (see Table 2.7). The overall area under 
irrigation grew during the green and post green revolution period 
but it was extremely dependent on the use o f groundwater 
resources. Irrigation through wells and tubewells accounts for 79.3 
per cent o f all the sources combined in 1980-81. This had slightly 
TABLE 2.7: AREA IRRIGATED BY SOURCE (IN '00 HECTARES) 
Source Year 
1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1991-92 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 
Government 3668 3586 4731 5570 5301 5930 5735 6125 
Canals 
WeUs\Tubewells 15884 16532 19301 20565 19709 23656 22665 23863 
Tanks 409 253 314 256 307 353 417 292 
Other sources 65 24 30 34 88 82 105 138 
Total Net 20026 20395 24376 26425 25405 30021 28922 30418 
Irrigated Area 
Gross Irrigated 23344 23812 29105 32269 30869 36548 34994 36424 
Area 
Percentage of 21.7 22.8 27.8 29.2 28.8 32.5 31.8 3Z9 
Gross Irrigated 
area to Gross 
Cropped Area 
Percentage of Net 20.9 21.7 26.2 27.4 26.9 31.2 29.2 31.5 
Irrigated Area to 
Net Area Sown 
Source: Directorate of Agriculture, Gujarat State 
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reduced to 78.4 per cent in 1996-97. The dependence on 
government canals increased from 18.3 percent in 1980-81 to 20.1 
per cent in 1996-97. In 1998-99, this percentage further increased 
to 31.9, which is around eight per cent below than the national 
average ( G O G 2003). 
In order to meet the growing need for irrigation numerous 
private tubewells were installed. The government also responded to 
this increasing demand. During the severe drought o f 1965-67, a 
centrally sponsored scheme was introduced for groundwater 
development in nine states. 1 1 The Gujarat Water Resource 
Development Corporation (GWRDQ was established in 1975 as a 
state-owned company responsible for establishing and managing 
irrigation tubewells with resource support from the State 
government Between 1975 and 1994, the G W R D C set up 2,800 
public tubewells (Shah et al. 1995: 159-60). The primary objective 
o f the public tube well programme was to increase the area under 
irrigation by utilizing the groundwater. T o an extent it created 
irrigation access for the farming communities. However, it was a 
bureaucratically managed, subsidy-based programme. It did not 
sustain itself over a long period. G W R D C generated enormous 
losses and its tubewells became defunct due to lack o f repair and 
maintenance on the part o f the bureaucracy. The government 
decided to transfer the management responsibilities of the public 
tubewells to the farmers' organisations. 1 2 It had two stated 
objectives for turning over public tubewells — to reduce the 
financial burden on the state and to improve utilisation of the 
wells. Many of these tubewells were transferred to farmers' 
cooperatives. Simultaneous with the government's response of 
increasing irrigation access through groundwater, many water 
companies 1 3 and farmers groups emerged to install deep tubewells 
for sharing and selling surplus water to other farmers. Shah et al. 
(1995) compared the economic performance o f the public 
tubewells turned over to farmers' cooperatives and water 
companies, and showed that an average company earned twice the 
gross income of an average cooperative run by the government 
These assessments created a policy environment where private 
water vending was advocated in groundwater potential areas. 
Institutional finance was made available for people or groups who 
wanted to sink tubewells to access groundwater for irrigation. In 
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many areas o f north Gujarat, private water markets emerged to 
access and sell surplus groundwater. 
With the economic resources to invest in tubewells and/or 
social networks to access institutional finance, the village elite 
mosdy dominated the water markets. The flat-rate electricity and its 
uninterrupted supply also gave impetus to this growth. As a result, 
small and marginal farmers became dependent on water vendors 
for irrigation. Within a policy environment with subsidised 
electricity, the number o f tubewells increased considerably. As a 
result, the water table started dropping alarmingly. Today, around 
50 per cent o f Gujarat's aquifer falls in the overexploited category. 
In sum, agricultural development in Gujarat has historically 
relied on the use o f groundwater. Irrigation was on the decline 
when the British took over Gujarat due to continuous warfare 
among earlier rulers in the area. The excellent surface irrigation 
systems built by early rulers were ignored and instead well irrigation 
was promoted through tax relief policies, which largely benefited 
wealthy farmers. The British also introduced commercial 
agriculture to provide raw materials for the industrial revolution in 
England. In addition, the change in property right over land 
created incentives for private appropriation o f groundwater 
resources. In the post-independence era the agrarian economy 
slowly moved from non-food crops towards cash crops that 
needed irrigation. The surface irrigation systems were unable to 
cover a large area and hence the changed cropping pattern relied 
heavily on well irrigation. The green and post-green revolution era 
experienced technological advancement with the introduction of 
mechanised tubewells. By this time food grain production replaced 
cash crops that were irrigated through wells and deep tubewells. 
However, use o f wells and tubewells also created water markets 
where resourceful farmers engaged in selling water to those who 
did not have resources to own a tubewelL This process also led to 
increased groundwater use and consequent depletion o f aquifers in 
many locations. In the next section I discuss the various responses 
o f the government towards solving the problem of water scarcity in 
Gujarat, and their effectiveness. 
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The State's Response 
The response o f the state towards growing water scarcity can be 
categorised in two ways: 1) to increase the supply o f water by new 
external sources and 2) to curtail demand through various policy 
measures. The policy response includes the enforcement of 
groundwater law, establishment of central and state authorities, and 
controlling institutional finance, and change in electricity tariffs for 
checking overexploitation o f groundwater resources. In this 
section, I discuss these policy responses and evaluate their 
effectiveness in solving the issue of water scarcity in Gujarat 
Loopholes in the groundwater law 
The constitution o f India treats "water" as a state subject and the 
Union comes in only in the cases of inter-state river waters. List II 
o f the Seventh Schedule dealing with subjects on which states have 
jurisdiction says "water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and 
canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water power 
subjects to the provisions o f Entry 56 o f List F'. The Entry 56 of 
List I (union list) reads "Regulation and development of inter-state 
rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulations and 
development under the control o f Union, is declared by the 
Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest" ( G O I 
1999:200). 
Within the constitution o f the State, various laws and policies 
govern the right to water. In the case o f groundwater, the most 
important law is the Easements Act o f 1882 implemented by the 
British government. The act refers to the right to every owner of 
land abutting a natural stream, lake or pond to use and consume its 
water for domestic and irrigation purposes. It gives the right to 
every owner of the land to dispose of all water under the land 
within his (her) own limits. However, this right is always subjected 
to the overriding power of the State to regulate the resource (ibid.: 
211). The consequence o f this legal framework is that only 
landowners can own groundwater. Landless individuals and tribals 
(who may have group or community rights over land but not 
private ownership) are excluded. The legal framework also implies 
that rich landlords can be water-lords and indulge in selling as 
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much water as they wish (Singh 1995). This law also led to a defacto 
right at the field level where affluent farmers with high pumping 
capacity and deeper tubewells have disproportionate claims over 
the resource. This iniquitous right over groundwater coupled with 
the lack o f capacity o f the state to regulate groundwater use 
resulted in excessive withdrawals in many areas. 
In 1970, the Government o f India introduced the Groundwater 
Model Bill. This was a legislation-based approach to control the use 
o f groundwater. Since water is a state subject, the bill brought by 
the central government was to be endorsed by the States and until 
now, very few State governments have enacted i t In 1992, a 
revised version o f the bill was introduced but enacted in very few 
States. Gujarat, where the groundwater depletion problem was 
clearly visible, succeeded in implementing it but only applied it to a 
limited number o f districts, which are considered overexploited. 1 4 
Even in these districts, the act was never implemented in full spirit 
due to a powerful farmers' lobby opposing any such regulatory 
measures. 1 5 
Establishment o f the ground water authority 
In 1996, the Supreme Court (SC) o f India, responding to public 
interest litigation (PIL) against the overexploitation o f groundwater 
resources, directed the Ministry o f Environment and Forests to 
constitute the Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) as an 
Authority and exercise power under section 5 o f the Environment 
(Protection) Act, 1986 for regulating the overexploitation o f 
groundwater resources. Further, the S C also directed the 
establishment o f State Ground Water Authorities to act at the state 
level and provided it with authoritative powers to check 
overexploitation of groundwater resources. However, the 
jurisdiction o f the Central Ground Water Authority (CGWA) and 
state authorities over protecting groundwater resource is intensely 
disputed. The case of the Gandhinagar district notification 
illustrates this. While making standard observations in Gandhinagar 
district, the scientists of C G W B came across a deeply located good 
aquifer. They sent a report to the C G W A recommending for its 
protection. Based on the report the C G W A notified Gandhinagar 
taluka as a protected reserve for groundwater and a directive was 
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issued with instructions for not drilling any tubewells below 200 
meters. 1 6 The issue raised controversy over the powers o f the state 
and the central authority. Since water is a state subject and 
environment is a central subject under the Indian Constitution, the 
central authorities notified the district under the environmental 
protection law. They argued that the exploitation o f the 
groundwater aquifer was environmentally unsustainable and hence 
should be curbed. However, the notification spoke only about not 
constructing new wells, and was silent on present wells being 
drilled deeper to exploit the aquifer. The notification did not work, 
as numerous wells were developed which CGWA could not check 
this due to lack o f resources and infrastructure to monitor them. 1 7 
The issue remains unresolved at the time of writing this book. 
Further, the C G W B drafted 'Environment Protection Rules for 
Development and Protection o f Ground Water' that included legal 
and institutional aspects. It was circulated to all the states for their 
comments before notification. 'However, the circulation and 
enactment o f such bills and rules raises the spectre o f a vast 
bureaucratic machinery administering use o f groundwater through 
licensing and supervision. Presently, the owner o f the land has 
absolute freedom in accessing groundwater. However, many 
abstain from trading this freedom with bureaucratically 
aclministered licensing regimes and therefore no state has shown 
any inclination to adopt the proposal' ( G O I 1999: 213). All these 
attempts led to the need o f coordination between the state and 
central authorities. The S C guidelines also directed states to 
establish state level organisation along the lines o f the State 
Pollution Control Board. In 2003 the Gujarat government 
constituted the Gujarat Water Resources Council (GWRC), an apex 
decision-making body on water related issues. The expected 
function of the council is to finalise a uniform tariff for water 
supplies from irrigation dams including the Narmada project to 
agriculture, industries and for drinking to big towns and cities. The 
council will also look into the haphazard exploitation o f 
groundwater and is expected to make important suggestions to 
amend the existing groundwater act. It is also anticipated that the 
council will form legislation to curb the increased pumping of fast 
depleting groundwater, mainly in north Gujarat region. 1 8 However, 
the effectiveness o f the recently formed council is yet to be known. 
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Institutional finance and electricity pricing 
Some of the indirect approaches to manage groundwater resources 
came in through limiting institutional credit for well development, 
controlling new electricity connections and electricity pricing 
mechanisms. The institutional finance for well construction was cut 
off in areas which had been notified as dark zones by the central 
groundwater board. The state electricity board denied new 
electricity connections to these areas. TSFrither credit limitations nor 
restrictions on electricity connection have proven particularly 
effective in limiting the growth of groundwater extraction. 
Farmers, particularly wealthy ones, can often tap private sources of 
capital for well construction. These approaches had little impact 
and have proven impossible to implement because well-off farmers 
are generally able to bypass regulations and obtain credit or access 
to electricity connections' (Moench undated: 10). A well-developed 
market for electricity connections is reported which uses one clause 
o f the electricity act where electricity connection can be transferred 
from one village to another within the same district (also see 
chapter 4). Further, the government also tried to curtail the hours 
o f electricity supply for agriculture to the farmers and increased the 
electricity tariff. Many attempts were made to convert the present 
flat-rate o f electricity into a pro-rata tariffs but it has been effective. 
The electricity charges have also been raised but every time the 
political leadership was compelled to backtrack on the decision 
taken by government departments such as the Gujarat Electricity 
Board (GEB) . At present, there is a tussle between the government 
and farmers' bodies over the electricity price. In the year 2003 the 
price was hiked by the electricity board, which resulted in farmers 
refusing to pay. Strong agitations by various farmers' groups have 
been reported, followed by some form of negotiation. However, at 
the time of completing this study an amicable solution o f the issue 
acceptable to both farmers and government had not come a b o u t 1 9 
As far as the cut back in the institutional finance, the rich farmers 
have never been dependent on the state for the investment Other 
sources o f finance based on social networks and private credit 
cooperatives can fill this gap. 
It is evident that the state responded to the scarcity situation 
through formal legal attempts and regulatory mechanisms. 
According to the law, the government classifies 'dark— 
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overexploited' zones by notification; there are specific Emits to 
tubewell construction. These notifications do not work, as 
numerous new tubewells are dug every day. The reasons for the 
non-implementation o f the regulations are many. Foremost among 
them is the Patel farmers' lobby. Patels are one o f the largest 
resource-rich caste groups in north Gujarat They constitute the 
strongest political influence in state politics. The use of their 
political influence has ensured that the regulatory aspects o f 
legislation are not implemented on the ground. Till now, the people 
have witnessed only indirect forms o f regulation through decrease 
in electricity supply and cuts in institutional finance for drilling 
tubewells. The electricity pricing mechanisms also did not work out 
for similar political reasons. In order to address the problem of 
water scarcity, the government initiated many programmes in the 
early 1990s. Among these are transfer o f government-owned 
tubewells to farmers' cooperatives, initiating participatory irrigation 
management for efficient utilisation of canal water, and 
undertaking watershed management at a large scale. Among other 
programmes, watershed management has shown initial success in 
Gujarat with significant increase in agricultural yield, which can be 
attributed to a substantial increase in the water table (Shah 2000). 
In the year 2004, the Gujarat government announced the ambitious 
'Sujalam Sufalam Yojna', which aims at finding a permanent 
solution to water problems particularly in drought-prone areas, 
while also doubling farmers' income and improving the rural 
economy. The scheme would usher what is called the second green 
revolution in the state. The project plans to build *khet talawadis' 
(farm ponds), check dams and tor ibunds ' (small dams made up o f 
sand-filled gunny bags) to store rain water. 2 0 
However, most important and controversial among them is the 
building o f a high dam on river Narmada. In the next section, I 
discuss this issue, which has the potential to alter the groundwater 
situation in some locations o f Gujarat I also analyse the impact of 
the new water 2 1 corning from the dam on the groundwater ecology 
o f Gujarat 
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The Sardar Sarovar Dam on River Narmada 
The Narmada River originates from the Maikal ranges at 
Amarkantak, 1057 meters above sea level, now in Shahdol district 
o f Madhya Pradesh (MP) in central India. In its 1312 km long 
journey before joining the Arabian Sea, the Narmada flows through 
the states o f Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat Nearly 
ninety per cent of the river flows in MP, and the rest in Gujarat 
The Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is part o f the bigger Narmada 
Valley Development Plan (NVDP) that envisaged building o f 30 
big dams, 135 medium dams and 3000 small dams along the river 
Narmada and its tributaries. Ever since its conception, SSP has 
been under controversy over its costs and potential benefits. 
Numerous organizations and individuals including the Narmada 
Bachao Andolan (NBA) led movements against the construction o f 
the dam. 2 2 The history of the SSP and associated controversies are 
well-documented (Morse and Berger 1992, Fisher 1995, Mehta 
2001) . 2 3 Hence, I focus only on updating the information from the 
perspective o f changing groundwater ecology due to SSP in 
Gujarat 
SSP's impact on water availability in Gujarat 
The Narmada canal make its journey up to the Rajasthan border 
traverses regions with diverse agro-climatic and soil characteristics 
and crosses numerous streams and major rivers. The major areas 
benefited should be central and north Gujarat, Saurashtra and 
Kutch (see Map 2.3). Apart from bringing irrigation, the canal 
network is expected to alter the groundwater ecology in the canal 
command areas. The farmers o f theses areas are hoping for year-
round irrigation based on surface flow from the canal. They expect 
the groundwater level to go up, which would also combat salinity 
ingress (Wood 1997). 
However, the data provided by the government are treated with 
a lot o f suspicion by activists and scholars (Ram 1993, Roy 1999, 
Kothari 1999 and Black 2001). Questions are raised on the extent 
o f irrigation possible under the Narmada command and the cost 
involved in bringing water from a far-off region to water-starved 
areas o f Gujarat It is claimed that when the original water flow in 
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In the SSP command areas, the cost at which water will be 
provided to water-starved areas is also questioned. SSP has taken 
away a whopping 80 per cent of the total irrigation budget o f the 
Gujarat government in the past ten years. In the 2000-2001 annual 
the river was calculated in 1979, there was not enough historical 
rainfall and river flow data to produce accurate figures. Official 
estimates have historically underestimated the affected area and 
people and grossly overestimated the benefits of dams (Roy 1999). 
The amount o f water actually available for use at the dam site at 75 
per cent dependability is only 22.69 M A F (Million Acre Feet) and 
not 27.22 M A F as stated by the government Even with the official 
estimate, the SSP is likely to irrigate only 44-52 per cent o f the 1.8 
M H a proposed as the amount of water available for irrigation is 
substantially less than what was planned. Furthermore, the 
efficiency of the canal system assumed by the government seems 
unrealistic. The efficiency is likely to be closer to 45 per cent rather 
than the 60 per cent claimed. Therefore, it will further reduce water 
available for irrigation (Ram 1993). 
MAP 2.3: THE CANAL NETWORK AND COMMAND AREAS OF S S P 
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plan, the SSP was allocated $811 million - half the state's entire 
budget The expenditure is morally legitimised on the ground of 
the persistent water scarcity in districts o f Saurashtra, Kutch and 
north Gujarat Experts say that water cannot enter the canal by 
gravity until the dam height reaches 110 meters. Therefore, a 
decision was taken to pump water into the canal from the Sardar 
Sarovar reservoir (Black 2001). Many believe that the cost o f 
pumping water into the canal is too high and unaffordable. For 
example, in October 2002, the water from Narmada was pumped 
into the dry bed of the Sabarmati River. The people o f Ahmedabad 
experienced the river flowing bank-to-bank after many years. The 
water was not directly used for dr inking but to recharge the French 
wells that are used to supplement the drinking water supply from 
Raska weir. However, later the Gujarat government slapped Rs. 
1020 million onto Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) as a 
charge towards the water flowing in the River Sabarmati at the rate 
o f Rs . 6.40 for every 10000 litres. As a result, the A M C was forced 
to increase taxes by nearly Rs. 3.3 million in its interim budget for 
the year 2003-2004. However, the interim budget was rejected by 
the standing committee o f the A M C under pressure from people 
and civil society institutions. 2 4 The example shows that the cost o f 
bringing water into canals will be high. Only time will tell how 
people are going to react to the increased cost of irrigation. 
Even at the cost decided by the government, the fact is that 
Narmada water will reach only two per cent o f the drought prone 
areas in Kutch, 22 per cent in Saurashtra and 17 per cent in north 
Gujarat There are other areas such as Sabarkantha, Banaskantha, 
part o f Mehsana and many villages o f Saurashtra that need 
irrigation but are not under the command area o f SSP (see Map 
2 . 3 ) . 2 5 In Rabi 2002, water was released in the Narmada canals for 
irrigating 80000 hectare in Narmada, Bharuch and Vadodara 
districts where canal infrastructure up to minor level was fully or 
partially ready. While the full reservoir capacity is likely to be 
created once the dam height is raised to 135 meters by 2003, it will 
take 10-15 years before the canal network gets constructed to cover 
the entire command area o f the project (Shah 2003). Even in the 
command area of SSP, water availability is expected to go down 
with time due to various environmental changes. Narmada, 
therefore, should not be mistaken for a panacea for solving the 
groundwater depletion o f Gujarat 
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Concluding Remarks 
This chapter shows how scarcity is historically grounded in the 
unique ecological situation o f Gujarat The ecology ranges from 
rocky highlands to marshy wet lands and alluvial plains to coastal 
zones. The physical situation has resulted in uneven distribution o f 
land, vegetation, surface and groundwater resources. The historical 
analysis showed that the British promoted commercial agriculture 
in the pre-independence era responding to the industrial revolution 
in England. This also resulted in early introduction of H V Y seeds, 
and Gujarat moved from non-food to cash crop irrigated 
agriculture in the post-independence era. However, the shift in land 
use pattern, which was earlier determined by the availability of 
surface water, slowly changed due to the introduction o f green 
revolution technology based on external inputs. In order to meet 
the demand, numerous wells and tubewells came up, mining the 
deep aquifers in many locations. The government policy of 
subsidizing electricity for the farming community promoted 
extensive groundwater markets. The market flourished in some of 
the alluvial zones suitable for tapping deep aquifers. 
The response o f the government to check groundwater 
exploitation was in terms o f certain policies for increasing supply 
and curtailing demand of water. These policies include direct and 
indirect forms of regulation. The direct form of regulation was the 
adoption o f the groundwater model bill and creation of authorities 
to check exploitation. Evidence shows that the regulation-based 
response had little effect and is difficult to implement in spirit due 
to political compulsions. The indirect forms o f regulation include 
controlling institutional finance and electricity prices, which has 
worked to some extent It has been inequitable in its effect on 
access to groundwater for the poor and marginalised. Altogether, 
governmental policies have been detrimental to the limited water 
resources of the state, allowing exploitation o f surface and 
groundwater resources for private gains, making the pattern largely 
unequal and unsustainable. As a part o f solutions to the problem, 
the government proposed to build a high dam in the River 
Narmada. An examination of the water available through the SSP 
shows limited effect on the groundwater ecology of north Gujarat 
in specific and Mehsana district in particular. The distribution 
networks o f SSP covers only part of the scarcity zones and, 
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therefore, should not be seen as a panacea for solving the crisis o f 
scarcity for large parts o f Gujarat Lastiy, planners and experts also 
question the cost at which this water will become available from 
SSP. 
Notes 
1 In defining what water scarcity is, I agree to the term used by Mehta 
(2003). She defines scarcity against the popular absolute and monolithic 
terms obscuring the complex nature of scarcity and links it with 
ecological, socio-politicaL temporal and anthropogenic dimensions. 
According to her, water scarcity is created and reproduced both at 
discursive and biophysical levels. The 'manufacture' of scarcity at the 
discursive level obscures some important aspects of 'real' scarcity. One, 
inequalities often shape access to and control over water. Two, water 
scarcity occurs largely due to anthropogenic interventions resulting from 
deficiencies in managing water and land use practices. The naturalisation 
of scarcity at the discursive level does not help mitigate the symptoms and 
causes of real scarcity. In addition, scarcity is also a revenue based criteria 
in most states, related to level of failure of crop yields. 
2 During 1999-2000, the government declared 8666 villages (from a total 
of 18637 villages) scarcity-hit'in the wake of monsoon failure. Total scarcity 
was declared in 6675 villages while 1991 villages had semi-scarcity 
conditions and 7467 villages faced severe shortage of drinking water. 
According to the government, the deficient monsoon during the year led 
to a decline of 29-31 per cent of crop production in Saurashtra, Kutch 
and North Gujarat districts. The estimated figures of production showed 
a decline of 45 percent in pead millet, 83 percent in sorghum, 72 percent 
in groundnut and 41 percent in moong. The total crop loss was estimated at 
Rs. 45.89 million (GOG 2000). The problem continued in 2002 when 13 
out of 25 districts received less than normal rainfall. In total, 5144 villages 
in these districts were declared scarcity/semi-scarcity hit. The production loss 
for the Kharif season was estimated to be 23 percent amounting to Rs. 
18.74 million while in the Rabi season, the loss was of the order of Rs. 
9.69 million (GOG 2003). 
3 According to the provisional results of the Population Census 2001 at 
0.00 hours on March 1, 2001. This figure includes the estimated (and not 
actual) figures of earthquake-affected areas of Gujarat where the census 
could not be held along with other areas (Census of India 2003). 
4 The sector 'Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing' registered a negative 
growth rate of 2.35 percent during 1998-99 compared to 1997-98. The 
sectors that registered significant growth during the same period were -
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Mining and Quarrying (13.08 % ) , Communications (18.64%), Banking and 
Insurance (13.88%) and Public Administration (24.89%) (GOG 2000). 
5 During 1961, agriculture in Gujarat engaged 64 per cent of the total 
workforce, which reduced to 50-six per cent in 1991. This indicates that 
the state is reducing its dependence on agriculture for income and 
employment generation and hence is going through structural 
transformation. This transformation is a result of a 'textile first strategy' 
vis-a-vis 'machine first strategy' apart from inducing agriculture and 
industry linkages. This strategy resulted in a decline of the share of cereals 
and food grains and a rise in non-food grain crops in total production 
(Mathur and Kashyap 2000) 
6 A local saying claims that 'north Gujarat has three Narmadas beneath its 
land'. This means to suggest that north Gujarat can store (or has stored) 
three times the water available in the River Narmada. 
7 According to the 1991 census, there were 19 districts and 184 sub-
districts in Gujarat. However, in the year 1998 the districts of Gujarat 
were reorganized and new districts were carved out of older districts for 
administrative purposes. Navasari, Bharuch, Anand, Patan, Porbandar and 
Narmada are the six new districts, increasing the total number of districts 
to 25 in 2001. The number of sub-districts increased from 184 to 226 
(Census of India 2003). 
8 According to the Central Groundwater Board, Government of India, 
overexploited sub-districts are areas in which the level of groundwater 
abstraction is more than 100 per cent of average annual recharge. Dark 
blocks are areas in which the level of groundwater extraction is between 
85 and 100 per cent of annual groundwater recharge. Similarly, grey 
blocks are areas that have between 65 and 85 per cent of groundwater 
extraction. White blocks are areas having less than 65 per cent of 
groundwater extraction. 
9 This figure excluding Kutch and Saurashtra regions as data was not 
available. 
1 0 The classification of irrigation projects in India is on the basis of extent 
(size) of cultivable command area (CCA) serviced by an irrigation work. A 
project with a CCA of more than 10, 000 hectare is called a Major 
Irrigation Scheme. One with a CCA of more than 2000 hectare but less 
than 10000 hectare is called Medium Irrigation project/scheme. One with 
a CCA up to 2000 hectare and less is called a Minor Irrigation Scheme 
(Navalawala 1997). 
1 1 In order to support the scheme, geo-hydrological units were set up in 
eight states. The programme was further facilitated by the rapid 
electrification of the rural areas and the increased availability of 
institutional finance. The estimated Fourth Plan outlay of Rs. 13.53 
million on groundwater schemes (Rs. 2.53 million from the public sector 
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plus Rs. 6.50 million from financial institutions, plus Rs. 4.50 million from 
the cultivators themselves) was expected to lead to a net increase in the 
irrigation potential of 4 mfllion hectares (Planning Commission 1974:1) 
1 2 I n recent years when the government has begun to restrict subsidies, 
the GWRDC has accumulated a loss of over Rs. 700 million. Most of the 
corporation's problems are those of any public-sector bureaucracy. It has 
acquired a permanent staff of 6400 imposing a staggering wage bill of Rs. 
220 million per year; as a result, its overheads were 3 1 % of its total 
operating cost in 1993. Compared to this, the annual gross income of all 
its tubewells is a mere Rs. 60 million which can barely meet a fourth of 
the salary bill, leave alone the costs inclusive of capital' (Shah et al 1995: 
160). 
1 3 These are private companies engaged in water vending. In most cases, 
the investment comes from individuals who are not engaged in agriculture 
and sell water for profit. Irrigation cooperatives are mainly farmers' 
organisations, which invest in tubewells to access water for their land and 
sell surplus water to non-share owners of the cooperative. 
1 4 'After some prodding from the central government, the Bombay 
Irrigation Act (governing Gujarat) was amended in 1976 to regulate new 
deep tubewells and the use of water in the existing tubewells. As a result 
of a series of legislative delays, the amendment only entered into force in 
1988 and currently applies to nine districts' (Dubash 2002:70). 
1 5 Moench (undated) discusses the implementation of the groundwater 
model bill. According to him 'implementation of regulations under the 
Gujarat legislation has proved difficult. Political opposition have blocked 
all attempts in areas where the act has formally been brought into force. 
How regulations limiting groundwater extraction could actually be 
enforced even if the political will were present is open to question. With 
wells in private hands and a firmly entrenched tradition equating 
groundwater use rights with ownership of the overlying lands, centralised 
enforcement would require development of a major and highly intrusive 
organisation^ibid.: 11). 
1 6 Interview with Mr. A.K. Sinha, Director, CGWB, Mr. Raghav Rao and 
Mr. P.K. Parchure, Scientists CGWB on February 25, 2003. Additional 
information was downloaded from the official website of the Central 
Groundwater Board, West Central Region, Ahmedabad at 
www.wcrcgwb.com/ achievements.htm. 
1 7 Compiled from various newspaper articles, Times of India, Ahmedabad 
edition. 
1 8 Based on newspaper article State Government sets up Water Resources 
Council', Times of India, Ahmedabad Edition, February 21,2003. 
1 9 Based on the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission's (GERQ 
award dated October 10, 2000, the Gujarat Government hiked the tariff 
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of electricity used in agriculture from June 2003. There are an estimated 
600,000 farm connections in the state wherein farmers pay for electricity 
according to the contracted load of their motors. The increased rates for 
electricity motors of less than 7.5 hp capacity was from Rs 350 per year to 
over Rs. 1050. For motors with more than 7.5 hp capacity, the increase 
was Rs. 1260 from Rs. 500 per year. NGOs and activist groups believe 
that the government acted under pressure from the Asian Development 
Bank to do away with the subsidies in the farm sector, following which it 
was decided to cut the subsidy to the Gujarat Electricity Board worth Rs. 
11.56 billion. Around 50-seven per cent of these subsidies are shouldered 
by the agriculture sector. The Gujarat government spends Rs. 17 billion 
every year as subsidies to farmers. However, soon after the declaration of 
this tariff hike strong agitations sparked off from farmers' organisations. 
They stopped paying electricity bills and in some cases did not allow the 
electricity department officials to enter the village to demand payment or 
sever connections due to non-payment. A number of farmers' 
organisations are involved in the agitation. Most prominent among them 
is the Gujarat Farmers' Agitation Forum led by Bipin Desai, Bhartiya Kisan 
Sangh (BKS), the farmers' wing of the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) 
and Gujarat Khedut Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS) backed by the Congress 
Party. The agitations led to two state-wide Bandhs (lockouts) in 2003 
wherein government used force to suppress the violent agitations. A 31 
year old farmer in Surat district died in September 2003 after police 
officers beat him up while taking part in a demonstration against the 
power tariff hike. Because the general election was round the comer in 
2004, the government offered a 25 to 33 per cent reduction in the power 
tariff. This would mean that the farmers using up to 7.5 hp pumps would 
have to pay Rs. 750 per hp per year instead of earlier proposed Rs. 1050. 
Similarly, those using motors with a capacity higher than 7.5 hp have to 
pay Rs 900 instead of Rs. 1260 per hp per year. The new tariff was not 
accepted by the farmers' organisations and they continued their resistance. 
In February 2004 one of the farmers' organisations, BKS, compromised 
with the government and called off their strike after a decision on 
lowering the tariff further by Rs. 50 per hp. However, other organisations 
are continuing with their agitations, calling it a great betrayal by BKS due 
to their proximity with the ruling BJP. In the general election of 2004 the 
ruling BJP suffered a major set back losing 12 of the 26 parliament seats 
including Mehsana. (Compiled from various newspaper reports, 
discussions with farmers and their organisation leaders) 
2 0 'Sujalam-Safalam : A unique scheme by honourable chief rninisrer: 
Gujarat towards a second green revolution'. News article published at the 
official website of the Government of Gujarat Sourced at 
http://www.gujaratindia.com/News_asp/en3.htm. 
2 1 I have borrowed this term from Wood (1997) who describes the 'new* 
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availability of water in the context of variety of water management 
initiatives possible in different zones of Gujarat including water available 
through the Sardar Sarovar Dam. The new water has to attend to 
technical, social, economic, institutional and political challenges. 
2 2 NBA also filed a writ petition to review the project in the Supreme 
Court (SC) to which the SC stayed the construction of SSP in 1995 at the 
height of 80.3 meters. In February 1999 the Supreme Court gave the go 
ahead for the dam's height to be raised to a height of 88 meters followed 
by the judgment in October 2000 to allow immediate construction of the 
dam up to a height of 90 meters. Further, the judgment also authorised 
construction up to the originally planned height of 138 meters in 5-meter 
increments subject to receiving approval from the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Subgroup of the Narmada Control Authority. 
2 3 The history of SSP is available at a number of internet sites. They are -
www.sardarsarovardam.org (official website of the Sardar Sarovar 
Narmada Nigam Ltd, Government of Gujarat), www.nvda.nic.in (official 
website of Narmada Valley Development Authority, Government of 
Gujarat) and www.narmada.org (website of sympathizers of the Narmada. 
Bachao Andolan, one of the activist organisations that is highly critical of 
the SSP). 
2 4 The information is based on the newspaper reports — "Water wars 
waged over Rs 100-cr bill', Times of India, September 19, 2003; 'What Rs 
102 crore means to cash-strapped AMC?' Times of India, September 21, 
2003 and 'AMC standing committee rejects interim budget", Times of India, 
September 21,2003, Ahmedabad edition. 
2 5 I n Junagadh district in Gujarat, the coastal areas of Mangrol block have 
become the scene of a major health scare. Take Loej village five 
kilometres from the coastline for instance. 200 odd families have one 
thing in common: each has at least one member suffering from kidney 
stones. According to WHO norms, the total dissolved solids in drinking 
water should not exceed 500 ppm. In Leoj, the TDS content is 4000-8000 
ppm. Over the past three decades, salinity ingress has made groundwater 
unfit for drinking in village after village. Out of the 60 villages, 23 are 
gripped under total salinity ingress. In 29 other villages, it has 
contaminated more than half of the groundwater resources. As the state's 
drinking water schemes always remained a pipedream, villagers had to rely 
on well water, even while the groundwater table was depleting fast The 
rhetoric of the Narmada water supply can not provide a balm as the 
scheme is meant for only parts of Jamnagar and Rajkot" (The Indian 
Express, April, 28, 2003 quoted in Dams, Rivers & People, 1 (6-7), July-
Aug 2003, Delhi: 26) 
3 
Groundwater Irrigation and Social 
Differentiation 
Wells and Tubewells in Sangpura 1960-2003 
We were sukbi (well-to-do) before but we lost the ability to go deeper with the 
aquifer like Patels. Patels can go to patal (bottom of the earth) to fetch 
water...we cannot. 
- A Thakore farmer in Sangpura 
If landownership reflects the sodo-economic condition o f people, 
access to irrigation is another crucial factor that determines one's 
position in sodety. The agrarian economy of Sangpura, where 
people's survival depends strongly on access to groundwater 
resources is a dear example o f this. Reliance on groundwater is a 
characteristic of the ecology of north Gujarat, which lacks 
perennial sources of surface water but used to have extensive 
aquifers with large groundwater storage capadty. With the 
introduction o f irrigated agriculture the use o f shallow wells started 
in the early 1960s in Sangpura. The shallow water table dried up 
around the mid 1980s, which led people to invest in deep 
tubewells. The immediate fallout o f tubewell irrigation was a sharp 
decline in groundwater levels. In less than four decades, Sangpura 
was classified as a dark zone for groundwater utilisation. The 
tubewell technology came with a price tag that was beyond the 
reach of many. Shared tubewells thus became the order o f the day 
in Sangpura and other villages of north Gujarat With depleting 
aquifers, the ownership of tubewells was further skewed to those 
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who had resources to buy shares in tubewell cooperatives, leading 
to an increased social differentiation. This differentiation was based 
on the unequal distribution of land and the control over productive 
resources such as groundwater by the privileged few. 
H o w did this process come about? What are the interrelations 
between social differentiation and the pattern of organisation 
around groundwater resources? Who are included and who left 
behind? I discuss these questions in this chapter. However, before 
investigating these issues in detail, I sketch the history o f irrigation 
in Sangpura and the surrounding region. This is followed by an 
analysis o f the ownership of and control over land and water and 
the organization o f tubewell irrigation cooperatives as shareholders 
and water buyers. The investigation shows that the ownership o f 
water closely follows landholding patterns. The control over 
groundwater reproduces the inequality in control over land. The 
class structure closely follows the caste hierarchy and determines 
the differential access and control o f groundwater for different 
social groups. This disparity establishes the level o f accumulation 
that different classes generate from agriculture. 
Irrigation History 
Groundwater development in the Mehsana region can be divided 
into three phases: pre-1935,1935- 1955 and post-1955. During the 
pre-1935 phase, groundwater was available at a depth o f 5-10 
meters and obtained from dug wells using manual lifting and 
draught power. During the 1935-55 phase, the groundwater level 
declined to ten to 30 meters primarily due to the use o f dug-cum-
bore wells powered by diesel pump sets. The post-1955 phase 
experienced a rapid decline in water table. From the 1960s, it 
amounted to one to three meters per year. The groundwater table 
deteriorated further in the post-1955 phase with the advent o f 
electricity-based pumping (Gupta and Deshpande 1998). Deep 
tubewells fitted with electric motors are now used for ufting 
groundwater from 100-250 meters depth. In Sangpura too, the 
decline o f the groundwater level has followed this pattern. Below, I 
reconstruct the history of groundwater and agricultural 
development from 1960 to 2003 for Sangpura. 
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TABLE3.1: DEPTH OFTUBEWELLS IN SANGPURA 1960-2002 
Year Depth to water tabt le Mode of extraction Electricity supply 
fin meters) (hours per day) 
Before 1960 3-4 Animal draught -
power 
1960 6-9 Crude-oil engine -
1970 16-24 Diesel engine -
1980 29-35 Diesel engine/ 24 
electric engine 
1985 35^7 Electric engine 18 
1990 103-112 Electric engine 16 
2003 118-132 Electric engine 8 
Source: Field data 
In the early 1960s mechanised pumps were introduced in the 
village. By this time, the groundwater level was at six to nine meters 
depth. The machines were powered by crude oil engines due to 
which irrigation in Sangpura contributed to about 60 per cent o f 
the total cultivated area. The remaining 40 per cent was irrigated 
through capturing runoff collected through small bunds and field 
ponds. This irrigation, together with new H Y V seeds, started to 
give a slightly higher yield. The new technology, thus, gave impetus 
to the further growth of irrigation. 
Table 3.1 sums up the development o f groundwater irrigation in 
Sangpura from 1960 to 2003. It shows how the water table 
declined from six to nine meters in the 1960s to 132 meters in 
2003. The mode o f extraction changed from animal draught power 
to oil engines and from diesel to electric engines to cope with the 
declining water table. However, the electricity supply for 
agriculture, which was 24 hours per day in the 1980s, has decreased 
Prior to 1960, the water level in Sangpura village was at around 
two to four meters depth. The main crops were sugarcane, paddy 
and chillies; irrigation was mainly through open dug wells. The 
winter crops were methi (fenugreek), bajri (pearl millet), chana 
(chickpea), indigenous cotton, jeeru (cumin) and vanyali (fennel). 
There were no summer crops during the 1960s, and even the 
winter crops were grown by utilising the soil moisture and with 
little irrigation. Irrigation was done through open dug wells using 
animal draught power. Irrigation constituted only 30 per cent o f 
the total cultivated area o f Sangpura. 
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to a mere eight hours per day in the 2001-2003 period. 1 Table 3.2 
shows the social ownership o f land and dugwells in the early 1960s 
in Sangpura. It shows that ownership was skewed towards Patels, 
the landowning caste that owned 53 per cent o f land and 67 per 
cent o f the dugwells in the village. Thakores followed them with 22 
per cent of land and 19 per cent ownership of five dugwells. 
TABLE 3.2: SOCIAL OWNERSHIP OF LAND AND DUGWELLS IN SANGPURA, 
1960 
Caste Land Dugwells 
Total land % of total Number Percentage 
in hectare village 
land 
Thakore 119.38 22 12 19 
Patel 289.18 53 42 67 
Prajapati 71.53 13 5 8 
Parmar 17.50 3 2 3 
Vaghari 3.44 1 1 2 
Darbar 12.22 2 1 2 
Others 28.24 5 - 0 
Total 541.49 100 63 100 
Source: Village land record of 1960 (land); field interviews (dugwells). 
Note: Others include Rabbari, Bawa, Suthar and Vaniya Castes. 
However, in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, access to the 
market was still difficult, as there were no good roads in the village 
and residents had to walk a kilometre to catch the passenger bus to 
sell agricultural produce in the market at Mehsana town. Many 
people used to walk up to Mehsana (around 15 kilometres) to visit 
the agricultural produce market. Camel carts were commonly used 
to carry agricultural produce to the market Villagers were largely 
illiterate, and Vanijas (moneylender caste) ruled the village through 
extending loans for agriculture and household consumption. 
Almost all villagers were indebted to the Vaniyas. The Land to the 
Tiller Bill, introduced in the district in 1955 paved the way for 
villagers' freedom from the Vaniya's clutches. 2 Agriculture was 
described as Sukhi Evam Sasti Kheti (dry and inexpensive). Milk 
production was limited as compared to today and was mostly 
utilised for household consumption. 
Many developments took place after Gujarat was separated from 
Maharashtra state in I960. 3 The most important among these was 
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the introduction o f a milk cooperative that was initiated in the 
village by the Mehsana-based Doodh SagarDoky in 1965. Earlier the 
Rabbaris (pastoral caste specializing in catde rearing and milk 
production) collected milk and sold it in Mehsana town and nearby 
villages. With the milk cooperative a ready market was created in 
the village itself, which initiated economic transformation for most 
people. Farmers could then invest this money in productivity-
enhancing measures for agriculture. During this time, only a few 
Patel households were living in brick houses, while the rest of the 
people lived in mud houses. Water scarcity' was not in the village 
dictionary, as many parts of the village used to be flooded for 
months after the monsoon. Water was abundant enough to grow 
sugarcane. People had enough water to irrigate. This was also the 
time when the Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society was 
introduced. It provided o i l kerosene and agricultural credit to the 
farmers. 
In 1970 the village was electrified and the panchayat office got 
electricity free o f cost. Initially people were afraid to use electricity 
and there used to be huge crowds at the panchayat office in the 
evenings to see the light powered by electricity. Patels and 
Prajapatis were the first to buy ten electricity connections for 
household consumption. Improved varieties of cotton and pearl 
millet were introduced around the same time. The landowners who 
possessed open dug wells and had water to irrigate first adopted 
them. The water level in the open wells was at 18-24 meters depth 
as a result of full-fledged irrigation through mechanized engines. 
Slowly all indigenous varieties o f crops were replaced by high-
yielding varieties. Only indigenous wheat (Tukri Ghaun) survived 
and is still popular among the farmers, due to lower water use, 
more resistance to pest attack, and almost the same level of 
production compared with the hybrid variety. O n the upper 
reaches of Sabarmati River, Dharoi multipurpose irrigation dam 
was built in 1960. A s a result o f this, the water flow in the river was 
severely affected. The farmers realised that water in the Sabarmati 
River, the only source of surface water in the region, had 
decreased. This affected the water recharge scenario o f the village. 
Sangpura's wells started to go deeper. By 1975 commercial 
agriculture had taken root in the village. The major crops were 
TABLE 3.3: CROP CYCLE IN SANGPURA, 2001-02 
Crops May 15 June 15 Juif 15 Aug 15 Sept 15 Oct 15 NOP 15 
- • Sowing Gestation 
Dec 15 Jan 15 Feb 15 Mardi 5 April 15 
Sesamum* 
Guwar* 
Cotton 
Mung* 
Chaura* 
Sweet 
Potato 
Castor 
Sorghum # 
Mustard 
Wheat 
Alfalfa 
Isabgol 
Pearl 
Millet 
Tobacco 
Ploughing 
Ploughing 
Ploughing 
Ploughing 
Ploughing 
Ploughing 
Ploughing 
Ploughing 
Sowing 
Sowing 
Harvesting 
Harvesting 
Gestation 
-•Gestation 
Harvesting 
Harvesting 
Harvesting 
Sowing Gestation 
Sowing Gestation 
^ Harvesting 
Harvesting 
- • S o w i n g Gestation " " ^ Harvesting 
^ Sowing Gestation 
^ Sowing Gestation 
Harvesting every 15 days" 
Harvesting 
Ploughing ^ Sowing Gestation Harvesting 
^ . Harvesting Ploughing Sowing Gestation 
Ploughing Sowing Gestation Harvesting every day as per requirement 
Ploughing 
Ploughing 
Sowing Gestation 
Sowing 
Ploughing 
Gestation 
Harvesting 
Sowing, Gestation 
" " ^ Harvesting 
Source. Field Data, *Non-irrigated; #fodder crop (Compiled with inspiration from Chakravarti, 2001: 60) 
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cotton, sugarcane, paddy, chillies, wheat, alfalfa (fodder crop), 
mustard, pearl millet (winter and summer), sorghum and castor. All 
these crops were of a high-yielding variety (see Table 3.3). 
By this time, diesel engines were slowly replaced by electric 
motors as the water level started to fall further and it was difficult 
to access it through diesel engines. The electricity supply was 24 
hours per day. By 1985 the water level had gone down to around 
47 meters. This was the time when tubewells, powered with electric 
motors, started to be installed in the village. The first deep tubewell 
was installed in 1974; Patel shareholders had a majority ownership. 
By the end of 1985 the number had risen to 12 along with six 
tubewells installed in 1984-85 (See Figure 3.1). By the end of 2001 
the figure rose further to 34 tubewells, excluding one owned by the 
Gujarat Water Resources Development Corporation (GWRDQ. 4 
Map 3.1 shows the location o f these tubewells in the village. 
FIGURE 3.1: CUMULATIVE GROWTH OFTUBEWELLS IN SANGPURA -
1974-2001 
4 0 n 
1974 1985 v 1990 2001 
Source: Field interviews 
With the declining water table, and farmers turning to electric 
motors, the demand for electricity increased. Since the electricity 
was subsidised, with the increase in demand, the government 
reduced the supply o f electricity from 24 to 16 hours per day to 
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adjust the level of subsidy. The credit cooperative provided 
advance crop loans to farmers, and the milk cooperative paid ready 
cash twice a month. The decade o f 1975-85 is known as the golden 
age o f agriculture. Farmers had bumper crops and could get 
substantial income from agriculture and dairy farming. However, 
this growth was limited to the main land-owning castes of Patels 
and Prajapatis and a few Thakore and Parmar families. They built 
concrete houses and their lifestyle improved. Thakores, who had 
land but were not as resourceful as Patels and Prajapatis could not 
derive much benefit in the process. With the decline in water table, 
access to irrigation started to reduce. The ownership o f tubewells 
was concentrated with a few resourceful farmers. This gave rise to 
water markets, as there was plenty of surplus water that could be 
sold to make a profit This was under the flat-rate tariff system with 
electricity supply available 18 hours a day. It rationalised the sale 
MAP 3.1: LOCATION OF TUBEWELLS IN SANGPURA, 2002 
Locations of tubewells 
Source: Field data 
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for the shareholders o f tubewells, as they had nothing to lose but 
only to gain monetarily through the sale o f surplus water. 
Groundwater markets flourished during this time. By 1990, 28 
tubewells o f Sangpura were irrigating an average o f 20 hectares of 
land per tubewell. However, after 1990 the situation started to 
change. By this time, the water level had fallen to around 100 
meters and electricity supply was reduced to 12 hours a day with 
flat rate charges based on the contracted load o f their motors 
measured in horsepower. The land had been over-cultivated. Some 
crops had developed pest resistance. In order to sustain the level of 
production, farmers increased the use o f external inputs such as 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides. However, even the excessive use 
o f fertilisers and pesticides did not sustain the level o f production. 
Hence, crop failure became increasingly common. D u e to the costs 
o f irrigation and other inputs, agriculture was not as profitable as 
earlier. Under increasing demand of electricity, the government 
decided to provide electricity in day and night shifts and in 
rotation. This caused inconvenience for the farmers who now had 
to be awake at night to irrigate their fields. Water buyers were then 
given night slots while the shareholders enjoyed the day-time 
irrigation. By this time the tubewells had passed the age o f 15 years. 
T o make the situation worse, tubewells started to fail one by one. 
In order to continue irrigation they needed to be renovated. This 
involved a minimum cost o f Rs. 200000 per tubewell. The 
indebtedness level rose, as the farmers had to take loans for 
investing in, or buying shares for new tubewells. The hourly 
charges for water were increased to cover the expenses. Until the 
late 1990s most of the shared tubewells were making profits up to 
Rs. 100000 per year by selling water to buyers. However, many 
tubewells went through major renovation with an increased 
maintenance cos t Some shareholders who could not contribute to 
this cost sold part o f their share. Thus, their share o f profit was 
also reduced. In 2000 the electricity supply was further reduced by 
the government to eight hours per day, leading to a significant 
decrease in water sales. Shared wells were not able to supply 
sufficient water to the shareholders, so the water sale was curtailed 
further. Hence, the profit went down for shareholders. The lands 
of water buyers were fallow and to cover this, five new tubewells 
were installed during 2000-2001 under joint ownership. By the end 
of 2002, the water level had gone down to more than 130 meters. 
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T o access water at this level the contracted load o f the motors had 
to be up-graded from lower to higher horsepower. I f the 1975-
1985 period was the golden years o f agriculture, post-1990 is 
referred to as the dark years with productivity decline, increased 
input costs and crop failures. 
The history of irrigation shows a grim picture o f groundwater 
utilisation in which agricultural development was achieved at the 
cost o f depletion o f the aquifer. The water level fell from 2 to 130 
meters below ground level within four decades. The changes in 
groundwater level coupled with land fertility decline. The water 
retention capacity of the soil reduced further due to intensive 
cultivation, which is one of the reasons for dedining agricultural 
productivity. In the next section, I discuss the effect o f this process 
on the village economy. I illustrate the levd o f clifferentiation in 
ownership and control over the two most productive resources, 
water and land in Sangpura. 
Ownership and Control of Economic Resources 
The economy of Sangpura is largdy driven by agriculture and 
animal husbandry. In a way, they are intimatdy related with each 
other. The access and control over land and water determined the 
pattern o f agriculture and generation o f surplus. This surplus was 
fed back into animal husbandry through the milk cooperative 
system. In Sangpura the introduction o f new agricultural 
technology, development o f groundwater irrigation and the 
establishment o f a milk cooperative happened almost 
simultaneously. The devdopment o f groundwater irrigation 
happened in the private sector, but it was informally linked with the 
partially state-funded cooperative sector such as the primary 
agricultural cooperative and the milk cooperative. The primary 
agricultural cooperative sodety provided institutional credit to 
farmers whereas the milk cooperative gave a village-based market 
to sell milk The easy availability o f institutional credit boosted 
investment in agriculture. Farmers invested in high yielding variety 
seeds, irrigation and other inputs. Agricultural produce and residues 
were well utilised for animal husbandry. The question is whom did 
this process h d p among the agrarian community? In this section, I 
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households households in hectares lot id holding 
Thakore 225 35.83 111.99 21.02 
Patel 200 31.85 284.00 53.32 
Prajapati 70 11.15 76.28 14.32 
Parmar 60 9.55 17.50 3.29 
Vaghari 25 3.98 5.19 0.97 
Darbar 12 1.91 12.25 2.30 
Rabbari 8 1.27 0.80 0.15 
Rawal 6 0.96 0.00 0.00 
Bawa 4 0.64 10.95 2.06 
Nai 4 0.64 0.64 0.12 
Suthar 4 0.64 9.86 1.85 
Others 10 1.60 3.21 0.60 
Total 628 100 532.67 100 
Source: Number of households from field data. 
Note: Landholding data was compiled from the land revenue register of Sangpura 
village in January 200Z This data does not include two joint holdings between 
Patel & Prajapati and Thakore and Prajapati castes of 1.47 and 1.20 hectare 
respectively. Shahs do not stay in the village as they shifted to Murnbai way back 
in the 1960s. However, they still hold land in the village, which is given for 
sharecropping. These families come once in a year to settle the accounts with their 
shareholders. The total number of household data was collected through field 
interviews and hence only showed the approximate number of households. 
examine the pattern of distribution of land and access to 
groundwater in Sangpura to find out whether these development 
processes have favoured or disfavoured particular social groups. 
Land ownership in Sangpura 
Land is an important indicator o f household wealth. Sangpura's 
2002 land revenue register speaks of inequality in land distribution 
(see Table 3.4). Patels, who constitute around 32 per cent o f the 
total households, possess 54 per cent of the village's agricultural 
land. Thakores constitute approximately 36 per cent o f the total 
households but have only 21 per cent of land. Prajapatis who 
constitute 12 per cent of the village household have 14 per cent o f 
village land. Around 35 per cent o f the households are landless (see 
Table 3.5) and 14 per cent o f the total households fall below the 
poverty line (see Table 3.6). 
TABLE 3.4: CASTE AND LAND HOLDING IN SANGPURA, 2002 
Caste No. of % of total Land holding % of total 
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The landownership class characterized by marginal, small, 
medium and large farmers and their caste associations show 
another distinct picture. Patels lead in each land class (see Table 
3.5), except in the class o f landless, which is dominated by 
Thakores. 5 The majority o f Patels fall in the category o f marginal, 
small and medium farmer and only nine households have 
landholdings greater than five hectares. In fact, only 14 per cent o f 
total land belongs to large farmers who hold more than five 
hectares and the larger part (around 75 per cent) consist o f small 
and medium farmers. This is largely due to land fragmentation and 
division between families over the years. O f the total landless caste, 
Thakores form the largest caste group in the village (225 
households) but hold only 21 per cent o f the village agricultural 
land. Most Thakore household have landholdings smaller than 
three hectares under the category of marginal and small farmers. 
MAP 3.2: LAND OWNERSHIP CHARACTERISED BY CASTE IN SANGPURA, 
2002 
• Common Land ffl Patel HThakore 
H Harijan ^ Prajapati Qj Others 
Source: Land record data superimposed on village revenue map 
TABLE 3.5 LAND OWNERSHIP SIZE CHARACTERISED BY CASTE IN SANGPURA, 2002 
Caste Landless Up to 1 Ha 1.01-3 Ha 3.01-5 Ha Month in 5.01 Ha Total 
Households MamnalFamer Small Farmer Mediur, i farmer Lam eFarmer 
Households Area Households Area Households Ana Housebol ds Area Households Area 
Thakore 11 24 11.95 44 8Z32 3 11.07 1 6.65 149 111.99 
Patel 30 55 25.72 66 123.13 21 79.24 9 55.90 181 283.99 
Prajapati 14 19 8.57 19 32.34 7 28.92 1 6.44 60 76.28 
Parmar 24 10 4.88 8 12.62 0 0 0 0 42 17.50 
Vaghati 7 1 0.62 3 4.57 0 0 0 0 11 5.19 
Darbar 5 2 1.93 2 4.38 0 0 1 5.94 10 12.25 
Rabbari - 2 0.80 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.80 
Bawa 2 3 1.90 1 2.44 2 6.61 0 0 8 10.95 
Nai 2 1 0.64 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.64 
Suthar 3 4 2.17 5 7.70 0 0 0 0 12 9.86 
Shah 1 0 0 0 0 1 3.21 0 0 2 3.21 
Total 165 121 59.18 148 269.5 34 129.05 12 74.93 480 532.66 
Source: Land record of Sangpura, year 2002 
For landless households information was obtained from village Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society 2001-2 
Note: The land record data does not speak of the division of landholdings within a family. The records show the land under the name of the eldest male 
member (in case of death of the male member, the land is in the name of the eldest member's widow). However, the names of family members are also 
written in the record including the names of women members. The total number of households presented in the table does not coincide with the total 
number of households identified through group discussions in September - October 2001. The households have divided in reality but the land is still 
undivided on paper. 
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Parmars and Vaghatis who form approximately 14 per cent o f 
village population hold only four per cent o f the total village land. 
Around 19 per cent o f the Thakores, 26 per cent of Parmars and 
36 per cent of Vagharis fall in B P L category (see Table 3.6). The 
large populations o f landless and below-poverty-line families o f 
Thakores and Parmars are the major agricultural labour force in the 
village. While Thakores specialize in agricultural labour, Vagharis 
lease horticultural plots on a yearly basis from mainly Patel and 
Prajapati farmers who possess orchards o f lemon and guava. Map 
3.2 shows the caste-wise land ownership in Sangpura. 
TABLE 3.6: INDIVIDUALS AND HOUSEHOLDS LIVING BELOW POVERTY 
LINE (BPL) IN SANGPURA CHARACTERISED BY CASTE 
Caste Number of Number of % of total % of BPL 
BPL BPL BPL families to 
individuals households households total village 
No % No % within caste 
category 
households 
Thakore 170 46.20 42 48.28 19 6.69 
Patel 13 3.53 4 4.60 2 0.64 
Prajapati 18 4.89 6 6.90 9 0.96 
Parmar 66 17.93 14 16.09 23 2.23 
Vaghari 43 11.68 9 10.34 36 1.43 
Darbar 7 1.90 2 2.30 17 0.32 
Bawa 13 3.53 2 2.30 50 0.32 
Nai 10 2.72 2 2.30 50 0.32 
Suthar 5 1.36 1 1.15 25 0.16 
Luhar 10 2.72 2 2.30 100 0.32 
Rawad 13 3.53 3 3.45 50 0.48 
Total 368 100 87 100 - 13.85 
Source: BPL list obtained from the Village Credit Cooperative Society, 2001-2 
The analysis of families falling under the official categories of B P L 
(see Table 3.6) shows that around 50 per cent o f all B P L families 
belong to the Thakore caste followed by Parmar (16 per cent) and 
Vaghari (ten per cent). Altogether, a total 14 per cent o f village 
population is below the poverty line.6 
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Access to irrigation in Sangpura 
In the groundwater-dependent economy of Sangpura, access to 
irrigation is a very crucial factor, which determines an mdividual's 
wealth. In Sangpura, 34 private tubewells were functioning at the 
end o f 2002. Most o f these tubewells were jointly owned between 
households. Only four out of 34 were mdividually owned. Before 
drawing upon the issue o f access to irrigation, let me detail the way 
irrigation cooperatives are organised. 
The organisation of tubewell cooperatives 
The tubewell cooperatives are organized on the basis o f shares in 
the tubewell. The shares are generally bought at the time of 
tubewell construction. The share o f a tubewell is fixed in 
proportion to the total expected cost of construction. For example, 
if construction of a tubewell is expected to cost Rs. 700000, a ten 
per cent of share could be bought for Rs. 70000. This cost excludes 
the cost of the underground pipeline from the source of water to 
the field, which is borne by the shareholder. The cost o f the 
pipeline depends upon the distance of the field to the tubewell. 
Investment in a share has two advantages. First, shares ensure the 
right to certain hours of irrigation based on their percentage. The 
right to irrigation is crucial in the groundwater-dependent 
agriculture o f Sangpura; by buying a share the shareholder ensures 
the right over irrigation. Second, the tubewell makes a profit by the 
sale o f water to non-shareholders. The shareholder gets a dividend 
at the end of every financial year. However, the risk o f tubewell 
failure and maintenance is also attached to the shareholder's right 
A shareholder has to invest in maintenance cost whenever needed, 
in proportion to the share. Most of the tubewells keep a reserve 
fund for incidental expenses. These expenses are accounted for in 
the yearly profit and loss account The shares in the tubewell follow 
the patriarchal inheritance right They are passed on to the male 
heirs after the death of the shareholder. Irrigation access is thus 
defined in two ways, for those having shares in the tubewell and 
those who buy water. 
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The shareholders 
In Sangpura, the tubewells can be classified according to the 
contracted load o f the motors represented by horsepower (hp). In 
most cases the higher the pumping capacity, the higher the yield. 
Thus, the cost o f a share in a tubewell is positively related to its 
capacity. This means, the higher the capacity o f the tubewell, the 
higher will be the value o f its share. The tubewells are categorised 
in three broad classes of 30-45, 45-60 and 60-75 hp. Out of a total 
34 tubewells, 12 fall in the 30-45 hp range while 11 each are in the 
45-60 and 60-75 hp categories. 
A n examination o f the percentage o f shares owned by families 
characterized by caste shows that Patels have 65 per cent o f total 
tubewell shares though they constitute around 32 per cent o f the 
village population. Thakores, who are around 36 per cent of total 
village households, have only 15 per cent o f total tubewell shares 
(see Table 3.7). Prajapatis, who are 11 per cent of the village 
population, hold 13 per cent o f shares. Parmars, who are 
approximately ten per cent of the village population, hold two per 
cent o f the total tubewell shares. The table also shows that the 
majority o f shares are in the 45-60 hp class (41 per cent) while the 
rest is almost equally distributed over the 30-45 hp and 60-75 hp 
classes. This means that the majority of the households own a 
medium capacity tubewell. Castes such as Darbars, Parmars and 
Vagharis possess shares in lower capacity tubewells only. Patels, as 
a social group have the biggest share in any tubewell class than 
TABLE 3.7: PERCENTAGE OF SHARE IN TUBEWELL CLASS CHARACTERISED 
BY CASTE7 
Caste 3045 hp 45-60 hp 60-75 hp Total 
Thakore 4 6 5 15 
Patel 17 27 21 65 
Prajapati 3 8 2 13 
Parmar 2 0 0 2 
Vaghari 1 0 0 1 
Darbar 3 0 0 3 
Total 30 41 28 99 
Source: Baseline survey of tubewells 2001-2 
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Caste Tubewell class in Horse Power 
3045 45-60 60- 75 Total 
hand % Land % Land % Land % 
in Ha in Ha in Ha in Ha 
Thakore 6.21 1.75 18.98 5.34 9.32 2.62 34.50 9.71 
Patel 36.46 10.26 106.49 29.97 92.52 26.04 235.46 66.27 
Prajapati 12.65 3.56 23.35 6.57 18.17 5.11 54.17 15.25 
Parmar 6.90 1.94 1.61 0.45 0.00 0.00 8.51 2.40 
Vaghari 2.30 0.65 0.58 0.16 0.00 0.00 2.88 0.81 
Darbar 2.76 0.78 2.30 0.65 3.91 1.10 8.97 2.52 
Rabbari 2.30 0.65 2.30 0.65 0.00 0.00 4.60 1.29 
Bawa 0.69 0.19 2.07 0.58 0.58 0.16 3.34 0.94 
Nai 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.13 0.69 0.19 1.15 0.32 
Suthar 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.73 0.49 1.73 0.49 
Total 70.27 19.78 158.14 44.5 126.92 35.71 355.31 100 
Source: Baseline survey of tubewells 2001-2 
Note: The figures presented in the above table show the total approximate land 
irrigated by the shareholders and do not show the total irrigated land of the village. 
The water buyers 
Water buyers form an important group in the village and until 2001 
they were a large group of people. From 2001 there has been a 
drastic reduction in the supply of electricity and therefore the 
number of water buyers has also decreased. This is mainly because 
the reduced water pumped from a particular tubewell has to fulfil 
the need o f the shareholders first Only then the surplus can be 
sold. Selling water is a profitable business as it subsidises the cost 
o f water for the shareholder, but it is not done at the cost o f 
availability of water for the owners. Table 3.9 shows the number of 
water buyers characterised by caste. It reveals that the total number 
others. The majority of them fall under the medium capacity 45-60 
hp tubewell class. The partem of tubewell shares closely follows 
the landholding and irrigation patterns. Patels own 66 per cent o f 
total irrigation share of the village followed by 15 and ten per cent 
for Prajapatis and Thakores respectively. The majority o f the Patel 
households irrigate through higher capacity tubewells falling in the 
category of 45-70 hp (Table 3.8). 
TABLE 3.8: LAND UNDER IRRIGATION CHARACTERISED BY TUBEWELL 
CLASS AND CASTE, SANGPURA 2002 
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of households buying water from tubewells has decreased from 173 
before 2001 to 104 in 2001-2. The total area o f land irrigated by 
"buying water" also reduced, from 124.5 hectares before 2001 to a 
mere 48.76 hectares in 2001-2. Thakores are the largest water buyer 
group in the village, and they are the hardest hit by reduction in 
sale o f water. Their total area o f land under irrigation decreased 
from 45.41 hectares in 1995-2000 to 20.13 hectares in 2001-2. 
TABLE 3.9 NUMBER OF WATER BUYERS CHARACTERISED BY CASTE 
Caste 1995-2000 2001-2 
No of No of Total Number Number Total 
HH TW irrigation 
in Ha 
ofHH ofTW irrigation 
in Ha 
Thakore 79 17 45.41 43 11 20.13 
Patel 57 19 47.21 31 14 16.96 
Prajapati 22 10 19.19 13 7 5.16 
Parmar 1 1 0.46 8 2 2.42 
Vaghari 5 2 1.79 5 2 1.79 
Darbar 5 4 7.02 2 2 1.38 
Rabbari 2 2 3.68 2 2 0.92 
Bawa 2 2 2.53 0 0 0.00 
Total 173 - 127.29 104 - 48.76 
Source: Baseline survey 2001-2002. HH: Households; TW: Tubewells 
JV»*:The figures in column 2 and 5 represent the total number of tubewells from 
which the households were buying water for irrigation. 
Groundwater Irrigation and Social Differentiation 
What does this information indicate for understanding the patterns 
of social differentiation in Sangpura? The early definition to 
understand this process came from Lenin (1967) whose study o f 
peasant differentiation in the nineteenth century Russia categorised 
peasantry into the capitalist and kbouring classes. 8 I^eninist 
differentiation analysis is criticised for its emphasis on definitions 
that separates people into classes in purely economic terms. Write 
(1979) describes the differentiation pattern in a politico-economic 
rather than a pure economic sense. Social differentiation in his 
approach, includes a set of relationships to the means o f 
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production, control over the labour process and material resources. 
Further, the social differentiation concept was redefined from the 
perspective of exploitation replacing domination. The exploitation 
model differentiates three main forms based on ownership o f 
capital assets, control over organisational assets and possession o f 
credential assets (Write 1985). Other scholars such as Wesolowski 
(1979) describe the differentiation in a peasant economy as arising 
out o f economic, political and ideological domination. Economic 
domination comes from control over the means o f production and 
the labour process while political domination is a result o f a nexus 
between classes and the power of the state. Ideological domination 
is a structure o f ideas professed by culture and institutions that 
legitimises the position of governing classes. 
I define social differentiation as a concept that includes a 
categorisation of the peasant community and the process of 
emergence and development o f social difference due to irrigation-
induced agricautural intensification and commoditisation (Mollinga 
1998). 9 As the Sangpura case suggests, the relationship between 
groundwater irrigation and social differentiation starts with the 
basic inequality in the ownership o f land. The inequality in 
distribution of groundwater resources builds on this, and therefore 
early advantages lie with landed farmers. The analysis shows that 
the distribution o f the two most productive resources - land and 
groundwater is skewed towards the higher classes. The class 
structure closely parallels the caste structure in the village. The 
dominant Patels are the principle land and groundwater share-
owning group in the village. The organisation o f groundwater 
irrigation is based on the access through shareholding in the shared 
tubewells and by selling water to non-shareholders. Table 3.10 
summarises the data on access to irrigation based on caste and 
shows that around one third o f the village households do not have 
any access to irrigation. These people belong to lower classes as 
well as to castes lower in the social hierarchy. Irrigation access is 
dominated by Patels who belong to the higher caste as well as class. 
They have shares in 29 out o f 34 tubewells in the village; 
amounting to 65 per cent of the total shareholdings (see Table 3.7). 
Thakores forms the largest water buyer group and have only 15 per 
cent o f the total tubewell shares. However, this was not the 
situation for Thakores in 1960 when irrigation used to be carried 
out through dugwells. In the 1960s, Thakores owned 19 per cent o f 
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the total village water shares (see Table 3.2). This shows that since 
the introduction o f tubewells, while the total area under irrigation 
has increased, the accessibility for some groups o f people has 
relatively reduced. Table 3.10 also shows that the lower caste 
groups neither own shares in the tubewells nor buy water. Many o f 
them are near-landless cultivators who cultivate only rainfed crops 
in the monsoon season. These groups, along with the landless 
families from the Thakore caste, form the wage labour force in the 
village. 
TABLE 3.10 CASTE-WISE ACCESS TO IRRIGATION IN SANGPURA 2002 
Caste No. of Households h laving share in Households b wying water 
households a tut bewell fromtui iewells 
HH NoofTW HH NoofTW 
Thakore 225 30 11 43 11 
Patel 200 165 29 31 14 
Prajapati 70 35 15 13 7 
Parmar 60 13 2 8 2 
Vaghari 25 3 2 5 2 
Darbar 12 6 3 2 2 
Rabbari 8 2 2 2 2 
Rawal 6 - - - -
Bawa 4 4 3 - -
Nai 4 3 2 - -
Suthar 4 2 1 - -
Others 10 - - - -
Total 628 263 - 104 -
Source: Field data 
Note: HH = Households; TW = Tubewells. For column 4 and 6, figure represents 
the total number of tubewells from which the households derive their water share 
or buy water. 
An examination o f the share o f land classes in each of the tubewell 
classes characterised by caste reveals another piece of information 
relevant to the analysis o f the social differentiation pattern in 
Sangpura. As discussed earlier, the higher the capacity o f the 
tubewell the higher is the yield. This also means that higher 
capacity tubewells are able to irrigate larger areas and thus having a 
share in a higher capacity tubewell means deriving more surpluses 
from the sale o f water. Table 3.11 shows the share o f land class 
irrigated by three tubewell classes divided on the basis o f horse-
TABLE 3.11 ACCESS TO TUBEWELLS CHARACTERISED BY SHAREHOLDER CLASS AND CASTE 
Caste Number of households in tubewell class I Number of households in tubewell class 77 Number of households in tubewell class HI 
Uptol 
ha 
1-3 ha 3-5 ha >5ha Up to 
1 ha 
1-3 ha 3-5 ha >5ba Uptol 
ha 
1-3 ha 3-5 ha >5ha 
Thakore 1(0.69) 1(2-3) 1(3.22) - 8(4.67) 7(10.8) 1(3.45) - 9(4.94) 2(4.37) - -
Patel 3(2.76) 6(8.45) 4(17.35) 1(7.36) 22(13.76) 37(70. 1(3.45) 2(11.5) 39(434.26) 36(54.27) 2(6.9) 1(6.5) 
Prajapati - 2(2.3) - 1 (6.9) 8(4.69) 82) 
10(15. 
1(3.45) - 3(1.83) 9(14.2 - -
18) 5) 
Parmar 4(1.61) 2(4.54) - - 2(1.61) - - - - - - -
Vaghari 1(0.69) 1(1.61) - - 1(0.57) - - - - - - -
Darbar - 1(2.76) - - - 1(2-3) - - 1(0.46) 3(3.45) - -
Rabbari - 1(2-3) - - - 1(2-3) - - - - - -
Bawa 1(0.69) - - - - 1(2-7) - - 1(0.57) - - -
Nai - - - - 1(0.46) - - - 2(0.68) - - -
Suthar - - - - - - - - 2(1.72) - - -
Total 10 (6.44) 14(24.2 5 (20.57) 2(14.26) 42 (25.76)57 (104.1) 3 (10.35) 2 (11.5) 57 (444.46) 50 (76.34) 2(6.9) 1 (6.5) 
_6_ 
Source: Land records of Sangpura 2001 and field data. 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the total land in hectares irrigated by the households 
TABLE 3.12 ACCESS TO TUBEWELLS CHARACTERISED BY WATER BUYER CLASS AND CASTE 
Caste Number of households in tubewell class I 
(3045hp) 
Number of households in tubewell class 77 
(45-60 bp) 
Number of households in tubewell class 777 
(60-75 hp) 
Uptol 
ha 
1-3 , 3-5ha >5i Uptol 
ha 
1-3 ha 3-5ba >5 ha Uptol 
ha 
1-3 ha 3-5 ha >5ha 
Thakore 
Patel 
Prajapati 
Parmar 
Vaghari 
Darbar 
Rabbari 
12(7.01) 
7(2.86) 
2(1.14) 
1(0.46) 
1(1.15) 
1(1.15) 
9(3.66) 
9(3.91) 
6(1.72) 
1(1.15) 
2(2.76) 
Nai 
Suthar 
18(5.02) 
12(5.8) 
4(1.19) 
7(1.95) 
5(1.77) 
1(0.23) 
2(0.92) 
1(1.15) 
1(1.61) 
Total 22(11.47) 2(2.3) 24(9.29) 3(3.91) 53(18.72) 2(2.76) 
Source: Land record of Sangpura 2001 and field data. 
Note: Figure in parenthesis represent the total land in hectares irrigated by the households 
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power. It is evident that Patels dominate in all tubewell classes but 
have a much larger share in the higher capacity tubewells. Table 
3.12 shows that the water buyers are mosdy small landholders 
having less than one hectare o f land. Table 3.13 summarises the 
number of shareholders deriving water from tubewell categories as 
per land class in shareholders and water buyers' category. Around 
87 per cent o f shareholders are from the higher capacity tubewell 
class o f 45-60 and 60-75 hp while 13 per cent fall in the 30-45 hp 
class. The water buyers are largely small holders; 99 o f 107 families 
belong to the land class of less than one hectare. D u e to decreasing 
hours o f electricity supply, the number o f water buyers also 
reduced considerably in the year 2001-02 (Table 3.10). 
TABLE 3.13 NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDER AND WATER BUYERS FAMILIES 
PER TUBEWELL AND LAND CLASS 
Land 
class 
Tubewell class based on ht irsepower Total 
3045 45-60 60-75 
SH WB SH WB SH WB SH WB 
> l H a 10 22 42 24 57 53 109 99 
1-3 Ha 14 3 57 3 50 2 121 8 
3-5 Ha 5 0 3 0 2 0 10 0 
> 5 H a 2 0 2 0 1 0 5 0 
Total 31 25 104 27 110 55 245 107 
Source: Field data. SH = Shareholder, WB = Water buyer 
T o summarise, the organisation o f tubewell irrigation was a 
response to certain developments in agriculture that induced the 
use o f external inputs such as irrigation. In Sangpura, the farmers 
responded to these changes through increased and unrestrained use 
o f groundwater. Consequently, the aquifer declined and in the 
process farmers started losing access to groundwater. In order to 
retain access, the irrigation institutions were reorganised as 
collectives to share cost and spread risk. The readily available 
tubewell technology yielded more water than the shareholders 
could use for irrigating their own fields and hence water markets 
developed covering a large area. However, these collectives closely 
followed class and caste affiliations and determined differential 
access and control over groundwater for different social groups. 
The powerful classes could generate surplus through water vending 
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which subsidised their own irrigation costs. The state subsidy for 
electricity and ready availability o f institutional finance supported 
this process o f accumulation. The surplus was diverted towards 
land and water owning classes. However, with the aquifer decline 
and decrease in supply of electricity the water markets started to 
shrink. The group of water buyers were severely affected by this 
change. They were pushed out of the market and lost access to a 
precious resource. This process led to the process o f social 
differentiation where a small minority controlled and defined the 
pattern o f access and distribution o f groundwater resource in 
Sangpura. 
H o w do this differentiation and relations of exploitation leads to 
larger control over the labour process, socio-political institutions and 
material resources? In the chapters that follow I provide evidence on 
these aspects. In the next chapter I illustrate how different social 
groups are affected by declining productivity and increasing irrigation 
prices, induced largely through unrestrained use of groundwater 
resources and unsustainable farming practices. I also show the 
strategies o f these groups in coping with the increasingly difficult 
situations. 
Notes 
1 The electricity supply was reduced to eight hours per day in eady 2001. 
However, during the panchayat elections, the electricity supply was 
increased to ten hours per day which was curtailed again to eight hours 
per day soon after the election was over. During the general election early 
2004 the electricity supply was again increased to ten hours per day. 
2 In 1948, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act replaced the 
Bombay Tenancy Act. The Act advocated fixity of tenure, right to house-
sites and trees, protection from eviction, commutation of crop share rents 
into cash and fixed the maximum rent at 1X6* of the crop irrespective of 
land being irrigated or non-irrigated. The Land to the Tiller Bill of 1955 
was passed by the State Legislature in 1965-66 and fixed the maximum 
and minimum rent at five times the assessment or Rs. 20 per acre and 
twice the assessment, respectively, in the areas surveyed and settled under 
the Land Revenue Code (Patel 1969:425). These laws worked for people 
who were indebted to Vaniyas and had lost their land to them. There were 
many cases where the land was in possession of the Vaniyas in lieu of 
non-payment of the loan advanced to them. This was mainly due to the 
high rate of interest that led to people falling into the indebtedness cycle. 
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However, in some cases, these lands were not transferred to Vaniyas in 
the land revenue register. Such lands were given back to the tillers as a 
policy initiative. Looking at the changes in adroinistrative policies and 
other advances in the village society, the Vaniyas slowly started to migrate 
to urban areas of Ahmedabad, Surat and Mumbai, as increasingly they 
found it difficult to extract rent and draw surpluses. None of the Vaniya 
families now live in Sangpura today although they still have houses, land 
and property in the village. They have given their land on sharecropping 
and come once in a year to settle the dues. 
3 During the British regime Gujarat was part of the Bombay State, which 
covered five districts. These districts were interspersed with 148 Princely 
States under the jurisdiction of the Western India States Agency. After 
Independence, Sardar PateL the then Home Minister, initiated a 
movement for integration of States. The present State of Gujarat was 
constituted in three administrative stages — the integration of States and 
estates in the British districts during 1948-49, the reorganization of States 
in 1956 and the bifurcation of the Bombay state in 1960 (Patel 1969). The 
bilingual state of Bombay was split into two - namely, the Gujarati 
speaking Gujarat state and the Marathi speaking Maharashtra state 
(Hirway 2000). 
4 In 1975 GWRDC transferred the management responsibilities of many 
of the public tubewells to the farmer's organisation. However, the 
GWRDC tubewell at Sangpura is still managed by the corporation. 
5 I have used four land size classes instead of the five used in government 
data. The categorization of marginal, small, medium and large farmers I 
have used in the study is based on intensive discussion with different 
social groups and their idea of land classes. Therefore, they only show 
local people's construction of land class and may not coincide with the 
government's classification. 
6 The Planning Commission in India estimates the proportion and 
number of poor people separately for rural and urban India at the national 
and state level based on the recommendations of the Task Force on 
•Projections of Miriimum Needs and Effective Consumption Demands'. 
The Task Force defined the poverty line as the cost of an all India average 
consumption basket at which calorie norms are met. The norms are 2400 
calories per capita per day for rural areas and 2100 calories for urban 
areas. These calorie norms have been expressed in monetary terms as Rs. 
49.09 and Rs. 56.64 per capita per month for rural and urban areas 
respectively at 1973-74 prices. Based on the recommendations of a Study 
Group on The Concept and Estimation of Poverty Line', the private 
consumption deflator from national accounts statistics was selected to 
update the poverty lines in 1977-78, 1983 and 1987-88. Subsequently, an 
expert group examined the issue and accepted the definition of poverty 
100 The Dark Zone 
line and base year figures but suggested an alternative methodology to 
calculate the poverty line. It recommended the use of a consumer price 
index for agricultural labour to update the rural poverty line and a simple 
average of weighted commodity indices of the consumer price index for 
industrial workers and for urban non-manual employees to update the 
urban poverty line. The Plarining Commission accepted the 
recommendations of the expert group but modified the method for 
updating the poverty lines. For example, in 1999-2000, the poverty line 
for rural Delhi was fixed at an individual's capacity to earn Rs. 362.68 per 
month (Plarining Commission 2001-2). 
7 The percentage shown is rounded up to whole numbers and therefore it 
does not include the share held by Bawas and Suthars, each of which have 
0.20 per cent of total village tubewell shares in the 60-75 hp tubewell 
category. It also excludes Nais who have 0.10 per cent of the total village 
share in the 45-60 and 60-75 hp tubewell categories. To obtain the 
percentage of shares in a tubewell, I collected information on the number 
of shareholders, percentage of shares owned by each shareholder, their 
caste affiliation, records of water sale and the capacity of tubewells. 
8 Lenin's definition included six peasant classes - agricultural proletariat, 
semi-proletarians, small peasantry, middle peasantry, big peasants and big 
landlords - a scale ranging from agricultural wage labourers to capitalist 
entrepreneurs. He used a number of criteria to classify the peasantry. 
Some are area of kndholding, tenure status, peasant's relation to the 
labour market, family and farm reproduction, peasant's participation in 
production and their relations of production (I^enin 1966). 
9 Athreya, Djurfeldt and Lindberg (1990) describe the level of 
commoditisation in an agrarian economy. Using the definition of 
Bernstein (1982), the authors explain economy being at a low level of 
commoditisation when the reproduction of the farm and the family 
involves the consumption of few commodities. In such cases, 
reproduction occurs through non-commodity circuits: it can be family 
labour working on raw materials and with means of production that are 
home-produced or it can be labour and means of production obtained 
through non-market networks of exchange like the Indian jajmani system' 
(ibid.: 183). The authors explain how an agrarian economy would have 
both commodity and non-commodity features. The green revolution 
increased the level of commoditisation by breaking down non-commodity 
forms of reproduction. At the same time the economy retains important 
non-commodity features. Therefore, 'peasants stand with one leg in the 
market economy and the other outside, in a non-commoditised economy. 
They cannot retreat completely from the market because the 
commoditised elements of reproduction have become necessities to life 
and to production' (ibid: 184). 
4 
Declining Productivity and Increasing 
Irrigation Prices 
Who will not like to sell water for profit? But we can not do it at the cost of 
irrigating our own field 
- A shareholder of a tubewell in Sangpura 
We have over used (cultivated) our dharti maa (motherland), now its time for 
her to take revenge. 
- A woman tenant in Sangpura 
With the decline in groundwater level the demand for energy-
applied in accessing water increases. The present electricity pricing 
structure in Gujarat is based on the contracted load o f the electric 
motors rather than a metered tariff based on pro-rata use of 
electricity. The increase in demand for electricity under this tariff 
system is controlled by the government through reducing the hours 
o f electricity supplied to the farmers.1 The reduced electricity 
supply has resulted in decreasing well yields and shrinking 
command areas of the tubewells. The process makes groundwater 
more expensive than in the pa s t It also parallels the decreasing 
economic returns from agriculture because o f land productivity 
decline with increasing requirements for external inputs. With 
water shortage, the irrigated lands are slowly converted back to 
rainfed cultivation. The groundwater was an insurance against risk 
for the farmers. Due to increasing groundwater mining this risk has 
been aggravated. On the other hand, the hydro-geological 
conditions o f north Gujarat, being in the alluvial 
zone, make further deepening o f wells possible. This helps in 
postponing rather than tackling the problem. The responses o f 
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different social groups are to take escape routes to avoid the effects 
o f depletion o f groundwater. Their efforts are focused on pushing 
the time horizon rather than actually confronting the 
unsustainability problem. Here, the logical boundaries to the 
productivity decline do not apply. Farmers adjust the declining 
productivity through increasing external inputs for maintaining the 
same level o f output However, this process makes agriculture less 
profitable compared to the past, and therefore only a few social 
groups are able to cope with mis change. These processes, coping 
mechanisms and abilities to push the time horizon for resource 
depletion contribute to resource mining, the impacts o f which are 
socially distributed through different mechanisms. 
This chapter maps these responses to increasing costs o f water 
and mobilisation of investment resources. Through the entry point 
o f four tubewells this chapter provides a worm's eye view of the 
organisation of tubewell cooperatives and their coping mechanisms 
in dealing with increasing groundwater extraction costs. It is 
divided in three sections. The first section focuses on the decline of 
agricultural productivity in Mehsana district and in the case study 
village. The next section presents the cases o f four tubewells that 
are starting points to understand the broader dynamics and 
strategies o f different social groups in confronting the declining 
trend of groundwater and increasing irrigation costs. The last 
section analyses - who are at the forefront of the crisis o f 
groundwater depletion and why? I argue that unsustainable 
resource use does not generate contestation in relation to 
the declining groundwater but shapes and structures responses 
towards the progression o f water mining. 
Declining Agricultural Productivity 
After the initial spurt in agricultural production during the green 
and post green revolution (1965-95) in Gujarat, a sharp decline has 
been reported in recent years. Declining productivity2 o f major 
crops, degradation of land and depletion o f groundwater resources 
has come to a threshold, making agricultural growth stagnant and 
its pattern unsustainable. This trend has been a matter o f concern 
in recent years. The issue is well documented and accepted, and 
hence does not require much confirmation (Desai 1997, Desai, 
TABLE 4.1 PATTERN OF AGRICULTURE IN MEHSANA DISTRICT 
Year Ana Value of Gross Net area Gross Fertiliser Tractor Pump sets 
under 35 output of cropped sown (V00 irrigated (NPK) (no) (no) 
crops 35 crops area (WO ha) area (WO consumed 
(WO ha) (WO Rs) ha) ha) (tonnes) 
1962-65 647438 1847092 752798 705513 145181 945 255 13325 
1980-83 661246 3948638 900670 684000 363670 22915.33 3484 24203 
1990-93 612715 4664191 900620 696450 450000 556828.53 4843 13497 
Source: Compiled from Bhalk and Singh (2001) 
TABLE 4.2 AREA ('OOHA), PRODUCTION ('OOTONNES) AND YIELD (KG/HA) OF MAJOR CROPS IN MEHSANA DISTRICT 
Crop 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 
Area Prod Yield Area Prod Yield Area Prod Yield Area Prod Yield 
Total Pulses 325 184 566 306 203 663 326 133 408 294 48 163 
Total Cereals 942 948 1045 942 947 687 918 667 727 852 571 670 
Total Wheat 788 2279 2892 859 2302 2680 793 2103 2652 654 1828 2795 
Total Pearl 
Millet 1047 1444 1379 1200 1787 1489 1307 1868 1429 1084 1293 1193 
Castor 913 1959 2144 952 1886 1982 928 1773 1911 783 1418 1811 
Total Cotton 1109 1743 267 999 1984 338 1076 1912 302 840 1051 213 
Mustard 1241 1815 1462 1245 1221 981 1148 1605 1398 1085 1059 977 
J a m * : G O G Undated (a) and G O G Undated (b) for years 1996-97 to 1999-2000. 
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Shah and Singi 1999, Hirway 2000, Mathur and Kashyap 2000, 
Bhalla and Singh 2001). However, most o f the data presented in 
the recent literature relates to the early and late 1990s. Hence, in 
this section, I update and confirm the deceleration process using 
the secondary information available. 
TABLE 4.3 AVERAGE RAINFALL OF MEHSANA DISTRICT 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Rainfall 
in mm 
508 476 1225 1096 380 300 627 
J W : G O G (2002) 
In order to understand the lagging agricultural growth in 
Mehsana, it is worthwhile to recapitulate the patterns o f its 
development Table 4.1 shows the growth in agriculture in three 
distinct periods, 1962-65, 1980-83 and 1990-93. The data illustrate 
growth in area under crops and increasing value o f output through 
adjusted value o f Rupees. However, during the 1980-90 period, 
though there was growth in gross cropped area and net sown area, 
that growth was not very significant as compared to earlier decades. 
Fertiliser consumption has doubled in the later years while the 
number o f pump sets has reduced for the district These figures are 
an indication o f the changes taking place in agriculture in the 
district 
Recent data on area, production and yield in Mehsana district 
show stagnation and decline in the yield o f major crops (Table 4.2). 
Based on final forecast reports of the Directorate o f Agriculture, 
Gujarat, the data suggest that the area under crops such as pulses, 
cereals, wheat, castor and cotton declined from the year 1996 
onwards. For pearl millet, there is a slight increase, but it is not 
significant looking at the decline in the yield. Table 4.3 presents the 
rainfall pattern o f Mehsana district and shows the low rainfall in 
year 1999-2000, which was declared a drought year. The 
fluctuations in rainfall also affect the productivity o f the crop. 
However, most of the cash crops are irrigated though groundwater 
and hence a drought year may not affect the number o f irrigations 
as water is accessed from deep aquifers. In order to relate the 
productivity decline data of Mehsana district with those in 
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TABLE 4.4: IRRIGATION REQUIREMENT AND YIELD 6 OF MAJOR CROPS IN 
SANGPURA IN 1985-90 AND 2001 
Crops Approximate 
irrigations I 
number of 
required 
Average app 
per hectare 
rroximateyield 
in kilograms 
1985-1990 2001 1985-1990 2001 
Cotton 8-10 10-12 350 200 
Castor 8-10 10-12 3038 2170 
Wheat 5-7 6-8 4340 3038 
Mustard 3-4 4-6 1736 1302 
Sweet Potato 8-10 10-12 17360 13020 
Tobacco - 8-10 - 2604 
Sorghum 1-2 3-4 6510 5425 
Pearl Millet 2-4 5-8 3472 2604 
Alfalfa (Rajko) 25-30 25-30 3200 3906 
Isabgol 2-3 4-5 868 520.8 
Indigenous (Desi) 
Wheat 4-5 6-8 2604 2170 
Source: Group discussions in September and December 2002 
The availability o f groundwater has also changed the crop cycle. 
For example, sugarcane and chilli were extensively grown in 
Sangpura until the late 1960s, but have now completely vanished. 
Sangpura, I gathered information on the number o f irrigations 
required and average yields for all the major crops (Table 4.4). 
The information on number o f irrigations required for major 
crops shows that there has been an increase o f about two to four 
irrigations in the year 2001 as compared to the period 1985-1990. 
The yield per hectare has declined considerably except that o f 
alfalfa, which is due to the introduction o f a new seed variety 
resulting in sustained yields over time. 3 Indigenous wheat has more 
or less sustained yield compared to other crops, perhaps due to its 
capacity to resist and adapt to a changing environment Other 
crops show a sharp decline in yield despite irrigation input rising. 
Farmers attribute these changes to the increasing crop intensity and 
the consequent loosening of soil that does not retain as much water 
as compared to the p a s t 4 This is coupled with the present seed 
varieties that are losing their genetic potential in repeated use, while 
information on new seeds is not reaching the farmers 5. In addition, 
with increasing external inputs in agriculture, farmers are afraid o f 
experimenting with new varieties o f seeds and therefore have 
increased external inputs to sustain the level o f yield. 
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Sugarcane used to be sown in waterlogged fields soon after the 
monsoon broke. With decreasing water availability farmers shifted 
to other crops. Chilli was reported to have suffered major pest 
attacks in the area, which led to farmers opting out o f i t Crops 
such as cotton and castor, which were grown with limited irrigation 
in the past, have become totally dependent on irrigation in present 
times. Tobacco has been introduced recently in the village, which is 
a high-input water-intensive crop. With the rise in tubewell 
irrigation, more water intensive cash crops were grown in 
Sangpura. With decreasing water table and changes in soil fertility, 
the yield has been dedining, which is supplemented with increased 
inputs. The present crop cycle o f Sangpura, therefore, reflects the 
changes in agricultural technology and availability of water 
resources. These changes are also observed at the district and state 
levels. Mathur and Kashyap (2000) analysed the district-level 
problems and prospects of agriculture in Gujarat state in the 
trienniums 1961-63, 1971-73, 1981-83 and 1991-93. They observe 
that 'amongst all the inputs, increased availability o f irrigation is an 
essential condition in rising productivity levds along with a shift in 
the cropping pattern, from less to more remunerative crops, which 
are often water intensive' (ibid: 3317-3318). They show a major 
change in Gujarat with a dear shift from food grains to non-food 
cash crops since the 1960s. This shift was particularly pronounced 
in canal-irrigated districts such as Surat and Kheda, and tubewell-
irrigated north Gujarat districts such as Mehsana and Banaskantha. 
Districts such as Mehsana that had greater input use experienced 
faster growth of output. However, soon the levd o f output and 
land productivity declined, making agriculture stagnant The 
authors call for a 'rethinking on the resource use pattern' to check 
the declining productivity and growth in agriculture (ibid.: 3146). 
The declining agricultural growth is reflected in agriculture's 
declining contribution to the gross state domestic product (GDP) 
o f Gujarat In 1993-94 agriculture and animal husbandry 
contributed 19.9 per cent o f the G D P . Quick estimates for the year 
2002-3 show that this contribution has come down to 13 per cent 
( G O G , 2004). One o f the reasons o f this could be that other 
sectors are growing at a faster rate than agriculture. However, 
government data shows that the growth of agriculture in Gujarat 
has also declined over the year which is reflected in its contribution 
to the G D P (also see Table 2.1). Until now, more than half o f 
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Box 4.1: The operator's day and night 
In Sangpura, the schedule of electricity supply followed the shift of 
day and night every 15 days in 2002-03. The operator of the tubewell 
changes his own schedule according to the electricity supply available. 
The arrangement is in such a way that those people who need to 
irrigate, contact the operator and get the schedule of their turn. 
Usually it is done a day before the farmer's irrigation requirement to 
avoid any criss-crossing with another's schedule. Once the farmer is 
aware of the schedule, the operator is approached, who should be 
present at the pump site. The operator starts the water and opens the 
pipe through which water flows to his field. Once the irrigation is 
over, the farmer informs the operator. If there is night irrigation, the 
operator sleeps after diverting water to the one who is under schedule 
for that night because it takes at least four to five hours to irrigate a 
quarter of a hectare of land. Based on the area of the land the 
operator calculates the timing and then goes back to sleep. The 
second farmer who is supposed to irrigate under the schedule would 
come and wake the operator. Usually there is half an hour overlap in 
night irrigation, while in day irrigation the gap is only in terms of 
diverting the water flow. This also means that the second person who 
needs water has to come half an hour before the specified time and 
then wait until the first person has finished irrigating. In some 
tubewells, the operator gives a receipt to the person stating the timing 
and date of irrigation. The copy of the receipt along with his signature 
is kept with the operator, who then enters it in the irrigation schedule 
register. The register carries the name of the person who has irrigated 
the field, the date and time of irrigation and the crop that was 
irrigated. Sometimes work such as irrigation after initial ploughing is 
also recorded to give a rationale for longer hours of irrigation. 
Source: Field note 
Guajrat's population still directly depends upon agriculture and 
allied services. The question is whether the productivity decline is 
affecting the agrarian community and if so, in what way. In the 
next section, I show how different social groups, through tubewell 
organisation, strategise to address these problems. Prior to this, I 
describe the tubewell infrastructure o f Sangpura. 
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The Tubewell Infrastructure 
The tubewells in Sangpura and surrounding areas of Mehsana 
district are constructed by drilling into the soil with a large auger 
using the hydraulic-rotary method. In this method, 'a bit is rotated 
at the end of a string o f pipe with mud slurry being circulated 
through the drill shaft into the hole and back to the surface outside 
the drill pipe. The slurry serves to support the walls o f the hole 
during the chilling and to bring the material loosened by the bit to 
the surface' (Linsley and Franzini 1991: 104). After drilling, the 
hole is cased with perforated pipe to prevent it from collapsing and 
to allow water to seep in from fissures and caverns. The electric 
motor is placed around three meters below the water table and 
then the tools are withdrawn (Picture 4.1). Once the tubewell is 
installed, it is connected with an overhead tank into which water is 
pumped and stored (Picture 4.2). From there, it is distributed into 
left and right hand pipe networks depending on the capacity o f the 
pump (Picture 4.3).The lower capacity pumps have one distribution 
Box 4.2: The decision on the irrigation schedule 
The decision regarding the irrigation schedule is taken on a first-come 
first-serve basis. Those members who have prepared their land come 
to the tubewell operator and request him to provide water. If there are 
two or more people in the same day, they decide among themselves 
whose land will be irrigated first. There is no point of conflict here 
because different people till their land at different times and so there 
is always a difference of 15 to 20 days between the first and the last 
farmer in the command area of a tubewell. The tubewells run every 
day during winter and summer season. Once a schedule is set, it is 
followed strictly. The first irrigation is given soon after land is 
prepared and just before the seeds are sown. A second irrigation is 
given after approximately 20 days followed by subsequent irrigations 
as per the schedule. However, this schedule depends upon the 
command area of the tubewell, its discharge and crops grown. The 
farmers have to adhere to the schedule as there are many in the queue 
to get water. This is especially so in winter season when the number 
of irrigators are more than in summer or in the monsoon season. 
Source: Field notes 
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PICTURE 4.2: GROUNDWATER PUMPED INTO OVERHEAD TANK 
PICTURE 4.1 : INSTALLATION OF A TUBEWELL 
^71 
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PICTURE 4.3: WATER DISTRIBUTED THROUGH RIGHT AND LEFT HAND 
CHANNELS 
PICTURE 4.4: WATER REACHES THE FIELD THROUGH UNDERGROUND 
CHANNELS 
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channel while the higher capacity pumps have two because o f the 
higher yield o f the tubewells. Underground pipes carry water to the 
field from where it flows through open channels (Picture 4.4). The 
entire network from the overhead tank to the underground pipeline 
is based on gravity flow and electricity is used only to pump water 
into the overhead tank. In order to distribute the water pumped, a 
written irrigation schedule is made at the beginning of the season. 
Each tubewell appoints an operator whose task is to operate the 
tubewell and keep these records (see Box 4.1). The operator is a 
paid employee of the tubewell cooperative. Sometimes they are also 
members of the cooperative themselves. The operator strictly 
follows the irrigation schedule (Box 4.2). Management is done in 
such a way as to minimise conflict 
Shrinking Command Area and Decreasing Profitability 
The first section showed that agriculture is stagnating and the yield 
for all major crops except alfalfa is declining. One o f the major 
responses to the declining yield and dwindling agricultural 
productivity is the heavy reliance on external inputs. 7 In order to 
maintain the level o f productivity, farmers are increasing inputs 
such as inorganic fertilisers, irrigation and organic manure. 8 In this 
section, I map the historical organisation o f tubewell cooperatives 
in Sangpura that came into existence in the early 1980s and 1990s 
when the shallow water table dried up. Through the cases o f four 
tubewells I narrate the experiences o f individuals associated with 
tubewells as organisers, shareholders and buyers while 
documenting their strategies in coping with the changes in the 
profitability o f agricultural production. 9 
Characteristics of sample tubewells 
The tubewells were selected to represent four different parts o f the 
village territory, the east, west, north and the south, in order to 
have good geographical representation. Land distribution in the 
village is also historically determined, and based on castes and 
class. 1 0 Thus, organization and membership of tubewells reflects 
the possession o f land for people falling in a particular area. As 
112 The Dark Zone 
evident from Table 4.5, Patels are the dominant group in tubewell 
1 having around 72 per cent of the total shares. Tubewell 2 has a 
majority o f members from the Prajapati caste, holding 60 per cent 
o f the total share. Similarly, major shares belong to Thakores in 
tubewell 3 (100 per cent) and Parmars in tubewell 4 (65 per cent). 
Table 4.5: SOCIAL COMPOSITION AND SHARE PATTERNS OF SAMPLE 
TUBEWELLS 
Tubewell I dumber of families (% of share in Tubewel '0 
Paul Prajapati Thakore Parmar Others 
1 9 (72%) 1 (5%) 5 (23%) 
2 3 (30%) 5 (60%) 2 (10%) -
3 - 6 (100%) -
4 - 6 (65%) 3 (35%) 
Source: Field data 
Table 4.6 shows the physical characteristics of the sample 
tubewells. The tubewells were constructed as early as 1985 - the 
starting point of the tubewells era and as late as 1990, which could 
be called the middle o f the tubewell era. The command area o f 
tubewells in Sangpura is dependent on the discharge of the 
tubewell, which in turn depends on the capacity o f the pump and 
the depth from which water is p u m p e d The command area ranges 
between 12 and 17 hectares while the capacity o f the pump ranges 
between 40 and 62 horsepower (hp). The discharge of tubewells 
TABLE 4.6 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE TUBEWELLS, 2001 
Features Tubewell 
1 
Tubewell 
2 
Tubewell 
3 
Tubewell 
4 
Year of construction 1985 1986 1990 1990 
Command Area (in ha) 17.14 14.95 12.65 11.73 
Depth of water table 
(in meters) 111.7 100.0 111.7 100.0 
Depth of tubewell 215.2 202.9 13Z3 132.3 
Discharge (litre per 
second) 21.7 22.9 18.5 17.9 
Horse power (hp) of 
Pump 62 65 50 41 
Water charge (Rs./hr) 74 52 35 40 
Water charge (Rs./m 3) 0.95 0.62 0.52 0.62 
Source: Field data 
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similarly ranges from approximately 18 to 22 litres per second. The 
•water charge for each tubewell is different and based on an internal 
decision of the cooperative members. 1 1 It ranges from a minimum 
Rs. 35 per hour for tubewell 3 to a maximum Rs. 74 per hour for 
tubewell 1. The water charge per cubic meter ranges from Rs. 0.52 
to 0.95. These variations in price show that there is no 'marginal' 
value of water that informs price. The price of water is determined 
on a variety o f other factors mcluding the decision o f shareholders 
on the level o f profit In 2001, Tubewell 3 and 4 did not sell water 
to non-shareholders due to considerable reduction in their yield. 
Tubewell 1 still engaged in selling water as it had gone through 
major renovation. The price of water is higher in tubewell 1 to 
make profit while for the other tubewells the water is shared within 
the shareholders and a few buyers. 
Next, I present the narration o f the organisers o f the four 
tubewells and the opinion of some of the associated members, to 
understand the strategy and basis o f their organisations and the 
problem they face in the process of increasing prices and declining 
productivity. 1 2 
Tubewell 1: Patel Jiwabhai Pasabhai 
Jiwabhai Patel initiated this tubewell in 1986. H e was one of the 
early starters o f what is called the 'tubewell era'. During 1986 the 
water was drawn from 47 meters using a thirty hp pump. The 
tubewell has 15 members. Jiwabhai describes the tubewell as 
panchrangi (five-coloured) as almost all the castes o f Sangpura are 
represented as members. However, nine out o f 15 members are 
Patels and they hold 70 per cent of the total shares. The tubewell 
has seven water buyers out of which four are Thakores, two are 
Suthars and one belongs to the Patel caste. Altogether, the present 
water sale is for 2.5 hectares o f land. Jivabhai has two sons, one of 
whom is settled in the U S A since 2001 working at a confectionery 
shop in Chicago. He went to the U S A by paying Rs. 700000 to an 
agent Jiwabhai has four daughters, all o f whom are married. The 
second son helps him in agriculture. Because his son stays in the 
USA, Jiwabhai has a sustained income and as he says, 'no day-to-
day headache o f carrying out agriculture'. According to him, he is 
engaged in agriculture only to "keep himself occupied'. Jiwabhai 
and his brother own 3.5 hectares o f land. In 1985, when he 
initiated the tubewell, the total cost came to Rs. 350000. His wife 
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suffers from heart trouble. Until now, his earnings from the 
tubewell have gone into the medical treatment of his wife and 
marrying four daughters. However, with his son now in the USA, 
he could save some money. According to him, from 1986 onwards 
until 1998, the tubewell generated a lot o f profit for the 
shareholders, as the command area was more than 25 hectares. 
Half o f that was irrigated through water sale. After the considerable 
reduction in electricity supply, the command area started shrinking. 
In the year 2000-01, the tubewell was defunct due to a technical 
problem. It became old, so many parts had to be renewed. The 
shareholders then spent more than Rs. 400000 to get it repaired. 
The cost o f repair was collected from the Bhagidars (shareholders) 
based on their share in the tubewell. Some of them could 
contribute money, others did n o t Those who did not had money, 
sold part of their shares to contribute for the repair. For example, 
Narayanbhai Patel held 20 per cent o f the share but since he did 
not have enough money to contribute. H e sold five per cent o f his 
share to another Patel. The capacity o f the motor was increased to 
65 hp and the renovated tubewell was dug to a depth of 220 
meters. The water table in 2001 stood at 117 meters. In the 
tubewell cooperative, the water charge is based on an electric meter 
rather than the hourly basis that is popular in the village. According 
to Jiwabhai, the meter-based charge ensures that every drop o f 
water is counted and then the farmer who is using it has to pay for 
the same. Due to the renovation cost, the water charge was also 
increased. This charge was towards collecting a maintenance fund 
over time, so that if tubewell has major problems again in the 
future, the members do not have to shell out a lot o f money at one 
time. The increased water charge would thus contribute towards a 
reserve fund. The charge now is 65 paisa per unit, which comes up 
to Rs. 37 per hour. 1 3 The earlier charge was less than Rs. 30 per 
hour. 
Amthibhai Patel, Bhagidar in Tubewell 1 
T o r both my brothers, I have a 15 per cent o f share in the 
tubewell. I have two hectares o f land. I have been associated with 
this tubewell right from the beginning. Earlier, we used to irrigate 
from our own dugwell. The total irrigation was around two 
hectares from my well, which was 18 meters deep. Slowly the water 
table started receding and then the need for having a tubewell was 
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felt In 1986, we invested in a shared tubewell, as having a tubewell 
costs so much money that one person individually could not afford 
i t Therefore, it was good to have the bhqgidhari (shareholding) 
system. We also decided about the kalakwari (hours of irrigation) 
through the unit system. In the village almost all tubewells 
distribute water on an hourly basis, but we charge on a unit basis. 
O n an hourly basis, sometimes, say ten to 15 minutes always goes 
unaccounted for between two irrigations but this is not so in the 
unit based system. It is a more accurate way of water charging. 
Even one unit is accounted here'. I asked him - how did the 
process of accounting come about, as there was no other example 
o f this in the village? Amthibabi says, I n our earlier motor we used 
to have metered water supply. We were more used to the metered 
supply and since we were the first few people who installed the 
tubewell, we continued with the metered supply even though the 
electricity charges were turned into a flat-rate system based on 
horsepower. We find this system more accurate. In 1986, we used 
to pay the electricity bill on a meter basis and then in 1987 we had 
the flat rate tariff. In the flat rate tariff, farmers can irrigate more 
and so the production is more. On a metered basis, farmers used to 
irrigate less as the charges were more. The cost o f water is lower in 
a flat rate than in a unit-based system. During the time of pro-rata 
electricity bill, we used to sell water on a crop-sharing basis. This 
means that those who bought water had to pay 1/3^ share o f their 
production as water charge. It so happened that for one or two 
years, the production was not much, due to drought and heat 
waves that stressed cultivation. During that time, the water buyers 
had low production while the seller had to pay money according to 
the tariff though the profit was less. During that time, the tubewells 
did not make profit and therefore, this system was changed to 
supply water on a cash rather than crop-sharing basis. N o w 
irrespective of anyone having crop failure or bumper crops, the 
charges o f water have to be given'. 
I n 1996, we bought a 20 per cent share for Rs. 16000. But this 
is not the only investment. Every year, we have been investing 
money in the tubewell. The general maintenance of a tubewell is 
Rs. 20000 for one year. This includes the operator's salary and 
electricity bill For the last three years, we have been in trouble due 
to the increased cost o f the tubewell. In the last two years, we spent 
more than Rs . 500000 for renewing some or other part o f the 
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tubewell. We bought a new motor and made a new storage tank. 
So, all the profit for the past three years has been invested back 
into the tubewell. In 2001, the net profit was around Rs. 50000, 
which was distributed among 15 members based on their 
respective shares. For my 15 per cent share, I got Rs. 7500. This 
was almost equal to my total irrigation cost and so I did not pay for 
the irrigation charges. This is the only benefit for shareholders, but 
we also have to invest all the time. I have two sons. One is a 
teacher in Kheda and the other one is studying in BA. I studied up 
to 1 1 t h standard. For ten years, we had a problem in maintaining 
the motor and whatever we earned went in that Initially, when the 
tubewell started, there were 11 bhagidars. In 1989, when there was 
increased maintenance cost, one member sold two per cent of his 
share. In 2001, when the tubewell was under major repair many 
people sold part o f their share and three more people joined. N o w 
we have 15 members. In 2001,1 also sold five per cent o f my share. 
Initially I had a 20 per cent share and now I have only 15 per cent 
I f you have a three per cent of water share, you can irrigate a 
quarter of a hectare of land. N o w there are eight water buyers and 
the irrigation turn is once every 15 days. We get eight hours per day 
so we get 120 hours o f water in one round. This means one who 
has one per cent share would get one hour 12 minutes o f irrigation. 
We sell water at the rate of ten per cent o f total water available. 
This means only 12 hours o f water that we have surplus is being 
sold. I have 15 per cent o f share and so I am entitled to 18 hours of 
irrigation. I have only two hectares of land. In the winter season, it 
takes four hours to irrigate a quarter of a hectare of land. This 
means that I need 40 hours o f irrigation for irrigating 2.3 hectares 
o f land. Therefore, I am buying water from this tubewell, as my 
shares are not enough for me to irrigate all the land. We have also 
kept the water charges high, so at the end we do not have to pay 
for irrigation as it is compensated against the profif. 
Tubewell 2: Atmaram Chagandas Prajapati 
Atmaram Chagandas Prajapati initiated the tubewell in 1986. 
Atmaram was the second son of his father. His elder brother was 
mentally ill and died at the age o f 18. Since there was no other heir, 
Atmaram inherited all the two hectares o f land from his father. His 
father expired when Atmaram was 15 and since then he is engaged 
in farming. Due to early responsibility, he studied only up to the 
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fifth standard Initially, Atmaram together with his first cousin 
owned the open dugwell that irrigated around six hectares o f land 
in the early 1970s. The dugwell was inherited from his grandfather, 
so it was to be shared between him and his first cousin. The well 
was powered by an electric motor. Out o f the total six hectares o f 
land, Atmaram and his cousin used to irrigate their own land and 
sell the rest of the available water. At that time, water sale was on a 
crop-sharing basis and for the water sale, Atmaram and his cousin 
used to keep l / 3 r d o f the total production, which was shared 
equally between them. Atmaram has two sons, one o f whom is 
working as an accountant in the Gujarat Government The second 
one worked for a few years in the diamond polishing industry in 
Mehsana. Since two years he is back in the village and is trying to 
go to the USA. H e now helps his father in agriculture. H e has gone 
to Mumbai twice to get the visa as per the instruction from the 
agent However, he failed to obtain the visa as the agent was found 
to be a fraud on both occasions. 
In 1986, when the dug well ran dry, Atmaram got together with 
other interested people and installed the tubewell. He bought a 15 
per cent share while nine other members contributed the rest The 
partners in the tubewell were carefully chosen based on those who 
own land in the vicinity and those who are good to deal with. 
Atmaram says - 'caste is not a factor here but you should chose 
someone who is sukhi (well-to-do) and vyavasthit (balanced). We 
even have Thakores as members in our tubewell. If their land is 
near our tubewell and if they are resourceful enough to contribute 
to the cost, why should we deny them membership?' Since 
Atmaram initiated the tubewell he takes minor decisions. For some 
major decisions such as repairs or maintenance, he talks to other 
shareholders. At the time of construction, the tubewell had a total 
investment o f Rs. 225000. In 1986 the water table was at around 35 
meters, which had increased to around 100 meters in 2001. D u e to 
the dedining water table, the capadty o f the pump had to be 
increased from 41 hp in the beginning to 65 hp in 2001. At present, 
it irrigates around 15 hectares of land All the shareholders o f the 
tubewell have their land near i t According to Atmaram, the 
tubewell has seen golden years during the decade 1980-1990 when 
the total irrigation from it used to be more than 25 hectares with an 
electridty supply o f 16 hours per day. In 1995 the irrigated area 
reduced to 23 hectares as the electridty supply was reduced to 
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twelve hours per day. In 1998 it reduced to 16 hectares with the 
electricity supply being curtailed to ten hours per day. In the year 
2001 the electricity supply was further cut With eight hours supply 
per day, the command area o f the tubewell was reduced to around 
15 hectares. The decreasing supply o f electricity has an impact on 
water sales. These were reduced from more than 13 hectares o f 
land in the beginning to less than a hectare in the year 2001-02. 
There were around twelve people buying water from this tubewell, 
while in 2001-02 it was reduced to two. Those who do not get 
water had either to invest in a new tubewell or keep their land 
fallow for two seasons and take only rainfed crops. 
According to Atmaram — 'the main cause of the reduction in the 
command area of the tubewell is the reduced electricity supply and 
the declining water table in the area. The tubewell is also getting old 
and hence the maintenance has increased. We have been tilling this 
land for more than 15 years and never gave rest to the land. 
Everyone has some capacity and if you overuse it, you are going to 
face the consequences. Nevertheless, what could we have done? 
We did not look at the future for utilising groundwater and hence 
now we face a problem. Earlier, with the same supply o f electricity, 
more land was irrigated because the water table was high. However, 
with the decreased electricity supply and groundwater depletion, 
more electricity is required to irrigate the land. We have to increase 
the power o f the motor so that it fetches the same if not more 
amount o f water. The command area is reducing and the water sale 
has virtually stopped. T o cope with the situation, we have to 
change the irrigation schedule. Earlier, the water supply was once 
in 15 days. This has gone up and now it is once in 20 days. In some 
cases only shareholders are getting water and we have said no to 
those who used to buy water. Who would not like to sell water? It 
subsidises the cost of water for us. Nevertheless, we cannot do 
anything. We cannot give water at our cost to others. However, the 
reduction in command areas has been more visible in the summer 
than in the winter season because winter crops require less water 
than summer crops. We are now giving water to only two people 
and for less than one hectare. When we ourselves do not have 
water, how could we give to others? This year, we had a great loss. 
Every year the profit of our tubewell exceeded Rs. 100000. For the 
last three years, it has been a no profit-no loss business. This year, 
the total profit from the water sale only just passed the total 
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expenditure and we could make profit o f only around Rs. 8000. 
Our tubewell is now 15 years old and so the maintenance cost has 
increased. This year, we spent around Rs. 40000 for repairing the 
motor and inserting two pipes (around six meters) as the water 
level went down further. Others made a profit, but we could not 
because we had to incur these costs. It is the same for all the 
tubewells now. If they made profit this year, they would lose the 
next year. So we can not foresee any profit in the future'. 
Joitaram Prajapati, Bhagidar in Tubewell 2 
W e have a ten per cent share in this tubewell. My father bought 
the share and we are two brothers, so the share divides between the 
two o f us. We have two hectares of land that is irrigated through 
the ten per cent share in the tubewell. Earlier it was good as half o f 
the water from the tubewell used to be sold increasing the profit. 
For the last two years we have been facing many problems. I keep 
all the accounts and make the yearly profit-loss account o f the 
tubewell. Our water sale is reduced to only half a hectare as the 
tubewell discharge is affected considerably. It is not only the 
electricity charges, but also the depth at which we take water. Most 
o f the people are concerned with electricity, as it is more visible. O f 
course, with more electricity available we can take more water. The 
other fact is that every year we are going six meters deeper and so it 
takes more electricity to fetch water from that depth. For us it is 
not much of a problem. I have four sons and all o f them are 
working and earning a good sum of money. My elder son works as 
an accountant, the second to him is in a fertiliser company. The 
third son is studying under an apprenticeship and working with the 
electricity department as a trainee. The fourth one has gone to 
Surat to work as a computer operator in the diamond polishing 
industry. At home, only my wife and I are dependent on 
agriculture. The land in the command area of the tubewell has been 
given on sharecropping to a Thakore. We ourselves cultivate 0.69 
hectare of land that is close to our house. That much is enough for 
us along with the income from the dairying. We have two buffalos, 
so we get a good income from dairy. All together, we are not at loss 
even when the profit from the tubewell is decreasing. However, I 
also see a bad time ahead because we do not know what is going to 
happen in the future. It is good that my sons are well placed, so I 
do not have any problem.' 
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I n our tubewell, the water charge is lower than every other one 
in the area. We used to have a high water charge when we used to 
sell a lot o f water. N o w there are only two water buyers, so we have 
reduced the water charge because it is our own money that is 
rolling and with two buyers it is not much of profit Therefore, we 
decided mat we would not charge more. When there was more 
water for sale, the charges were high. We never had two charges for 
owners and buyers. It does not look good. In any case, the money 
is divided between us as profit so it should not look bad for the 
buyers that they are paying more and we are paying less. They also 
know that ultimately the money will come to us but on the face o f 
it, it does not look good. This year, we had a lot o f maintenance 
problems, as the tubewell is getting old. Like the problem of old 
age, our tubewell gets sick now and then. We have to invest a lot o f 
money to get it repaired. This government is not good. They are 
decreasing electricity supply and so our profit is being cut We pay 
the same charge as before but we get much less water. They also 
called for an increase in electricity rates. We will oppose any more 
increase until our last breath.' 
Tubewell 3: Chelaji Badarji Thakore 
Chelaji Thakore, 54, worked in a textile mill at Ahmedabad for 20 
years. When the mill was shut down, he tried working at some 
other places in Ahmedabad. However, he never got a satisfying job 
and hence decided to come back to the village in the late 1980s. In 
1990 he initiated the tubewell partly with the money that he 
received from the textile mill to compensate for the loss o f his job. 
In the area where Chelaji's tubewell is now situated, there were not 
many tubewells except that of Jiwabhai PateL Jiwabhai's tubewell 
used to be in demand and so Chelaji did not get water from his 
tubewell. This led to Chelaji's decision to invest in a tubewell. The 
tubewell was initiated with a bhagidari system but the major share 
o f the tubewell - 85 per cent - remained within his extended family 
o f four brothers and only 15 per cent o f the share in the tubewell 
went outside the family. According to him 'during that time only 
Jiwabhai's tubewell was there... we never got water from him as 
his tubewell was occupied with other people's demands. I got 
money from the textile mill as compensation and invested that in 
the tubewell. In 1990, I spent Rs. 350000 from the money I had 
and the rest I borrowed from others. Out o f this, around Rs. 45000 
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were contributed by bhagidars. In 1990 water was only 70 meters 
deep and I used to have two relas 14 o f water from the tubewelL 
Therefore, there was so much water for all o f us. The total irrigated 
area was more than 23 hectares but now we cannot even irrigate 
ten hectares o f land. At that time, the water charge was 15 rupees 
per hour and now it has increased to 35 rupees per hour. My father 
was working in the textile mill and so we also worked in the mill. I 
was educated in Sangpura but my brothers studied in Ahmedabad. 
Those were the good times and we never wanted to return to the 
village. In Ahmedabad there were 75 mills and now only four to 
five have survived. The rest are closed now. All my three brothers 
have been working in the mills but when they started to close one 
by one we all returned to Sangpura, Those who had some land in 
their village returned, but those who did not have any thing back 
home stayed in Ahmedabad. They started working as wage 
labourers in other industries. Since we had land, we could fall back 
on the assurance that we can have food to survive. Just now I have 
spent around Rs. 20000 because the motor had to be renewed. 
Earlier, the profit from the tubewell was around Rs. 60000 -70000 
but this year we are under a big loss. For the last three years the 
tubewell is giving some or the other trouble... sometimes the motor 
has to be repaired sometimes the pump (see Box 4.3) . . . so one has 
to spend a lot of money in all that... for us, Rs. 26000 is the total 
electricity bill in the year whether the tubewell is running or not5. 
TDue to some problem or the other, my tubewell has not been 
running but I have to pay for the electricity charges. Even small 
maintenance such as starter repair takes away a lot o f money. This 
year we have incurred a loss and I am totally broke. I could not 
collect the water charges as the crops have failed. N o one is giving 
money for the water consumed; they themselves have not earned 
money. Even the labour charge could not be paid, so how can I ask 
money from them when I know that they do not have money? I 
want to return the electricity connection this time. I have half a 
hectare of land. For this much of land, why should I take this big a 
headache? I have to give money to the person who repaired the 
tubewell. Last time I bought a starter for Rs. 15000 and I gave him 
only Rs . 5000 as I did not had money. I have to give Rs . 10000 
back but how can I repay the loan to him if I do not have any 
income? This time the crops have failed - from a quarter of a 
hectare one did not get even 100 kg o f pearl millet so what should 
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we do? From less than 100 kg o f pearl millet, we have to deduct 
the kalakwari and majuri (labour charges). All o f us have the same 
problem and so how can I pressurise them to give me money? This 
year, we did not get enough to survive, leave apart the profit See, 
Gemarji Thakore has now constructed a new tubewelL For 
electricity connection, the government has given him an estimate o f 
Rs. 100200. H e spent Rs. 60000 on buying an electricity connection 
Box: 4.3: The maintenance diary of Chelaji Thakore 
Jan 1,2001 New starter was bought and the motor was 
repaired 
Nov 29, Purchased new capacitor for the pump 
2001 
Dec 3,2001 Two new columns were inserted 
Jan 1,2002 New starter was bought and the motor was 
repaired 
Jan 8,2002 Two new columns were inserted 
Oct 23, 2002 New motor installed 
Nov 24, New column inserted 
2002 
Dec 6, 2002 The bore had accumulated sand and so the sand 
was removed for 29 meters and then one column 
was inserted 
Dec 8,2002 Pump bearing was changed 
Jan 18,2003 Motor was repaired 
Source: Field notes 
from a village in Vijapur under a transfer scheme. Last week the 
electricity board has given the connection. The electricity bill is 
four times the bill that we pay as all the new electricity connections 
are metered and charged on a pro-rata basis. The charge for new 
connection is 50 paisa per unit For me the bill comes to Rs . 4200 
every two months. I have a 50 hp motor and so the flat-rate 
charges are Rs. 500 per hp per year. Therefore, the total money is 
Rs. 25000, which I have to pay in six instalments. For this month, I 
have got the bill but do not have money. From where would I pay 
the bill? I do not have any other source o f income like Patels. We 
have to depend upon the income from agriculture to pay for the 
tubewell. We do not have income from the USA either. From 
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where should we be paying? I went to Rambhai Patel to ask for 
money. But he said that he himself does not have money and his 
bhagidars have also not contributed. He is calling a meeting of all 
the bhagidars. N o w tell me, if Rambhai Patel would face problem 
then we are small people in front o f him. 1 5 What can we do? ' 
Chelaji has two sons who work in the industries in and around 
Mehsana both earning around Rs. 3000 per month. Chelaji does 
not want his sons to be engaged in agriculture as in his opinion it is 
becoming an uncertain business. Working in the industries is 
preferred much more due to the sustained income that one gets. 
Takhuji Thakore, Bhagidar in Tubewell 3 
T am a ten per cent bhagidar in the tubewell and I am there since 
the beginning. In 1990 I paid Rs. 30000 for getting the ten per cent 
share. Earlier we used to have very good profit but now we are 
running into trouble. The discharge o f the tubewell has reduced 
and together with less electricity supply the total area under 
irrigation has reduced. I have half a hectare o f land but I also take 
up Patel's land for sharecropping. Today with half a hectare o f 
land, you cannot survive. I used to work in diamond polishing in 
Mehsana. For 25 years, I did diamond polishing but it requires very 
minute observation. So when I become old, I had to leave i t Many 
people like us came back to the village and are engaged in doing 
agriculture now. From the last year onwards, we are not having any 
profit from the tubewell. All the bhagidars are in debt now and we 
cannot give back the money that we took on loan to repair the 
motor. I have two sons and two daughters. The daughters are 
married. My elder son is engaged in diamond polishing while the 
younger one is studying. After he finishes his education, he will get 
some job in Mehsana. Even if he works for Rs. 1000 a month, it is 
good for him. I will not allow him to take up agriculture any more'. 
Takhatji Thakore, Water buyer, Tubewell 3 
Tn our tubewell the water charge is 35 rupees for one hour. We 
have a problem, as we do not get water. Our turn o f water comes 
after 15 to 20 days and sometimes even after a month. The land on 
our side of the village is not good. The soil is sandy, so we need 
irrigation every 15 days in the winter season. But what to do if we 
do not get it? As a buyer, I am dependent upon them. There are no 
other tubewells here and so I have to be with them even if I do not 
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get water when I require. This government is curtailing power and 
we cannot do anything. We cannot even get back our investment 
from agriculture now. I have four cattle but I buy fodder for them, 
as the agricultural residue is so little. I have four sons and two 
daughters. All the daughters are married. We do sharecropping and 
if we do not get it, we go for wage labour. I have a pair of oxen 
that I give on hire and this is one source o f income for me. I get 
Rs. 200 per hectare for land preparation. I will tell you, there is 
nothing left in carrying out agriculture for us. I f you are a Patel and 
if you have orchards, then you can survive. I do not have a share in 
the tubewell and have to give money for water. I f there are more 
hours o f electricity, the water charges are less. N o w they have 
increased the price o f water because the electricity comes for only 
eight hours or less. When water decreases in the tubewell, we are 
the first ones whose water is curtailed. Last winter, it was worse as 
they (the electricity department) first gave four hours of electricity 
and then six hours and then at the fag end of the winter season 
they gave nine hours o f electricity. Therefore, the average supply 
comes up to around six hours per day. The charges for electricity 
are based on the flat rate so there is no reduction in the bill but 
when hours o f electricity is reduced, we are the first ones who are 
denied water. Even I cannot complain because, if I were the owner 
o f the tubewell, I would not give water to others if my fields were 
drying. It is all this government which does not want people like us 
to survive.' 
Tubewell 4: Ramchandrabhai Parmar 
Ramchandrabhai Parmar (70) initiated the tubewell in 1990. 
According to him 'in 1962, the first tubewell was installed by the 
Gujarat Water Resource Development Corporation [GWRDC] but 
most o f the people used their own wells for irrigation and very few 
bought water from the G W R D C tubewell. It was only when the 
groundwater level started to decline in the 1980s that people 
started to irrigate through tubewells. Parmars in the village have 
approximately 23 hectares o f land. Most o f the land (10-12 ha) is 
concentrated on the south o f Sangpura bordering Aakhaj village. 
O n the western side, Parmars own three hectares o f land while on 
the eastern side they have three hectares o f land. On the northern 
side o f the village, we have little less than a hectare o f land. When 
the water level declined, we started buying water from the 
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G W R D C tubewell. Since most of our land used to come in their 
command area, we never thought o f investing into a tubewell o f 
our own. However, in 1989 the G W R D C tubewell went out of 
order. The tubewell was never repaired and hence we started 
buying water from a Patel from the neighbouring village. Since 
many people were getting water from that tubewell we started 
having difficulties in getting water. The Patel used to give us water 
only during the night while he used to irrigate his fields in the day. 
Since the Parmars did not have any share in his bore, they could 
not force the Patel tubewell owner for any equitable time 
distribution between share and non-shareholders. This problem 
drove Parmars to have their own tubewells, and in 1990 we 
invested in the tubewell. The tubewell was constructed to a depth 
o f 132 meters and the water table was at 59 meters. The tubewell 
has ten bhagidars out o f which two belong to Vaghri caste and one 
is a Bawa. Since we have more land in this area, the members are 
dominated by people from the Parmar community. In addition, 
whoever came to invest in the tubewell was inducted into the 
cooperative and so there is no cfistinction made based on caste. 
When we started this tubewell, we used to have a good profit and 
all the water charges for our own fields were paid from this profit 
In 1990 a ten per cent share's value was Rs. 26000 and then we 
hardly paid any money for our own irrigation. However, from 
1998-99 onwards things started to change. First the hours o f 
electricity available were curtailed and then our tubewell started to 
give problems. Earlier, we used to have two relas but now we have 
only one rela. Therefore, the water sale was curtailed and now we 
have very little profit Because not much water is sold, the profit 
comes from us only as we have kept the water charge higher than 
what is actually incurred. This is the way to collect money and keep 
it as a reserve, as one will never know when the motor or any other 
part o f the machine needs replacement During the last three years 
the water sale has been reduced and so the profit became very low. 
Apart form this, we also incur costs for maintenance of the 
tubewell'. 
So what are the costs o f adjustment to the declining water table 
and increasing cost of irrigation? Ask the question and 
Ramchandrabhai replies 'the cost o f mamtaining the tubewell is 
very high. Many tubewells are creating one or other problem and 
so if the shareholders are not financially strong they cannot survive 
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with the increasing problems. For the last three years, four new 
tubewells were installed in the village; all the money has come from 
the USA. Anyone who is working here will not have money to 
initiate a tubewell. Not even ten per cent of the share. Earlier, we 
used to have shares that were almost equal within a tubewell 
cooperative. N o w one Patel will have 60 to 80 per cent and the rest 
o f the shares will be with his friends and relatives. It is difficult for 
an outsider to buy a new share in a tubewell. Every year we are 
going six meters deeper and so we do not know where we are 
heading. Every time you sink a pipe you spend around Rs. 4000-
5000. The water sale has almost ended and so we have to pay from 
our own money now5. 
Bechargiri Bawa, Bhagidar, Tubewell 4 
Bechargiri is one o f the partners in the tubewell. H e used to work 
with an industrial house in Ahmedabad and returned to the village 
after retirement H e has 0.7 hectare o f land which is irrigated 
though the tubewell. Two years ago, a Thakore took a Rs. 20000 
loan from him. As an interest towards the loan, Bechargiri kept his 
half hectare o f land and would return this only after the principal 
amount is given back to him. He has given that land to another 
person for sharecropping. According to him 'the tubewell is like a 
security deposit for us. In 1990 ,1 paid Rs. 13000 to get a five per 
cent share... tomorrow if you need Rs. 10000, you can sell part o f 
your share. There are many people to buy these shares here. 
However, in our tubewell we have made a karar (agreement) that if 
any one wants to sell the share, they will have to inform the 
shareholders and the first preference would be given to the present 
shareholders. Even for selling water to non-shareholders, there has 
to be a consensus among the Bhagidars. Some people want to sell 
some parts of their share. The value o f our tubewell shares have 
gone up. N o w a normal tubewell costs around Rs. 700000 and so a 
five per cent share will cost around Rs. 35000. In 1990,1 paid Rs. 
13000 and the same share could cost Rs. 35000 now. However, the 
price of the share always depends upon the capacity o f the motor 
and so in actual sense we cannot compete with the new tubewells 
as they have higher capacity pumps and so the actual price o f our 
share will be lower but the price has definitely doubled in ten years. 
Earlier, when there was sufficient electricity in the village, we used 
to give water to bin-bhagiddrs (non-shareholders). However, we have 
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stopped that for the last two to three years. The amount o f fallow 
land was never like this before. There obviously is an interest in 
selling water. I f we give water the income is for our tubewell only, 
isn't it? We have to pay the same amount to the electricity 
department Earlier, there were many buyers but now the tubewell 
has only one rela and that is why the water flow is less...when the 
gbarka dhani (tubewell owners) will not get water, how will they sell 
it to bin-bhagidars? We do not even give water to the tubewell 
operator if he is not having share in the tubewell'. 
Somabhai Vaghari, Bhagidar and Operator, Tubewell 4 
Somabhai Vaghari, 50, is the tubewell operator and now stays at 
the tubewell for eight hours when the electricity is provided. H e 
says that it is not difficult as one anyway comes to the field to work 
and this becomes his side profession. According to him, 'now 
having a share in a tubewell means shelling out a lot of money. In 
April we got the servicing done for the tubewell and hence the 
yield increased but we had to pay Rs. 18000 for the work. 
Generally, when there is an emergency like this, we collect money 
from the people based on their share. For example, i f the total 
expenditure is Rs. 10000 then the person who has five per cent o f 
share will have to contribute Rs . 500. I f not then we take money 
based on total command area of the tubewell. For example, if the 
tubewell has 11 hectares of total command area during a particular 
season, we charge Rs. 850 per hectare and so collect the money. 
Those who are buying water also give money and we deduct the 
money paid in advance from their water charge for that particular 
season. Two people have invested in our tubewell but they do not 
have land in the command area. For them, it is just an investment 
and so they do not give money for any emergency repair. All the 
people get their fair share at the end of each year and so no one has 
a problem. I have half a hectare of land and I have taken another 
half hectare on sharecropping. I also cultivate my brothers' land 
but it is on a fixed rent basis as he has a government job and stays 
in Junagarh. I am the operator for the last eight years. Earlier we 
used to have 24 hours o f electricity so there was no problem in 
getting water but when electricity was reduced to twelve hours a 
day, the electricity supply was converted in day and night shifts. 
Every 15 days, the shift is changed. My son has studied up to 12 t h 
standard and is working in Kalol in die Arvind mills factory. We 
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spent Rs . 5,000 for his training and now he has a job. H e took 
training in Gandhinagar and now he is working over there. I would 
never like my sons to take up agriculture. It is better for them to 
work outside the village. I have a five per cent share in the tubewell 
for which I paid Rs. 13,000 in 1990. I took a loan from our 
relatives. Because of the tubewell my son has studied and is 
working. When you take a loan for investing in the tubewell, it is 
easy to get money from relatives, as this investment is considered 
safe. I f you want to borrow money for marrying your daughters, 
you may have a problem in getting it but not so when you want to 
buy a tubewell share. This is because in the past, a tubewell 
generated money and so it was not difficult to get the money back 
if given on loan. 
The increasing cost of water and dedining profit 
The four case studies of the tubewells and narratives of farmers 
clearly show that the decreased supply o f dectridty has had an 
impact on the groundwater available for the farmers. Table 4.7 
provides the data on shrinking command area and reduction in 
water sale o f the four tubewells. It shows that the command area o f 
all tubewells has reduced. Due to the shrinking command area the 
sale o f water has also been decreasing. In some cases, such as 
tubewell 2, the water sale has reduced from irrigating around 13 
hectares in 1990-91 to less than one hectare in 2001-02. The case is 
similar for other tubewells in Sangpura (also see Table 3.9). 
Another effect of the lowering o f the water table is the 
progressive deepening of the tubewells. The present rate o f 
deepening in Sangpura is around six meters per year. The 
deepening of tubewells has been combined with increasing the 
capadty o f the motor. All the four sample tubewells have increased 
their pumpset capadty from 10 to 20 hp in less than a decade. The 
price of dectridty is based on the capadty o f the pump and hence 
the increase in capadty affects the price paid for pumping water 
(Table 4.8). 
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TABLE 4.7 SHRINKING COMMAND AREAS AND FEWER WATER BUYERS 
Sample Command Area fin ha) Water sale fin ha) 
Tubewells 1990- 1998- 2001- 1990- 1998- 2001-
91 99 02 91 99 02 
1 26.45 19.55 17.14 14.95 4.14 2.53 
2 25.3 16.1 14.95 13.45 2.76 0.69 
3 24.15 14.95 12.65 19.55 14.95 3.91 
4 22.54 16.56 11.73 12.65 6.44 1.38 
Source: Field data 
Note: Until 1986 the charges of electricity in Sangpura were based on kilowatt of 
electricity consumed. In 1986, it was turned into a flat rate based on the 
contracted load of the motors (in Horse Power). In 1998-99, the supply of 
electricity was reduced to twelve hours from the earlier 16 to 18 hours per day. 
The increasing cost o f water has affected the profit for members 
o f the tubewell cooperative. The profit calculation is a very 
important exercise and is done with taking all the expenditures and 
costs into account (see Box 4.4). The profit also depends upon the 
total water yield o f a particular tubewell and hence its water sale. 
The sale o f water is highest in winter followed by summer and the 
monsoon (see Box 4.5). Table 4.9 shows the gross profit o f the 
four tubewell cooperatives in three distinct years. In 1991-92 all the 
tubewells generated a profit from the sale o f water. With the 
electricity cut in the year 1998-99, the profit reduced considerably. 
Further, in the year 2001-02, the account shows that only tubewell 
1 and 4 have made a profit whereas tubewell 2 and 3 have just 
managed to cover their costs. 
In 2003 tubewell 3 has stopped functioning due to increasing 
maintenance requirements and lack of money to get it repaired. 
Tubewell 1 has made considerable profit even in the time when 
everyone else is losing out. This is because the owners have 
renovated the entire system using some parts o f the old tubewell, 
costing around Rs. 500000. The capacity of the pump was 
increased and hence it could cope with the problems. The case o f 
tubewell 4 is similar: its major shareholders have government jobs 
and hence they do not solely rely on agriculture. They also 
renovated the tubewell to maintain the flow of water. Tubewell 3 
has barely survived, making a profit o f around Rs. 8000. In the year 
2001-02, tubewell 3 faced problems and hence it was stopped twice 
for major repairs, which lasted for almost 15 days during the peak 
winter season. Due to this, the farmers getting water from this 
TABLE 4.8: PROGRESSIVE DEEPENING 
Tubewells Depth of water tah 
(in meters) 
<le Capadty of pumpset (in hp) Sisgofcasit, tg (pump lift pip \e) in inches 
1990-1991 1995-1996 2001-2002 1990-1991 1995-1996 2001-2002 1990-1991 1995-1996 2001-2002 
1 94.1 105.8 117.6 41 50 62 8(5) 8(5) 10(5) 
2 8Z3 94.1 100.0 41 50 65 8(4) 8(4) 8(4) 
3 67.6 88.2 111.7 41 41 50 8(5) 8(5) 8(5) 
4 58.8 82.3 100.0 30 30 41 8(4) 8(4) 8(4) 
Source: Field data 
TABLE 4.9 GROSS PROFIT OF TUBEWELL COOPERATIVES (IN RS.) 
Financial year Tubewell 1 Tubewell 2 Tubewell 3 Tubewell 4 
1991-92 120000 80000 80000 80000 
1998-99 95000 75000 50000 55000 
2001-02 68517 8566 2106 40165 
Source: Field data 
Note: For the year, 2001-02, the records were taken from the annual profit-loss 
accounts of the tubewell cooperatives. Figures for the other years are based on 
the recall method and hence do not represent a totally accurate figure. 
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Box 4.4: Record keeping and profit calculations 
The profit of a tubewell is calculated by deducting the maintenance 
cost, electricity expenses and the salary of the operator from the 
total water sales. The price of water is fixed per hour. The price is 
the same for share and non-share holders in Sangpura. The 
irrigation schedule is stricdy maintained and minutely recorded in 
the record book, including the hours of irrigation for each 
individual. At the end of the season, just before harvesting, these 
records are pulled out and each person's kalakwari is calculated. 
First, the money is collected from the non-shareholders after 
confirming that they have sold their harvest and have ready cash 
that could be collected. The yearly account is made in October soon 
after the nine-day long festival of Navratri. The new account book 
is opened in November on the day of Labh Pamham, the first day of 
the New Year according to the Gujarati-Hindu calendar. The 
charges for kalakwari of shareholders are also taken at the end of 
each season. This money is utilised for paying electricity bills and 
for any eventualities such as major maintenance of the tubewell. 
Some tubewells have reserve funds kept for emergencies. At the 
end of the financial year, the profit is distributed according to an 
individual's share in the tubewell. If the shareholder's kalakwari is 
more than the total profit, he is supposed to pay back the money. 
For example, if a shareholder has a five per cent of share and if the 
total profit of the tubewell is Rs. 40000, then the share of profit is 
Rs. 2000. If that shareholder's kalakwari is less than Rs. 2000, the 
money is returned. If the kalakwari is more than the share of profit, 
the money in excess of this amount is paid back 
Source: Field notes 
tubewell could not access water and hence their crop failed 1 6. 
Therefore, even though the account shows a small profit of Rs. 
2106, the owners could not collect the money from farmers as 
some incurred loss due to crop failure. In this case, the profit-loss 
account recorded the individual's liability that will have to be paid 
back in the next year. 1 7 
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Box 4.5: Shrinking command area in summer 
It was observed in one of the tubeweHs that the command area in the 
winter of 2001-2002 was around eighteen hectares reduced to eight 
hectares in the summer of 2002. The question is why was there such a 
reduction if water was available? The answer lies in the fact that there 
are very few crops - only as pead millet, sorghum and alfalfa - that 
are sown during summer (the hot season). The farmers' choice of 
whether to grow a summer crop or not depends upon the profit 
projection for the season by studying the market and trends. Every 
farmer keeps some land for the fodder crop alfalfa, which is used as 
green fodder for buffaloes. Depending upon the resource base of the 
farmers, they decide how much to sow during the summer season. 
This is largely because the number of irrigations increases in summer 
and thus the cost. If farmers do not see the returns coming from a 
particular crop, they do not wish to irrigate. During summer the 
physical labour requirement is also higher and the decision to sow a 
crop considers this. The chances of crop failure are much higher due 
to heat waves. Further, the choice also depends up on their 
neighbour's decision to take up crops or not, because if all the 
surrounding land is fallow, the crop in the middle would require more 
water for irrigation due to the oasis effect. In that case farmers decide 
against taking a particular crop. However, this decision does not affect 
alfalfa cultivation as it is necessary for milk production. In almost all 
cases the command area of the tubewell is reduced to half during 
summer. 
Source: Field notes 
Whose Crisis is it Anyway? 
Declining productivity in Sangpura is caused by the depletion o f 
groundwater resource coupled with other crucial factors such as 
the impact o f intensive agriculture over time and lack o f technical 
innovation to keep up the level o f productivity. The immediate 
fallout of this is the declining yield o f crops. The area under 
cultivation also declined from 1996 to 2000, as recent government 
figures show (Table 4.2). The visible effects of the dedining 
productivity trend are increases in cost o f inputs such as irrigation, 
and decreasing yield. Both have an impact on the household and 
Declining Productivity and Increasing Irrigation Prices 133 
village economy. Until very recently, the government data did not 
show a declining productivity trend, which is calculated as yield per 
hectare. At the village level, the cultivators increase the level of 
input to maintain output Yield data fails to capture the declining 
trends of productivity. For each hectare o f land the cost o f 
production goes up while per unit o f land productivity is 
maintained. In this chapter, we have seen how farmers have been 
engaged in progressive deepening o f tubewells that increases the 
irrigation prices. Apart from this, the number of irrigations given to 
a particular crop has increased, as well as the application o f other 
inputs such as fertilisers and organic manure. These efforts are 
directed towards mamtaining the level o f productivity. Each o f the 
above has an effect on the profitability o f agriculture. In Sangpura 
a large majority is still engaged in subsistence agriculture. The 
declining profitability of agriculture has direct linkages with 
household economics especially for small and marginal farmers. 
N o n e of the above responses address the issue o f groundwater 
depletion and in fact reinforces the situation of mining. Why is this 
so? The answer lies in the way the crisis hits the village. N o t 
everyone is affected by the crisis in the same way. For example, 
tubewell 1 has made profit, as the owners were able to invest and 
renovate their tubewell. With increased capacity of the tubewell 
they could maintain the level of profit, if not increase it 
significantly. Tubewell 3 that is primarily owned by Thakores, 
could not cope with the problem of increased prices and 
maintenance cost, and hence was shut down in the year 2003. The 
shareholders confessed that they have incurred debts in the process 
and the only way to recover this is to sell off the tubewell along 
with the electricity connection to someone who has more capacity 
to maintain i t In Mehsana district there has been a government 
restriction on providing electricity connections to tubewells; as the 
district is categorised as a dark zone. However, the farmers exploit 
a section of electricity rule for transferring electricity connections 
within the district A market for electricity connections has 
developed. Hence people sell their electricity connection at very 
high prices in the name of connection transfers. The leaders of 
tubewell 3 were considering that option to recover their losses and 
in this way could get immediate relief. 
The case o f Sangpura and Mehsana is not isolated and can be 
largely compared to the situation in Gujarat and some other parts 
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of India. Bhalla and Singh (2001) carried out a nation-wide study o f 
district level agricultural growth and development The study 
suggests that the high rates o f growth recorded during the 1980s 
are not being sustained and that the growth rates o f agricultural 
output have decelerated during the 1990s. The study shows that the 
central region (comprising of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Rajasthan) is characterised by year-to-year 
fluctuations in agricultural output, mainly due to vagaries o f the 
monsoon, absence of assured irrigation and non-development o f 
appropriate technology suitable for dry-land and drought-prone 
areas. Mathur and Kashyap (2000), in their district-level analysis o f 
the problems and prospects of agriculture in Gujarat, report a 
major shift from food to non-food cash crops in the 1980s. 
However, the land productivity for selected crops has experienced 
a significant decline after the 1980s. According to them 'declining 
productivity levels of selected crops perhaps indicate that 
increasingly productive and problem-free lands are being allocated 
to other crops. These crops perhaps also account for a major 
portion o f purchased inputs (fertilisers, water, tractors etc)' (ibid.: 
3146). This decline o f agricultural growth is attributed to several 
technical constraints such as present H Y V seeds losing their 
genetic potential. Government expenditure on agriculture, 
irrigation and electricity is decreasing, which destabilises the 
capacity o f farmers to sustain risk (Desai 1997). Over the years, the 
pressure on land has increased in absence o f a major diversification 
from agriculture. This led to an increased pressure on natural 
resources such as land and water. Experts in Gujarat are calling for 
'seed-centred new technology with resource-centred new 
technology' to combat the situation (Hirway 2000). However, until 
this happens the crisis continues in villages such as Sangpura. The 
crisis definitely is not for the resource rich farmers who have 
greater capacity to sustain risk and maintain the level o f 
productivity through increasing inputs and renovating and 
deepening wells. The crisis is for households who have no means 
to respond adequately to the situation. Their own labour utilisation 
is subject to the agricultural productivity as they do not have any 
means o f existence other than agriculture and therefore are at the 
receiving end of the declining productivity. 
In the next chapter I show how groups who are solely 
dependent on agriculture for survival are coping with changes in 
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the agricultural production system. The small and marginal farmers 
who are pushed out o f the water market form a large labour force 
in Sangpura. The easy availability o f labour has revived the 
sharecropping system. The dominant classes are able to extract 
surplus and transfer the burden of resource depletion to groups 
lowest in the socio-economic hierarchy through the sharecropping 
arrangement 
Notes 
1 The government avoids using direct methods of revenue generation to 
curtail subsidies in the power sector. This is largely because of political 
reasons. The government chooses to decrease supply in electricity. The 
conflicts between farmers and government over a recent price hike in 
electricity used in the farm sector are discussed in chapter 6. 
2 There is an increasing body of literature dealing with water productivity 
instead of land productivity due to increasing water scarcity situations. 
The water productivity concept is based on more crop per drop or 
producing more food with the same water resources or producing the 
same amount of food with less water resources. In a broad sense, 
productivity of water is related to the value of benefit derived from the 
use of water (Molden 1997). Water productivity also describes various 
aspects of water management such as production, utilisation, environment 
and economy (Molden and Sakthivadivel 1999). The term, water 
productivity is used due to the growing recognition of agriculture being 
the main consumer of freshwater resources and increasing productivity of 
water use seems to be the most practical way to save water (Droogers and 
Kite 2001, Bastiaansen and Droogers 2003). However, in this chapter I 
use land productivity instead of water productivity when referring to the 
word 'productivity'. This is because of the lack of historical data available 
on water productivity when referring to productivity growth in agriculture 
over time. The village level data on water use is based on the recall 
method, which could not be used to calculate water productivity over time 
as that should be based on more accurate and precise information on 
water use. However, I define productivity using the concept of ecosystem 
productivity developed by Datye (1997) and Paranjape and Joy (1995). I 
will return to the discussion in chapter 7. 
3 Unfortunately I could not confirm the introduction of new variety seeds 
of alfalfa from government sources. 
4 Farmers refer to these changes as land becoming Reteelee (sandy) due to 
which the irrigation requirement has increased. The director of an 
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agricultural college, on request for anonymity, informally confirmed this 
problem of land degradation and desertification in Mehsana and other 
intensively cultivated districts of Gujarat due to over-cultivation. 
5 Only recently, Bt Cotton seeds have been in news as an alternative to 
existing cotton seed varieties. However, there was a lot of confusion 
regarding the use of Bt Cotton in Sangpura as it was not authorised for 
commercial use in the year 2001-02, and eady 2003, during the time of the 
my field work. Farmers heard the rumour that the leafs of Bt Cotton are 
poisonous and if buffaloes eat them, by mistake, they would die instandy. 
Some confusion was regarding the actual productivity of this new seed 
variety and the authorisation for actual use. During my stay, I never heard 
any official confirmation of the introduction of this HYV seed in 
Sangpura through agricultural extension services. 
6 The production of sorghum is measured in Puaa (a bundle of grass) that 
is roughly equivalent to 2.5 kg. Tobacco is a new crop for farmers of 
Sangpura and hence its production in 1990 is not known to them. Alfalfa 
lasts for approximately one to two years but is mostly taken for eight to 
twelve months in order to get good quality. The crop is irrigated every 
seven to ten days depending upon the season. The yield for alfalfa is 
calculated based on an approximate production of eleven kg per day for 
one year in one hectare of land. 
7 This could be a two way process. External inputs may cause decline in 
productivity while because of productivity decline, the use of external 
inputs may go up. However, the declining productivity may also be due to 
other factors such as declining soil fertility that includes changing 
chemical composition of the soil, organic matter content and soil 
structure. These concerns are subject to detailed analysis of soil texture 
and ecological factors other than groundwater depletion. 
8 Gupta and Deshpande (1998) studied the cost to economy and health of 
depleting groundwater levels and increasing fluoride in Mehsana district. 
Their study shows that in the decade 1980-1990 large scale exploitation of 
groundwater has occurred due to intensive cultivation based on 
groundwater irrigation. This has led to a fall in groundwater table at the 
rate of three meters per year. The study cites four major impacts of 
groundwater level decline. First, the fluorides and other dissolved salts in 
drinking water have shown a progressively increasing trend and have 
exceeded the safe limit in the past two decades. Second, chemical quality 
of groundwater is also showing an adverse impact on soil fertility and 
crop growth. Third, with progressive decline in groundwater table more 
electric power is required to lift the same quantity of water. Fourth, the 
process of deterioration of groundwater quality continues unabated. This 
leads to a proportion of the population being affected by fluorosis. The 
study recommends conserving rainwater in both surface and sub-surface 
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reservoirs and treatment and reuse of waste water as a step towards 
solving the problem. 
9 As mentioned in chapter 1, the initial idea was to study how people 
identify and associate themselves with the tubewell. In Sangpura, this 
identification is based on the one who is the principle motivator to start 
the tubewell and hence their caste identities are attached simultaneously. 
In the initial days of my stay at the village I also started my investigation 
with criteria based on caste. I assumed that the tubewell cooperatives were 
caste-based organisations. However, I was proved wrong as I started an 
in-depth enquiry into the membership partem of the tubewells. I found 
that most of the tubewells consisted of mixed caste groups but were called 
by the caste name related to the person who manages it. As I enquired 
further, a class and geography-based classification of tubewells pattern 
emerged against the caste-based identities. Caste plays an important role 
in deterrruning access and control over land, but in tubewell organisation, 
geography and class were more prominent identifications than caste. 
1 0 Caste-wise land ownership is largely clustered in particular geographical 
regions because of historical ownership of large tracts of land by 
particular families who belonged to a particular caste. The class-wise land 
ownership is clustered more in some areas that are considered good due 
to better soil quality. They are also in possession of richer class families. 
As shown in Chapter 3, class and caste coincides inmost of the cases. 
1 1 For tubewell 1 and 2, the discharge is high and hence water is divided 
into two parts and sold simultaneously through right and left hand pipe 
oudets. Upon enquiry, the price of water per hour will be referred by the 
villagers as the price of water from one outlet only. Therefore, in 
calculating the price, the referred price has to be doubled as water is sold 
simultaneously. For tubewell 3 and 4, there is only one oudet and hence 
calculation is done based on the referred price. 
1 2 While interviewing the individuals, I used audio tape and then 
transcribed them. Some of the conversations that are presented in the 
case studies and where actual quotes are used, I have not edited the text 
apart from changing the use of land measurements from bigha to hectare 
and water level from feet to meters. This was mainly for the reason that I 
want to use the literal account of the people that provided information on 
connectedness between issues while the topic is centered around 
tubewells. This, in my understanding, shows the other linkages and hence 
provides a broader understanding of the context. 
1 3 While saying this, he refers to only one side of the pipe flow. Refer to 
footnote 13 for details. 
1 4 Normally the water from the tubewell is divided in two sections and 
water flows through the pipe in two different directions. They are called 
left and right hand pipes. Reld actually means 'flow' but here the two rela 
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means that the tubewell had water flowing in left and right hand pipes. 
When the discharge of tubewell is low, it leads to having only one rela or 
water flowing only in one direction at a moment in time. 
1 5 Rambhai Patel is one of the big landlords in the village. He also lends 
money to people. 
1 6 In such situations farmers try to get water from neighbouring tubewells 
on request. Most of the time, the schedule for irrigation is very strict and 
so it is unlikely that neighbouring tubewells will share their water as they 
are bound by commitments to their shareholders and buyers. Sometimes 
it also depends upon the number of tubewells in the area and the surplus 
water available. In that case farmers buy water through other tubewells. In 
the area where tubewell 3 is located, the density of tubewells is very low as 
the area is dominated by Thakores, who are mostiy non-tubewell owners. 
In absence of tubewells, farmers of tubewell 3 lost their crop. 
1 7 There is a superstition attached to showing a negative balance in the 
annual account book. Due to this, the tubewell owners do not want to 
show that they have incurred a loss due to the belief that it would happen 
again. In the case of tubewell 3, the account calculated the total irrigation 
charges and showed a small profit but in reality, it was at a loss. The loss 
or inability to collect money from the shareholders was shown as a 
liability, which had to be paid back by next year. 
5 
Sharecropping Migration and the New 
Face of Water Markets 
Je hitkarm kare eche te bhai eche 
Je poshak eche te pita eche 
Jema vishwas cebe aee mitra eche 
Jya jivika eche aee desh eche 
(Who is concernedfor the well-being is a brother, who is a protector is a father, 
who is trustworthy is a friend and wherever there is livelihood, is the native-
land 1) 
- A Gujarati Saying 
'Reaching the USA will also not last forever like groundwater so utilise it to the 
maximum now' 
-A Patel Farmer 
This chapter deals with some of the problems faced by marginal 
and near landless households who take up sharecropping for their 
livelihood in Sangpura. Sharecropping links the land rental and 
water markets with the labour market to share the increasing 
irrigation costs. The large farmers adjust to the situation of 
declining profit from agriculture through long-distance migration 
and appropriation o f surplus through sharecropping contracts. The 
marginal and near-landless farmers are forced to take up land on a 
sharecropping basis to cope with their increasingly difficult 
situation. The new situation creates a divide between those who 
can afford to move out o f agriculture partially and those who are 
forced to bear the consequences of declining productivity in 
agriculture due to their inability to seek employment outside the 
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village. Within the class of tenants, the burden of agriculture is 
transferred to the next 'weaker' segment — the women. The chapter 
illustrates how sharecropping is part of the changing social fabric 
o f village society due to changes in systems o f production. It also 
looks at the aspects o f production relationships where 
sharecropping becomes the preferred form of contract, and how 
dominant classes define the manner in which labour is 
appropriated through these arrangements. This aspect explains why 
sharecropping in Sangpura is not 'a mere technical arrangement for 
allocating productive resources but a product o f varying social 
relationships' (Pearce 1983: 43, emphasis added). These 
arrangements provide instruments for the dominant classes to 
transfer the burden of resource depletion to other people. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
describes the basic features of sharecropping in Sangpura by 
focusing on its historical evolution, its coverage and the types o f 
contracts prevailing. The following section outlines the social 
relations o f production in sharecropping arrangements. It also 
looks at the rationale of landlord and tenants for taking up 
sharecropping. The last section places the analysis within the realm 
of theory and concludes the chapter. 
Historical Evolution of Sharecropping in Sangpura 
The system of sharecropping 2 in Sangpura dates back more than a 
century. However, it was not a very significant production relation 
until the rise of irrigated agriculture in the early 1960s. During that 
time irrigation was carried out in the winter season, and only if 
there was inadequate rainfall. Water was lifted through kos } and the 
production under sharecropping used to be divided in three parts -
the bhagiyo's (tenant's) 4 share for labour, the dhani's (landlord's) 5 
share for the land, and the owner of the draught animal's share for 
lifting water. During that time tenants and landlords usually owned 
draught animals as keeping them was not very expensive. However, 
the first right to use the draught animal rested with the tenant and 
hence, even though the well used to be owned by the landlord, two 
parts o f production used to go to the tenants in most cases. The 
rationale for the third share was that for accessing water through 
the well, the tenant had to use draught animal and labour to lift 
water and hence the right to that produce rested with them. l i f t ing 
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water was very laborious work as the tenant had to be present the 
whole day looking after irrigation. The crop share was 
compensation towards the work. As an old tenant explains, 'it was 
not Eke pushing a button to get water in a minute'. However, this 
system was not very popular in the beginning and was enforced 
slowly in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the cropping system 
included irrigated winter crops. Earlier the winter crops were 
grown with the water available from residual soil moisture and 
irrigation was not necessary for the crops. In this system, the shares 
were divided equally between the tenant and the landlord as there 
was no irrigation cos t With the changes in water table, the winter 
crop started to be irrigated using the open well. Hence the one-
third system of sharecropping was introduced. 
The system of hfting water using kos was followed by well 
mechanisation. The water level started to go down and it was 
beyond the capacity o f draught animals to lift water. With well 
mechanisation the area under crops increased significantly, as the 
well yield almost doubled, making water available in surplus. This 
water was sold to people who did not have a well and a water 
market started to develop. The water charge was based on crop 
sharing. One-third o f the production went for the share o f water. 
With the availability o f water, the gross area under irrigation 
increased significantly as summer crops were introduced together 
with the existing monsoon and winter crops. The changes in 
agricultural technology under the green revolution required more 
control over external inputs. This was different from non-irrigated 
agriculture where the external inputs used were minimal and would 
require minimum care from the farmer. Slowly a large part of the 
land came under irrigation. The sharecropping system evolved as a 
response because the owners could not cultivate all the land in their 
possession. This situation existed until the full-fledged introduction 
o f tubewells in the early 1980s. 
During the pre-tubewell phase, the sharecropping system 
divided production again into components - land, labour and 
water. However, the expenses to access water increased under the 
mechanised well system, which used electricity or a diesel engine to 
lift water. Costs were higher as compared to the use o f draught 
animals. In mechanised wells, the machines for lifting water always 
belonged to the well owners who were also landowners. Compared 
to draught animals, the machines to lift water were immovable 
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items. In a symbolic sense, using draught animals never threatened 
the landowner's individual right over the well whereas it was 
otherwise in case of water lifting machines. Draught animals were 
used for carrying out multiple tasks and could be hired if not 
owned. In contrast, the electric or diesel motors had to be fixed to 
the well and therefore it was the well owner who invested in these 
machines. In this context, the landlord got two-thirds o f the 
produce while the tenant received one-third. The well and the 
motor to access water always belonged to the landlord. This was 
the case in the early stage o f the green revolution. The use o f 
external inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides and seeds was still 
minimal as the land was fertile enough to provide good harvests. 
Therefore, the net benefit was more due to minimal expenses 
incurred for external inputs. 
During the 1980-90 decade there was a slump in the incidence 
o f sharecropping contracts. This period was marked by innovations 
in tubewell irrigation. Because of round-the-clock electricity supply 
much more water was available than a decade before. The water 
markets became much more extensive, covering a much larger area 
than before. It was also an opportunity for small and marginal 
farmers to access water. Hence owner cultivation became a much 
more lucrative option than sharecropping. Apart from a few 
drought years, the period is referred to as the 'golden years o f 
agriculture' in which land productivity was at its maximum. As 
compared to the present day, the farmers recollect that the land 
was very fertile and it had capacity to retain soil and moisture levels 
that resulted in good production with less irrigation. For the 
tubewell owning farmers it was a vending boom and water markets 
expanded. The returns from the sale of water were higher than that 
o f sharecropping. The good harvests created a lower willingness 
than before to share the produce with sharecroppers. Agricultural 
operations were carried out with household and hired labourers. 
For the marginal farmers without a tubewell water was available. 
Together with fertile land conditions and family labour, the returns 
were higher than what they could get through sharecropping. 
However, this situation lasted only for a decade and in the late 
1990s things started to change again. By this time the tubewell 
owning farmers had generated enough surpluses from booming 
agriculture and invested in other sectors. The water level started to 
decline together with the hours o f electricity available, making 
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Occurrence of sharecropping 
As stated earlier, the occurrence of sharecropping in Sangpura is 
very extensive. In 2002-03, around 80.4 per cent o f the total land 
sown in Sangpura was under sharecropping contracts. 6 
groundwater much more expensive. By this time, some of the 
tubewells had become old and hence their maintenance costs 
increased (see chapter 4). All this reduced the well yield, which 
resulted in shrinking of command area. Once again sharecropping 
contracts became preferable for both tenants and landlords for two 
reasons. First, the shrinking o f water markets pushed out the water 
buyers who were dependent on the market for their access to 
groundwater. With a shrinking command area, water was made 
available first to the shareholders and buyers or non-shareholders 
were denied irrigation. Second, the number of irrigations also 
increased together with input costs such as fertilisers and pesticides 
to keep up the level o f productivity. It made agriculture more 
expensive than in the p a s t The increased cost o f agriculture 
reduced the margin between investment and profit The landlords 
wanted to share this burden. Alongside, there was a large majority 
o f people available who had been pushed out of the water market 
and were ready to take up sharecropping for survival regardless of 
the terms o f contract. This led to an elaborate and more 
institutionalised form o f sharecropping, in which the contractual 
arrangements carefully followed the input share in agriculture to 
allocate the increased costs. Another cause for the rise of 
sharecropping was the land division and fragmentation in the 
village, which reduced per capita land available for farmers. This 
was especially the case for marginal farmers. Their descendents 
have doubled in number but not the size of the land, making more 
people to survive on the same piece of land. For the large farmers 
ckirying supplemented income together with employment 
opportunities outside agriculture. So the marginal farmers where 
hard hit, rather than medium and large farmers, who had partially 
moved out of agriculture. Some families with small tracts of land 
on two different sides o f the village preferred to have one 
sharecropped as they could not manage them both. Table 5.1 
summarises these developments in Sangpura. 
TABLE 5.1: T H E HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SHARECROPPING IN SANGPURA 
Period Incidence of Incidence of Approximate Preferred mode of 
water irrigated area contracts 
Reasons for the preferred system 
(coverage) markets in Sangpura 
(in hectares) 
Prior to Low 
1960 (less than 20% of 
the total culttvated 
area) 
1960-80 Medium High 
( around 60% of the 
total cultivated area) 
1980-90 
1990-
2003 
Low 
(less than 20 % of 
the total cultivated 
area) 
High 
(80% of the 
total cultivated 
area) 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
150-200 
300-350 
500-540 
300-350 
Divided in three 
parts- one each for 
tenant, landlord 
and the owner of 
the draught animal 
One third for 
tenant and two-
thirds for the 
landlord 
One third for 
tenant and two-
thirds for landlord 
One third for 
tenant and two-
thirds for landlord 
Limited land was under cultivation and winter crops were taken with minimum 
irrigation; external inputs such as fertilisers were used but not so significant to 
be calculated as costs; the groundwater level was high; water was lifted through 
kos using draught animals in winter and hence a third part of the produce went 
to the owner of the draught animals 
Groundwater level declined; need of irrigation was felt; water charges were 
included in sharecropping; one part of production was charged towards the cost 
of running the pump, cost of external inputs were very low and were rarely 
calculated 
Groundwater level further declined and tubewells were installed; water became 
'costly'; external inputs were introduced; shares included one part each for land, 
water and labour with an institutionalised system of who will share how much; 
water markets expanded and income from sale of water exceeded that of 
sharecropping; sharecropping declined 
Groundwater level further declined and together with the decrease in electricity 
supply accessing water became expensive; command areas of tubewells 
decreased drastically and the water market was curtailed; sharecropping 
contracts increased to share the burden of increased costs for lifting water 
Source: Field data 
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T A B L E 5.2: OCCURRENCE O F SHARECROPPING BY CASTE AND LAND CLASS 
IN SANGPURA 2002-03 7 
Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of 
household in the households leasing households leasing 
specific group (%) in (%) out (%) 
Caste 
Patel 32 13 83 
Thakore 36 84 16 
Prajapati 11 20 80 
Parmar 10 50 0 
Others 11 100 0 
All Households 100 49 46 
Land ownership 
class (ha) 
0 34 2 0 
0.1- 1.0 25 87 3 
1.1 -3.0 31 11 89 
3.1-5.0 7 0 100 
5.1 and Above 3 NA NA 
Source: Village sample survey, 2002-03. NA: Not available 
A sample survey o f the proportion o f households engaged in 
sharecropping contracts showed that around eight per cent o f 
people leased in as well as leased out land while 12 per cent were 
owner cultivators. Patels were the biggest caste group that leased 
out land. 
In 2002-03, 83 per cent o f the Patel respondents leased out part 
o f their land under a sharecropping contract Thakores were the 
principal caste group that leased in land, as 84 per cent o f them 
were involved in some or other tenancy contracts. Leasing out was 
also widely prevalent among Prajapatis. About 80 per cent o f them 
leased out part o f their land. All together around 49 per cent o f the 
households leased in land while 46 per cent o f households leased 
out part of their land. When households were divided on the basis 
o f land class, it showed that households having one to three 
hectares o f land were the largest group leasing in land (87 per cent). 
Households having land between three to five hectares were the 
major group that leased out land (see Table 5.2). 
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Types and Terms of Contract 
As seen above, sharecropping is a widely accepted and practiced as 
a form of leasing land in Sangpura. The sharecropping contracts 
last for a minimum of a season to two years depending upon the 
type o f contract. In the majority o f cases, the tenants have been 
cultivating the land for at least two years and in some cases even 
for 20 years. The contract involves an unwritten oral agreement 
between the tenant and the landlord, the specifics o f which are 
different for different crops and types o f contracts. Below I Est all 
the prevaiEng contracts including their terms and conditions. 
1. One-third system; This system is the most common and 
covers around 85 per cent of all the sharecropping contracts in 
the village. It functions through distributing the agricultural 
production in three parts each representing the inputs in the 
production process - land, water and labour. Over the years, 
the one-third system has developed an elaborate arrangement 
through which different inputs are shared between the tenant 
and the landlord (Table 5.3). These inputs are paid in cash or 
kind by the tenant and the landlord. The net production is 
shared in three parts. Under the system, the right to irrigate 
rests with the landowner, as s /he usuaUy has a share in the 
tubeweU. However, if the landowner does not have a water 
share in any tubewell close to the land, she is supposed to buy 
water from any tubewell. In this case the share o f water from 
the overaU production will go to the landlord. Thus, under the 
one-third system, the shareholder is entitled to only the labour 
input share. 
2. Fixed rent The fixed rent system is called ucchak in the viUage. 
In this system the land is leased to the tenant for one year on a 
fixed rent In ucchak, the responsibiEty o f irrigation also Ees 
with the tenants who either buy water or use their own share 
(if in possession) in the tubewell to irrigate. Ucchak is popular 
mainly in two cases. First case is o f families who stay outside 
the village but own land. In this case ucchak is given within the 
extended family, which reduces the risk o f the land being 
acquired by others if cultivated for a long time. Second, it is 
also popular for leasing in horticulture plots on an annual basis. 
The tenants in the case o f horticultural plots are mainly o f 
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T A B L E 5.3: TENANTS ' AND LANDLORDS' SHARE O F INPUTS IN T H E O N E -
THIRD SHARECROPPING SYSTEM 
Activities/ Items Tenant's share of 
inputs (%) 
Landlord's share 
of inputs (%) 
Land 
Land Preparation 100 0 
Making Field Borders too 0 
External input costs 
Seeds 50 50 
Pesticides 50 50 
Inorganic fertilisers 0 100 
Organic fertilisers 100 0 
Labour costs 
Sowing too 0 
Weeding 50 50 
Labour cost for fertiliser 100 0 
applications 
Labour cost for pesticides 100 0 
application 
Harvesting the crop 100 0 
Labour cost for thresher 100 
Making bundles of 100 0 
agricultural residues (if 
any) 
Carting the produce from 100 0 
the field to the home of 
the landlord 
Carting to market yard 33 66 
Irrigation 
Cost of buying water 0 100 
Labour cost for irrigating 100 0 
the field 
Source: Field data 
Vaghari caste. They stay on the plots during the harvesting 
season for guarding, plucking and selling the products. In the 
first case, the rate o f leasing was around Rs. 5000 per year per 
hectare in 2001-02 while in the latter, the rates differed for 
clifferent orchards such as lemon and guava. These contracts 
are renewed on a yearly basis. The fixed rent system had an 
approximate coverage of five per cent o f total tenancy 
contracts in Sangpura in 2002. 
3. Fifty-fifty system: In this system, all the costs o f inputs and 
labour are shared equally between the tenant and the landlord, 
which includes irrigation, field preparation, harvesting and 
weeding. The fifty-fifty system mostly works on a season-to-
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season basis. Sometimes the landlord may not contribute the 
actual labour for say weeding or irrigating the field. In this case, 
an equivalent amount o f money is paid to the tenants as the 
landlord's share. This form of contract had less than five per 
cent coverage in 2002-03. 
4. One-sixth system: In this system, the cost o f all the inputs are 
b o m e by the landlord and only labour is provided by the 
tenants. This also means that the tenant takes all the 
responsibility for providing labour whenever necessary but the 
management and supervision o f the farm will be done by the 
landlord. The landlord has to inform the tenant about the need 
for labour a day in advance (any time during the period o f 
contract) and the tenant is obliged to come. This formed only 
two to five per cent of the sharecropping contracts in 2002-03. 
This contract is used on a season-to-season basis. 
All the above sharecropping contracts are for irrigated crops. 
For non-irrigated rainfed crops, the gross production is shared 
equally between the owner and the tenant This is because the use 
o f external inputs is minimal in the non-irrigated crops and in some 
cases zero. The seeds o f non-irrigated crops are indigenous and 
farmers do not buy them in the market. Instead they use the seed 
preserved from last season. 
In all the contracts, the share o f the landlord is larger than that 
o f the tenant In the most prevailing one-third system, two-thirds 
o f the produce goes to the landlord while only one-third remains 
with the tenant This system is based on the principle that it is the 
landlord who has to provide the water for irrigation. In almost all 
cases the landlords have a water share in a tubewell. It is very 
unlikely that the tenant will have a water share in that particular 
land, for three reasons. First, it is not practical to hold a water share 
in a tubewell when the tenant does not hold land in its command 
area. Second, the sharecropping contract is not fixed and is 
renewed on a yearly basis, so there is no assurance that the person 
would win the contract again. The third reason is clearly explained 
by Jhalabhai Thakore, a tenant, 'if we could afford a water share, 
we would have been working on our own land'. 8 H e owns half a 
hectare o f land but it is non-irrigated as he was unable to buy a 
share in a tubewell. His land also falls in the area where mostiy 
Thakores own land, and there is no tubewell in the vicinity for him 
T A B L E 5.4: TYPES AND TERMS OF SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS PREVALENT IN SANGPURA 2002 
Type of contract Share of input Share of output Appro> dmate coverage 
the total 
ipping contracts 
Landlord Tenant Landlord Tenant against 
sharecn 
One-third Land, some cost of Labour and input Two-third of net One-third of net 8 5 % 
inputs shared with costs, share cost of production production 
tenants, water charge weeding and 
carting with 
landlord 
Fixed Rent Land All costs involved Fixed rent per Profit from > 5 % 
in agricultural year agriculture or 
operations horticulture 
Fifty-Fifty Land and half of all Half of all input Half of gross Half of gross 5 % 
input and labour cost and labour costs production production 
One-sixth Land and all the Labour 5 / 6 * share of 1/6* share of 2-5 % 
inputs including gross production gross production 
supervision and 
management cost 
Source: Field Data 
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to buy water. His land is thus cultivated only during the monsoon, 
which he thinks is 'quite erratic nowadays and one can not totally 
rely on if. Without irrigation, he can cultivate only pulses such as 
Tal, and Mag, which are not the staple food. T o feed his family he 
has to grow pearl millet and wheat, therefore he takes land for 
sharecropping. 
The landlord is powerful and has the right not to renew the 
contract if there is the slightest threat on the part o f the tenant in 
not adhering to the specified 'norms'. What are the rights of the 
tenant in this case? One rule relates to tenants' investment in 
buying and applying organic fertiliser in the landlord's field. It is 
believed that a one-time adequate application of organic fertiliser 
stabilises the soil moisture level and helps in keeping the fertility 
for two years. The landlord applies organic fertilisers once in two 
years when it is owner-cultivated. In the case o f giving land under 
sharecropping, the tenant is expected to put in the same. This also 
provides a right for the tenant to cultivate the land for two 
consecutive years. I f the landowner wants to break the contract 
before that, the landlord is expected to pay compensation to the 
tenant. Most o f the time, the compensation is calculated through 
the money spent by the tenant to buy fertiliser. The case o f 
Takhatji Thakore elaborates this further. 
Takhatji took land under the one-third contract system from 
Bhatarbhai PateL He sowed cotton as advised by Bharatbhai. One 
day while visiting the field Bharatbhai saw that cotton buds had 
matured and had to be harvested. H e insisted that Takhatji should 
pluck the cotton on the very same day. First, Takhatji did not like 
the manner in which Bharatbhai had communicated with him. H e 
also takes up other land for sharecropping. That day was assigned 
for irrigating one particular field, so he agreed to pluck the cotton 
the next day. Bharatbhai was annoyed and asked Takhatji to pluck 
cotton the same day or his contract would be discontinued. 
Takhatji replied that he had applied organic fertiliser in the field 
and so he had the right to cultivate it for two years. I f the contract 
had to be discontinued, he should be given compensation o f Rs . 
5000 for 1.15 ha o f land. The compensation included the charge o f 
field preparations and application o f organic fertiliser in the field. 
Takhatji also threatened that if he did not pay him the 
compensation, he would see that no one worked in his field or 
took it up for sharecropping. Iflsghe village, the majority o f the 
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tenants and labourers are from the Thakore community to which 
Takhatji also belonged. H e used this threat to seek justice and 
ultimately, Bharatbhai had to pay Rs. 5000 as compensation to 
Takhatji 
However, the tenant is not always given compensation in case o f 
breach of contract In a similar case, Dashrathbhai Patel 
discontinued the contract that was given to Kalaji Thakore just 
after one season, as he did not find much inclination in him to 
work hard for a good harvest However, as Kalaji had put in 
organic fertiliser, he insisted that he would not leave unless he was 
compensated. Dashrathbhai's son had migrated to the U S A around 
six years earlier and hence the family has a steady income. H e said 
that he would prefer the land to remain uncultivated if no one 
comes to sharecrop it from the Thakores but he would not give the 
compensation to Kalaji. He claimed that due to his lethargy, he has 
suffered a production loss and hence did not see a point in 
compensating him. The matter was under dispute and for the next 
season, no one from the Thakore community came forward to 
negotiate for the contract In the year following this Dashrathbhai 
could strike a contract with a Parmar family who took the land on a 
fixed contract at the rate o f Rs. 5000 per hectare per year. 
This section shows how sharecropping contracts largely favour 
and respond to the need o f farmers owning land and water rights in 
Sangpura. However, there are cleavage points that do provide some 
rights to the tenants as the cases above suggest Nevertheless, these 
rights work on a case-to-case basis and largely depend upon the 
bargaining power o f the two mdividuals in the contract For the 
tenant, this power could derive from social ties and bonding among 
the communities as the first case suggests. However, in the second 
case, the Thakore threat' did not work, due to the economic power 
that the Patel farmer had. This power provided him the capacity to 
wait for the full year due to the sustained income from his son who 
worked in the USA. The problem is that these situations are 
increasingly common as more and more people from the upper 
income strata diversify from agriculture. In the next section, I 
examine how sharecropping mterlinks with land, labour and water 
markets, favouring the class of landlords. 
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Land, Labour, Water Interlinkage in Sharecropping 
Above I showed the increased incidence o f sharecropping in 
Sangpura and how this is closely related with the rise and fall o f 
water markets (Table 5.1). In periods with a sharp decline in water 
markets, the incidence o f sharecropping increased strongly. This 
section looks into the rationale of taking up sharecropping from 
the point of view of both the tenant and the landlord and answers 
the question: what is the mtedinkage between land, labour and 
water markets under sharecropping arrangements? 
The economics of sharecropping 9 
In order to understand the rationale of increased occurrence o f 
sharecropping in Sangpura, it was worthwhile to understand the 
economics behind i t The information collected from the farmers 
for five major crops that are cultivated through sharecropping is 
presented in Table 5.5. It shows that the net gain for the labour 
share is highest in castor, a cash crop, while it is lowest in pearl 
millet, which is a food crop and mostiy used for household 
consumption. For a large part o f the village population, especially 
the poor, pearl millet is the staple diet. Wheat supplements pearl 
millet for the medium and upper strata o f people. The net gain for 
labour is second highest for wheat From the landlord's 
perspective, the net gain for the land component is highest in 
castor followed by cotton and pearl millet For the water 
component, the gains are highest in castor while it is lowest in 
mustard. This is mainly because castor is an eight months crop 
spreading between monsoon and winter season and needs around 
eight irrigations. The winter crops of cotton and wheat need a 
similar number o f irrigations, and because o f this reason the water 
charges are almost the same for castor and other crops while the 
cash value o f the yield is much higher. 
H o w are these figures useful to understand the rationale behind 
sharecropping? The contract includes a two-thirds share for the 
landlord as the land and water right rests with them. Therefore, the 
profit for the landlord includes the net gain from land and water 
components together. The tenant gets the return from the labour 
days invested into agriculture through sharecropping. In Table 5.5, 
TABLE 5.5: P E R HECTARE N E T GAIN FOR LABOUR, LAND AND WATER COMPONENTS IN SHARECROPPING, 2002-3 
Crops Gross nr Labour cor> vponent Labour Landlord's Land Irrigation Water 
product 'on share of investment component investment component costs component 
per ha gross Cash Labour net gain (inRs.) net gain (inRs.) net gain 
equivale tit production in Rs. days (inRs.) (inRs.) (inRs.) 
in Rs. inRs. 
a b =a*0.33 c d e — b-c f A = b-f H i = b-b 
Castor 50666 16720 3026 82 13694 1926 14794 4709 12011 
Cotton 29989 9896 3081 98 6815 3494 6402 4514 5382 
Mustard 17956 5925 1850 38 4075 1255 4670 4496 1429 
Wheat 25272 8340 2311 63 6029 3547 4793 4613 3727 
Pearl 23590 7785 2345 72 5440 1529 5820 5880 1905 
millet 
Source: Field data 
Note: For the land component, the net gain was calculated by deducting total cash expenditure from the share of produce. For the labour 
component, the total cash expenditure was deducted from the share of produce. This figure does not include the price equivalent of the 
number of labour days invested as it is seen as overall return from the produce of labour, which is different from the concept of 
working as wage labourer. For the water component, the irrigation schedule was looked at for each of the farmers and the amount paid 
by them for the water. This cost was deducted from the water component share so as to calculate the net gain. At the time of fieldwork, 
the crops of mustard, wheat and pearl millet had very different yields, and for some farmers especially the small holders, these crops 
failed. Thus, this analysis does not reflect the normal situation for these crops as yields are normally higher. 
During the financial year 2001-2003, the value of one US $ ranged between 47.5 - 49 INR (Mehra, 2004). 
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T A B L E 5.6: INVESTMENT AND PROFIT FOR LABOUR, LAND AND WATER 
COMPONENT 
Crop Labour component Landcompi ment Water comj. ionent 
% % % % % % 
investment profit investment profit investment profit 
Caste* 52 26 14 41 34 33 
Cotton 50 14 22 47 28 39 
Mustard 39 26 13 56 47 17 
Wheat 40 25 26 42 34 33 
Pead 
Millet 45 18 11 62 43 20 
Average 
(all crops) 45 22 17 50 37 28 
Source: Field data 
Note: The investment for labour component here includes cash investment plus 
the cash equivalent of labour days incurred. The market rate for a labour day 
during 2001-03 equals to Rs 50. The land and water component cash investment is 
in Table 5.5 which is calculated here as percentage. Figures rounded up to their 
nearest whole number. 
Table 5.6 shows that for the tenant, the profit ranges from a 
maximum 26 to rriinimum 14 per cent while for the landlord it 
fluctuates between a maximum of 82 per cent to a minimum of 74 
per cent This means that in actual sense, the one-third 
sharecropping system is never exercised as the average profit ratio 
for the landlord and the tenant is 78:22. However, this figure 
excludes the profit that the landlord makes from the sale o f water. 
The market rate of the irrigatiori price includes the cost of 
the labour component net gain excludes the market equivalent of 
the labour price. This is because a tenant is viewed from the 
perspective of an entrepreneur rather than a wage labourer. Taking 
a step further in analysis, the actual profit for the three components 
is calculated. The profit o f the labour component is calculated by 
deducting the prevailing market price o f the labour days invested 
from the total rupees equivalent of the share in produce. This 
excludes the supervision and management cost that the tenant puts 
in apart from manual labour. Similarly, for the landlord, the time 
invested in supervision is minimal, so the calculation excludes the 
wage equivalent of the supervision cos t The actual price of water 
paid by the landlord is deducted from the total share to arrive at 
the profit 
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electricity, maintenance o f the tubewell and a profit margin for the 
shareholders. In the present analysis, the irrigation cost is calculated 
taking the prevailing market rate and includes the profit of the 
shareholders which is calculated separately. I f that cost were to be 
calculated, the net profit would further move towards the landlord. 
The tenant's rationale 
The analysis above indicates the flow of surplus from the tenants 
to the landlords through labour appropriation. However, a very 
important question that follows is the rationale for the tenant to 
take up sharecropping even if the situation is exploitative. There 
are three main motives for the tenants to take up sharecropping 
despite being aware of the terms, conditions and the situation that 
favours the landlord. First, the present tenants are smallholders 
(and former water buyers) who have been pushed out o f water 
markets due to the significant reduction in hours o f electricity 
supply, aging o f tubewells and the consequent decline in tubewell 
yield (also see Table 3.9). Due to large-scale reduction in the 
functioning of water markets, the total irrigated area in the village 
reduced and the people associated with it needed work to survive. 
These former water buyers were a ready work force for 
sharecropping. 
Second, taking up sharecropping also assures employment over 
the contract period, a situation that is in favour o f tenants. Within 
the prevalent situation, it was the most convenient arrangement for 
the tenants to tie up with the landlord Hence sharecropping is 
preferred As Table 5.7 shows, the wages received by tenants under 
sharecropping range between Rs. 70 to Rs . 167 per day averaging 
to approximately Rs. 100 per day. This is double the wage for a 
casual agricultural worker in Sangpura in 2002. This provides a 
rationale for a tenant to tie up with the landlord As evident from 
the Table 5.7, the lowest wage is for cotton, which is labour 
intensive because of the number o f days required in plucking 
cotton. The highest wages are for castor, which is an eight-month 
cash crop. Pearl millet comes close to cotton as regards the return 
in wages. This is mainly because it has a high productivity suited to 
climatic areas such as Sangpura. Poor farmers also prefer it because 
it provides food security. 
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Third is the issue o f the féminisation of the agricultural work 
force in the village. Sangpura is located in the central part o f the 
industrialised Mumbai-Mehsana highway that is also called the 
'golden corridor' o f Gujarat It has a number o f small and medium 
industries concentrated along a 500-kilometre stretch. The 
T A B L E 5.7: WAGES FOR TENANTS UNDER SHARECROPPING (PER HA) 
Crop Average labour 
days incurred by 
tenant 
Averagefinancial 
benefits of tenant 
(in Rs.) 
Wages for tenant 
ßnRs.) 
a b b/a 
Castor 82 13694 167 
Cotton 98 6815 70 
Mustard 38 4075 107 
Wheat 63 6029 96 
Pearl millet 72 5440 76 
Source: Field data 
industries in the vicinity create a requirement for unskilled labour 
on a daily wage basis. The wage outside the village was around 
Rs.100 per day during 2001-03 while the agricultural wage labourer 
in Sangpura got only Rs. 50 per day. D u e to lucrative options 
available outside agriculture for wage workers, it is convenient for 
male labourers o f Sangpura to search for non-agricultural 
employment Women do not work outside the village due to their 
day-to-day household responsibilities such as childcare, cooking 
and looking after the needs o f the family members. This situation 
has led to increased women's participation in agricultural 
operations inside the village For example, earlier, taking the grain 
to the thresher was the responsibility o f men. This is now 
undertaken mostly by women. Other 'men's' jobs include field 
preparation and making borders. This is now largely done by 
means o f tractors and is done by sub-contracting to the owners o f 
tractors. Out o f all the manual work in agriculture, now only 
irrigation is men's responsibility and the rest is slowly sWfting 
towards women. 
Table 5.8 provides the gender-segregated labour requirement for 
five major crops. Cotton is a highly women-intensive crop due to 
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T A B L E 5.8: G E N D E R E D DIVISION OF LABOUR (PER SEASON) 
Crop % of man days involved % of won van days involved 
Castor 42 58 
Cotton 31 69 
Mustard 35 65 
Wheat 55 45 
Pearl Millet 42 58 
Source: Field data 
Note: The irrigation component includes the per day wage (done by men), which is 
largely based on number of irrigations rather than on daily wages. For 
convenience, it is estimated on hourly basis and hence it may overestimate the 
number of actual working days for men. In Sangpura, there is no different wage 
rate for men and women. 
which is largely men's responsibility. However, threshing is fully 
mechanised for these two crops and the only task for men now is 
to collect the grains and fill them in the bag. Harvesting o f pearl 
millet and mustard is done manually and the responsibility largely 
rests with women. Therefore, even though the labour days for 
cultivating wheat are more for men, in physical terms, the work is 
heavier for women. An overall segregation of labour days shows 
that the responsibility o f men and women are in the proportion of 
40 to 60 respectively. 
Box 5.1: Gitaben's working day 
Gitaben Jhalaji Thakore, 28, stays in the Thakore Vas in Sangpura 
along with her husband, two children and in-laws. Gitaben's husband 
works as a wage labourer in a brick kiln factory. Her father-in-law, 
Manguji Thakore holds less than half a hectare of land in the western 
part of the village. Manguji worked in the diamond polishing industry 
until very recendy, where he was engaged in cutting and polishing 
diamonds. The family never had enough resources to acquire a share 
in a tubewell but were benefited by the water sale. 
the need for labour to pluck cotton buds. It is followed by mustard, 
castor, pearl millet and wheat Wheat and castor require ihreshing, 
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(Box 5.1 continued) 
They bought water for their land and grew food crops that ensured 
some food security for the family. Together, with the earnings of 
Gitaben's husband and her father-in-law's work at the diamond 
polishing industry, the family lived a comfortable life. However, the 
water market started shrinking in the area due to the reduction in 
electricity supply. The tubewell was also aging and hence the capacity 
slowly reduced. Around 5 years ago, Manguji left the job at the 
diamond industry as it was affected by the global slump in the market. 
The industry became more mechanised over the years, and Manguji 
could not cope with the new techniques. He was also getting old and 
had to leave the job. Back in Sangpura, he took 1.15 hectare of land 
under a sharecropping contract. Together with their own land, they 
have around 1.6 hectare of land under cultivation. Gitaben's mother-
in-law is aged and she cannot work in the field. Though she looks 
after the children, managing daily household chores is Gitaben's 
responsibility. She gets up early in the morning at five and after 
finishing the usual work at home such as cooking, cleaning the house, 
milking the buffalo and going to the dairy to sell milk in the 
cooperative, she heads for the field at eight in the morning. She works 
in the field up to 12:30 engaged in various tasks such as sowing, 
weeding, harvesting, and gleaning depending upon need. After this, 
she returns home and cooks for the family. After the lunch, she again 
works from 2:30 to 5:30 pm. Gitaben also has a buffalo and after 
returning from the field, she milks the buffalo and goes to the dairy to 
sell the milk. After this she comes back home to cook for the family. 
How does she manage 1.6 hectare of land looking after almost the 
entire cultivation? Gitaben says that her father-in-law helps her 
sometimes; also her husband who, if he does not get work comes 
back to the village to help her. They take up tasks such as initial 
preparation in the field and irrigation as it is not supposed to be a 
female job. Complaining on the unequal division of labour within 
households, Gitaben laments 'if my husband and I have come 
together from the field, he will sit on the cot while I am supposed to 
work in the kitchen'. 
However, the family find themselves fortunate to get land for 
sharecropping. According to Gitaben, 'if the same situation existed 
around 10-15 years ago, we could not have got land on sharecropping. 
Most of the land that is on sharecropping is with Patels. Since they 
have started going to the USA, they have been providing land to us. 
So the dollanyo Patels (the Patels who have relatives in the USA 
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(Box 5.1 continued) 
earning in dollars) do not work now, and hence land is all given to us 
— the Thakores'. Having one's own land and water is always preferable 
for people but in their absence, sharecropping does provide income 
assurance. The number of women labourers aspiring for work is 
always higher than the amount of work available. Sharecropping 
ensures some returns for labour. What if Gitaben had more land 
along with a water share in a tubewells? Would it make the family 
happy? Ask this question and Gitaben's answer is simple: i f we could 
afford a water share, we should be working on our own land and 
selling water to earn profit We have to work on others' land only 
because we do not have any other way to live and survive'. The 
sharecropping is undertaken because if there is good harvest, it 
ensures that the family has enough pearl millet to eat for some 
months, if not the whole year. 
Source: Field notes 
The central government has fixed the minimum wage for 
agricultural labour per day at Rupees 86.63 under the Miriimum 
Wages Act 1948 (GOI Undated). In Sangpura, the wages are much 
lower than the minimum wage as fixed by the government. As 
compared to real wages in states like Punjab and Haryana, where 
the wage for agriculture labour has crossed Rs 150 per day, wages 
in Sangpura and surrounding areas can be considered very low. 1 0 
One of the possible reasons for the wages not increasing in the 
village and surrounding areas as compared to other parts o f the 
country is the easy availability o f women wage labourers in the case 
o f male labour migration. The male labour generally goes out o f the 
village to work as manual labour in Mehsana and connected 
industrial areas. However, the demand for unskilled labour is not 
very high and usually a person gets work only for 15 days in a 
month. The wage rates for casual labour are more than double that 
for agricultural labour and hence 15 days of work in non-
agricultural sector equals a month's work in the village. Apart from 
this, there is a social taboo attached to agricultural wage labour for 
men and therefore they prefer to do any menial job outside rather 
than work as labourer in one's own village. These taboos have also 
generated the practice o f labour sharing that is called aras-paras, 
which is a mutual sharing of labour within households. Under the 
system, the number of days worked in another person's farm is to 
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be returned by the other person working in one's own farm for a 
similar number o f days. Working as a casual labourer is associated 
with loss o f dignity. However, in peak agricultural seasons, there is 
always a shortage o f labour and families help each other in 
harvesting the crops. This is more so among marginal farmers who 
cannot afford to hire labour, so aras-paras come to their rescue. 1 1 
A s o f now, it is practiced within caste and extended family units. 
This system is not very significant now and amounts to around 20 
per cent of the labour requirements in the peak agricultural season. 
T A B L E 5.9 SEASONALITY O F WAGE LABOUR D E M A N D IN SANGPURA, 
2002-03 
Month Demand 
for 
labour12 
Remarks 
Oct - Dec 70% This is one of the peak agricultural seasons and 
labour demand is high. The type of work includes 
sowing and weeding (for mustard, wheat, isabgol, 
tobacco and metbi [fenugreek]), picking in cotton 
and irrigating crops 
Jan-Feb 40% During this period, the labour demand declines as 
the crops are in their gestation period and as a result 
there is not much work apart from irrigating and 
weeding 
Mar-Mid 70% It is the period of harvesting so the demand for 
Apr labour picks up again. Apart from this, pearl millet 
and sorghum are also sown during this season 
Mid Apr 5% Very low demand for labour due to the hot summer 
Mid May season; agricultural activity at a low 
June 1-30 100% It is harvesting season for pearl millet and sorghum. 
On the onset of the monsoon, people engage 
labour for saving their crops from rains and keeping 
it safely at home. The stems of pearl millet are used 
as dry fodder whereas sorghum is specially grown as 
cattle feed. Non-irrigated crops such as fed, guwar, 
mag and irrigated cotton are also grown. Labour 
demand thus reaches its peak 
Aug - Sept 30% During this period castor is sown and non-irrigated 
crops are harvested which is mosdy done by 
households themselves. Labour demand is low. 
Source: Field data 
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Table 5.9 shows the seasonality o f labour demand in Sangpura. A s 
against agricultural labour, non-agricultural work is available in all 
seasons and preferred by men. Lower caste women, both in casual 
labour as well as under sharecropping, supplement the shortage o f 
male labour. Around one quarter o f the families in Sangpura work 
as casual labourers. 70 per cent o f these workers come from the 
Thakore community followed by 20 per cent from Parmars and ten 
per cent from Vagharis. The participation o f lower caste women in 
agricultural operations have increased, adding to their burden (See 
case box 5.1). Kodoth (2004) documents similar experiences in the 
southern Indian state of Kerala, where greater male occupational 
mobility has increasingly shifted the balance of responsibility for 
farming to women. Citing a number o f case studies, she shows 
that, due to gains from education, employment and migration of 
male members to the Gulf countries, some households moved up 
in the income ladder. For others who still derive their primary 
livelihood from agriculture, considerable change in women's work 
pattern was observed. This is in a context where 'agriculture is no 
longer perceived as a gainful or viable occupation in Kerala and the 
value of agricultural land is low compared to its real estate value. 
The decline o f agriculture has gone alongside pronounced male 
occupational mobility away from agriculture and outmigration 
processes that have pushed women to shoulder increasing 
responsibility over farming and family property' (ibid.: 1918). She 
considers the outcome of such processes as increasing insecurity 
and vulnerability of women. Comparing this with Sangpura, the 
sharecropping system is an escape route as wages are much higher 
under sharecropping equivalent to the share o f food product 
Working as a labourer under sharecropping avoids the stigma of 
hiring oneself out as wage labourer. 
The landlord's rationale 
The rationale for the landlord to offer land for sharecropping is 
two fold. First, as the data presented in Table 5.5 shows, one-third 
sharecropping is the best option for the landlord as it combines 
land and water share components. Hence they appropriate two-
thirds o f production. Further, the average percentage o f the cost 
share for labour, land and irrigation comes to 45 ,17 and 38 
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respectively. Among all costs, the percentage o f labour costs are 
the highest followed by cost o f water. The tenant, who shares 45 
per cent o f total costs, gets around 22 per cent o f the profit while 
the landlord who shares 55 per cent o f the total costs receives 78 
per cent o f the net profit (see Table 5.6). This profit sharing makes 
the one-third sharecropping system a preferable mode o f renting 
out land. Further, the landlord also saves the costs otherwise 
incurred in supervision and management The crops are virtually 
looked after by the tenants, including the day-to-day management 1 3 
BOX 5.2: Going abroad 
Around 100 people from this village alone have migrated to the 
USA. Going abroad is an aspiration that cuts across all groups in 
the village. There are many agents operating in the village who 
send young people to the USA and other places legally or illegally. 
In the first one week's stay, I could see two such people visiting 
village elders and convincing them about sending their sons 
abroad. On a couple of occasions, I was mistaken as an agent who 
sends people to the USA and was asked about the present rate. It 
costs a lot to go abroad. The rate has increased after the terrorist 
attack in the USA on September 11, 2001. Now it touches up to 
Rupees 2 million. People borrow from friends, family and 
outsiders to go abroad. There are agents working right from the 
top to the village level. Most of the people who go to the USA are 
graduates, but they work as labourers in various places. The 
borrowed money is returned within two years of the person 
reaching the USA after which a regular income is assured for the 
households. Some of the people who have paid up the borrowed 
money have rebuilt their houses and invested in new tubewells. 
Two new tubewells that have come up in Sangpura in the last three 
months belong to Patels whose sons are in the USA. 
Source: Field notes, November 2001 
Second, from 1990 onwards Sangpura and surrounding areas in 
Mehsana district experienced large-scale long-distance migration o f 
the upper class farmers, mostly Patels (see Box 5.2). 1 4 In Sangpura 
also, out o f around 200 families o f Patels, 100 families have close 
relatives such as a brother, father or first cousins in the USA. Most 
of them migrated illegally, paying a huge amount o f money to 
agents. The process started in the early 1990s and is still operational 
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BOX 5.3: The USA rationale: A friendly chat with Kalpeshbhai Patel 
Kalpeshbhai is in his eariy 20s. He studies B Com in Mehsana. He 
belongs to one of those families in Sangpura that could be categorised 
as big farmers. Kalpeshbhai also looks after agricultural operations on 
his family's land, most of which is on sharecropping. His father 
migrated to the USA in 1997, working in a motel in Georgia State. He 
earned around six US $ an hour in 2002 and worked for 12-14 hours 
per day. His boarding and lodging was arranged by the owners of the 
motel who are distant relatives. Kalpeshbhai owns a share in one of 
the tubewells and has initiated a new tubewell where the family has 
more than a 50 per cent share. His brother owns a confectionary store 
in a nearby town. Like his father, he too wants to go to the USA but 
since his father had gone there illegally, he cannot invite him unless he 
surrenders himself as an illegal migrant. His father paid Rs. 700000 to 
the agent, which has already been repaid by him. Kalepeshbhai says 
'going to the USA has many advantages. As you invest in a tubewell, 
we invest in people who work in the USA for their family. With one 
person's work, the whole family is at an advantage back home. People 
going from the village to the USA earn around 1000-1500$ per 
month and after deducting the cost of living, they save around 500-
1000$ a month. This money travels back to Gujarat and supports the 
family. It also increases the status and respect of the family in the 
village. For the first year, the family repays the loan that it had taken 
from the 'markef to pay the agent The second investment is to 
improve household infrastructure such as renovation of the house, 
buying modem gadgets and items of entertainment followed by 
investment in tubewells and land. The fourth priority is to diversify 
from agriculture and invest in business like the one my brother has 
done. He owns a confectionary shop in another town. Some of our 
relatives have invested in viable businesses like medicine or small 
industries in Mehsana town. However, going there is not easy at all. 
Most of the time people go to the USA when they already have a 
network of people over there. In my father's case, his cousin brother's 
son was there in Chicago and helped him find a job. In some states of 
the USA, the concentration of Indians is high and hence they are not 
easily recognised as illegal migrants. The government there has a 
tough time searching for people who do not have proper visas.' 
Source: Field notes, December 2002 
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despite the stringent policies o f the government, especially after the 
9 /11 attack on the twin towers in the U S A in 2001 . 1 5 The migrant 
uses social networks to stay in the U S A and works in industries 
owned by Gujaratis forming cheap and reliable labour for them. 
Some individuals work for more than 16 hours a day to repay the 
loan that they have taken to reach the USA. After the initial 
months, they start sending money back home to first repay the loan 
and the interest amount, and then provide income for the family 
(see Box 5.3). O f late, people from the Prajapati caste have joined 
their Patel counterparts. In the year 2003, two out o f the 70 
Prajapati families had migrants in the USA. This process made 
many families independent o f agricultural operations in the village, 
as migration secures a considerable money income from their kin 
in the USA. Their houses are easily recognised. They have dish 
antennas and freshly plastered tiled rooms furnished with modem 
gadgets such as colour TV, cordless telephones and newly bought 
fridges. During 2001-03, three new tubewells were installed and 
financed solely by these families. The long-distance migration of 
some families has strengthened their economic base, making more 
room for them to bargain for a maximum share from the profit. 
However, the tenants have no other options but to agree to the 
contract, in absence o f other employment opportunities. The case 
shows how water scarcity and increased pricing o f groundwater has 
contributed to a 'shared' contractual arrangement It illustrates how 
pricing o f groundwater is either shifted or shared by the landlords 
in a way that favours their interest 
Unequal Crop Sharing and the New Face of Water Markets 
This chapter showed that there is a transfer o f surplus through 
sharecropping contracts from the tenants to the landlords in 
Sangpura. The issue becomes important given the large prevalence 
o f these contracts and their contribution to overall village 
economics. In Sangpura, the incidence o f sharecropping closely 
followed the changes in the mode o f agricultural production. With 
the introduction of irrigated agriculture and well mechanisation, 
large areas came under agriculture. The technological innovation 
for water extraction in the form of tubewell irrigation resulted in 
amphfying the area under irrigation from a single extraction point 
and gave rise to water markets. During the 'golden years o f 
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agriculture' in Sangpura, sharecropping incidence touched an all-
time low and water sales were reported to be the highest The water 
right owning community found it easy and more lucrative to sell 
water than to put their land under sharecropping and share the 
booming produce with tenants. 1 6 
However, this situation did not last more than a decade because 
o f the deepening o f the water table, over-cultivated lands and sharp 
reduction in the supply o f electricity. Agriculture started to become 
a costly exercise with profits becoming less and less. A large share 
o f the input costs were water costs and agriculture was no longer 
seen as a lucrative business for the upper classes. The reduction in 
electricity supply also curtailed the tubewell yield, and water 
markets started to shrink. Small and marginal farmers who were 
earlier dependent on water sales for irrigation had to abandon 
agriculture or take up only rainfed monsoon crops. Once again, 
Sangpura experienced a rise in sharecropping contracts that 
claimed to share the produce for land, labour and water 
components under the most popular one-third sharing system. In 
2001-03, around 80 per cent o f the irrigated area in the village was 
under sharecropping. Sharecropping was the new face of the water 
market. Water was sold to tenants in return for a one-third crop 
share. Technically speaking, in the one-third system, combining the 
share for land and water should leave at least 33 per cent o f the 
benefits for the tenant The analysis showed that the average net 
profit share between the landlord and the tenant is in the 
proportion o f 78:22. This is against the share of average 
investment, which is in the proportion o f 55:45 for the landlord 
and the tenant respectively. This ratio does not include the cost o f 
supervision and monitoring on the part o f the landlord. This is 
reduced to a minimal level when land is given on sharecropping. 
On the contrary, the supervision and monitoring cost lies with the 
tenant which is not calculated here as its investment cos t Thus the 
labour days invested by the tenant are much higher than that of 
landlord. Under sharecropping, the risk o f agriculture is shared 
with the tenant in an unequal way. The profit share is unequal 
against an almost equal input sharing. This is an economic relation 
o f inequality where surplus is generated by the landlord through 
controlling the labour process under sharecropping by virtue o f the 
property right in land and water. This surplus flows towards the 
landlord through unequal profit share in a situation of extreme 
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scarcity of water, where agriculture is characterised by lower 
productivity and negative growth. 
What is the theoretical significance of the case o f Sangpura? The 
theoretical literature found on sharecropping can be broadly 
divided in the neo-classical and Marxist streams o f thinking. 
However, both relate to the 'economic' logic o f sharecropping 
dealing with risk sharing (Cheung 1969), incentive effects (Stiglitz 
1974) and moral hazards (Dubois 2002) in principal-agent models. 
Sharma and Dreze (1996) considering sharecropping as a 'puzzle' 
in economics, demystified it on the ground of common sense and 
basic economic analysis in a village o f north India. The authors 
looked at sharecropping from the partnership perspective that 
involved both conflict and cooperation between landlord and 
tenant especially in the case o f modern agriculture. A n excellent 
review of literature is available elsewhere and hence I am not 
focussing on it here. 1 7 
Instead, I focus on the social relations o f production and try to 
understand 'sharecropping as a part of the changing fabric of 
history and as a relationship that is a product of certain social and 
economic contingencies' using the analytical framework developed 
by Pearce (1983:42). H e suggested that share contracts are a 
particular method of surplus labour appropriation in contexts 
where 'class relations are such that the decision concerning the 
nature o f the contract lies with the landowning class, but where the 
costs o f supervising production are potentially large' and where the 
tenant is 'insufficiently endowed with resources to allow him to 
discount income variance as a decision variable' (ibid.: 65). The 
case o f Sangpura too suggests that the social relations of 
production and control o f the labour process become the crucial 
characteristics o f sharecropping logic. The 'partnership' concept of 
sharecropping as a product of bargaining between the landlord and 
the tenant, as described by Sharma and Dreze (1996) does not hold 
much meaning in Sangpura. 'Bargaining is meaningful only if both 
parties enjoy more or less symmetrical economic power' (Bhaduri 
1983: 88). This is hardly the case in Sangpura where land - and 
water - owning Patels and Prajapatis strike a deal with marginal and 
near landless Thakore and Parmar households. In the village, the 
sharing o f the net profit under sharecropping is on the basis o f the 
proportion of the cost contributed including the labour cos t In a 
partnership arrangement, reward should ideally be proportion to 
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the input, which in turn is, proportional to the contribution to the 
production process. I showed in Sangpura that two parties - the 
landlord and the tenant - contribute to cover the costs o f a 
production process in certain proportion but benefits differentiy 
and disproportionately. This is because the landlord exploits the 
tenant's labour by virtue o f holding property right for land and 
groundwater. The 'partnership perspective' does not problematise 
the social relations underlying the sharecropping arrangements and 
do not question the issue o f disproportionate right in land and 
water. This exploitation of landlords is strengthened by the new 
economic power gathered through long distance migration, which 
virtually makes them independent o f agricultural operations. 
Marginal and near landless farmers are at the forefront o f this 
changing situation. For them, it is an agrarian trap characterised by 
land degradation and water scarcity embodying increasing prices 
and lower profit for sustenance. 
von Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann (1994) look at 
social organisations, institutions and norms from the perspective of 
social security which refers to ways in which individuals, 
households and communities protect their livelihood and are 
protected socially against the shocks and stresses that threaten their 
stability. People's choices are responses to the uncertainties and 
eventualities of daily life and therefore their strategies to combat 
them are mostly non-state and localised. The migration and 
patterns of sharecropping in Sangpura could also be viewed from 
this perspective. Migration can be both a source o f and response to 
insecurity that couples local networks with wider networks in an 
area where state provisions are better accessible with more 
economic opportunities. Nooteboom (2003) documents various 
approaches to social security to understand the persistence o f 
poverty and vulnerability. His analysis shows that some people are 
better equipped to cope with risks and uncertainties and wealth is 
an obvious discriminating variable Poor people face more risks 
and uncertainties in their Eves than those who are better off as they 
are more vulnerable and often have less ways and means to cope 
with adversities. Chakravarti (2001) narrates the changes in 
production relations brought about by green revolution technology 
and canal irrigation in north Bihar, which led to a decEne in the 
sharecropping system because it became less profitable for 
landowners. The tractorisation, intensive cultivation and 
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interlocking of credit and product markets compounded the plight 
o f sharecroppers, resulting in their indebtedness and eviction from 
agricultural operations. Sharecropping as an institution started to 
decline and gave rise to the emergence o f new production relations 
based on wage labour. Thus, 'technology plays a catalytic role in the 
transformation to a new regime of production relations' leading to 
the landowners becoming directly concerned with the labour 
process making the issue of tenancy reform obsolete (ibid.: 100). A 
similar process could be observed in Sangpura, where the new 
tubewell technology paved the way for sharecropping leading to a 
demise o f the institution when the water market was booming. 
However, when the groundwater and agricultural operations started 
to become more expensive, the institution was revived. It used the 
cheap labour force o f lower caste women, who were evicted from 
direct cultivation due to shrinking of command areas and declining 
water markets. 
An important question that follows from this is whether this 
nature o f production relations and labour process produces 
conflicts leading to class struggle As analysed, there are areas of 
disagreement but there are no open and organised conflicts against 
the landlords. A s seen in chapter 3, the relations of exploitation in 
Sangpura are embedded in the class structure based on production 
relations and the labour process. Together, they provide the 
impetus for landlords as a class to decide the nature o f labour 
exploitation and surplus generation. The necessary condition for 
class struggle is class formation, that is: the transformation of 
classes-in-themselves into classes-for-themselves (Das 2001). This 
is hardly the case in Sangpura. A possible explanation for the lack 
o f 'open' conflict is the consolidation o f inequality through the 
caste system and economic dependence on the upper classes for 
day-to-day survival. The exploited classes are overtly divided in 
hierarchical caste systems placing one against another, although 
together they form a decisive majority. 1 8 The lack o f agency o f 
exploited classes inhibits them from associating with their other 
exploited counterparts for exerting collective pressure on their 
employers. This comes from their dependency relationship with the 
landlords, which deters them from forming economic agency in the 
labour market and political agency in class politics (Chakravarti 
2001: 286). In addition, landlords as a class have also been 
changing over time, trying to see that the situation is not too 
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exploitative to generate conflict As a Patel farmer puts it, 'if you 
keep your pet dog hungry, it may turn against you even though it is 
loyal to you...so you have to give them food from time to time for 
them to be faithful'.19 The sharecropping arrangement in Sangpura 
does give advantages to tenants in satisfying their need for daily 
survival These arrangements are also nurtured through social and 
credit ties where the tenant feels obliged towards the landlord. This 
makes them too passive to raise issues o f inequity. Therefore, it is 
very unlikely that subde conflicts will result in class struggle The 
costs o f that seem too high and the potential benefits too low to 
take the risk o f open confrontation. Another aspect of this is the 
active support from the political class working at the level o f the 
state, which upholds and protects the interest o f the propertied 
class. I analyse the nuances o f this in the next chapter. 
Notes 
1 I am mankful to Esha Shah and Deepa Sonpal for the English 
translation of the original Gujarati saying. 
2 Here I follow the definition of sharecropping as described by Cheung 
(1968). According to him 'share tenancy is a land lease under which rent is 
a contracted percentage of the output yield from the tenant per period of 
time. As a rule, the landowner provides land, and the tenant provides 
labour, other inputs may be provided by either party. Share tenancy (or 
sharecropping) is thus share contracting, defined here as two or more 
individual parties combining privately owned resources for the production 
of certain mutually agreed outputs, the actual outputs to be shared 
according to certain mutually accepted percentages as returns to the 
conttacting parties for the productive resources forsaken' (ibid.: 1107). 
3 Kos is an irrigation device operated manually using barad (draught 
animal). It has a bag made up of camel leather attached to the well with 
rope. The barads are tied up with the rope that is attached to a wheel 
When barads move in a circle, the water comes out of the well. The 
device resembles a Persian wheel but is different in design. 
4 Bhagiyo is a Gujarati word that means sharecropper. It originates from 
the word Bhag that means share or division. 
5 Dhani originates from the word Dhan meaning wealth. Dhani is 
someone who possesses wealth. The landlords in Sangpura and elsewhere 
in north Gujarat are addressed by this term. 
6 In order to understand the coverage of sharecropping, I undertook a 
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stratified random sample survey of households engaged in agriculture in 
the winter season of 2002-03. The figures in the Table 5.2 refer to the 
proportion of leased-in land to the total land holding of the members 
participating in the survey. 
7 The information represents sharecropping contracts during the winter 
season 2002-03 collected through a stratified random survey of 65 
households (approx. 10% of the total households engaged in agriculture). 
Unfortunately, the survey missed a representative sample from the total 
12 households in Sangpura that have more than five hectares of land. The 
table, therefore, does not provide information about households falling in 
that land class. Eight per cent of the total households in the survey were 
both leasing in and leasing out. 
8 There are a few cases where people have invested in tubewells but do 
not own land in the command area of that particular tubewell. However, 
these cases are exceptional 
9 In order to understand the economics of sharecropping contracts, I 
interviewed 85 farmers engaged in a sharecropping contract selected 
through stratified random sampling. The input-output data of five major 
crops were taken in the year 2002-03. The time of interview ranged 
between July 2002 and April- May 2003 to cover the three seasons -
monsoon, winter and summer. 
1 0 Sidhu and Singh (2004) correlated the status of agricultural wages and 
employment in Punjab with the introduction of technology. Due to 
stagnation in the growth of agriculture, a decline in demand for labour 
was observed. However, since 1980s, the wage rate had tended to rise 
faster than commodity prices, machine use prices and prices of herbicides. 
The index for wage rate with respect to output price (base 1981-82) rose 
to 176.63 in 1998-99 for wheat and to 156.82 for paddy. Correspondingly, 
the wage rate index with respect to price indices of machine use and 
chemicals use rose to 191.57 and 203.88 respectively for wheat and 174.56 
and 174.77 respectively for paddy. 
1 1 A popular Gujarati saying 'Sapey maryo one lathi na tute' was used while 
narrating the incident. Translated literally, it means Trilling a snake while 
saving the stick'. In the present context, it means gaining both ways. Here, 
by exchanging labour among caste/kinship/neighbours, one does not 
acquire the indignity associated with hired labour while it fulfils labour 
requirements. 
1 2 This is a qualitative scale as expressed by wage labourers and shows the 
percentage of actual labour absorption to the total labour available for 
agricultural work during the time period. It is based on the interviews 
conducted during October 2001 to March 2002 in the village. 
1 3 As compared to the tenant, the landlord's time investment in the 
sharecropping arrangement is minimal The only time investment is 
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during harvesting of the crop and selling it in the market. However, it was 
observed that the landlord keeps a vigilant eye on the whole affair through 
an elaborate social network For example, if any other person who has 
passed by the land of a particular person who has given it on 
sharecropping, and if something unusual is seen such as pest attack or any 
other eventuality, it would be instantly communicated to the one who 
owns the land. These information bases work mutually and save the time 
of the landlord from day to day supervision. The evening gossip groups, 
which are based on class and caste affiliations also discusses the behaviour 
patterns of tenants or other crucial issues. These platforms also help in 
the management of farms by landlords. Similarly, the same also works for 
other groups. 
1 4 Patel and Rutten (1999) discuss the emigration patterns of Gujarati 
Patels. They report that about two million persons from south Asian 
origin reside in Europe, the US and Canada. More than half of them, that 
is, about 1.26 million live in the UK. About 35 per cent of Gujaratis living 
in the U K are Patels. 
1 5 During my fieldwork in 2001-2003, two people from the Patel and one 
from the Prajapati caste migrated to the USA. 
1 6 Shah (1993: 51-52) illustrated three types of contract in the water 
markets. The first included labour contracts, in which the buyer provided 
labour and draft power to the seller in return for water. The second was in 
terms of a crop-sharing contract where the seller provided water while the 
buyer provided land, labour, manure and other inputs and they shared the 
crop. The third included crop and input sharing contracts where the buyer 
provided land and labour while the seller provided water and both shared 
other input costs and output. The seller's share in output ranged between 
33 and 50 per cent in the second contract while it was between 50 and 66 
per cent in the third contract. Shah considered it an indication of the 
development of water markets and the level of maturity where the 
multiplicity of Trind' contracts gives way to cash payments. In Sangpura 
too, at the peak of water markets during 1980s and 1990s, the kind-based 
transactions gave way to hourly supply of water based on cash payments. 
Sharecropping was at its lowest during this period. 
1 7 For review of the literature on sharecropping, see Pearce, 1983. 
1 8 This is contradictory to Patnaik's explanation that exploited classes are 
not yet a decisive majority in most regions of India, which weakens their 
organisation against exploiting classes (Patnaik 1999: 205). In Sangpura, 
they do form a decisive majority but are divided and unable to form a 
force against landlords. 
1 9 Personal interview, Bhikhabhai Patel, Sangpura, September 23,2002. 
6 
Stratège Alliances and Everyday Village 
Politics in Sangpura 
We don't give privilege for every one to ally with us. Have you ever seen a velvet 
cloth being stitched with jute thread? 
-A PatelFarmer 
This chapter looks at the everyday village politics of Sangpura while 
focusing on the distribution of power in the community. It is about 
the reproduction of economic and political dominance by powerful 
social groups in the village. The previous chapter have shown a 
largely unformed collective contestation of the domination by 
those who are not at the centre o f power. This chapter closely 
examines the everyday contestation of power and politics in 
Sangpura showing how it generates social power for dominant 
classes, first from the control over economic resources and second, 
by mamtaining the social and political hierarchy. It also leads to 
increased struggle between various social groups for control over 
critical and symbolic resources. The chapter shows how caste is still 
the main vehicle o f social, political and economic organisation, 
which is closely linked with state politics and the way different local 
actors engage in broader society. 
The chapter is organised in two parts. The first part discusses 
the constitution, basis and legitimacy o f social power and defines 
everyday village politics. It shows how mdtviduals and caste groups 
organise and contest for increased control over resources. T h e 
second part discusses how the structure o f power and politics at 
the village level is reflected in the control over three formal 
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institutions in the village - panchayat, dairy and credit cooperatives 
that reemphasise the sources o f legitimacy and power for the 
influential groups. 
Social Power and Everyday Village Politics in Sangpura 
Power is a concept variously used in the sociological literature and 
broadly falls in the purview of political sociology.1 Max Weber's 
interest in understanding power is most prominent in the 
sociological literature. According to him, 'power is the chance o f a 
man [or woman] or a number of men [or women] to realize their 
own will in a social action even against the resistance o f others who 
are participating in the action (Weber 1978: 926 quoted in Beteille 
2002: 158). The broad framework provided by Weber influenced 
sociologists and social anthropologists as they encountered social 
situations, processes and relations that had a manifestly political 
component Sociological enquiry, thus, focused on the 'distribution 
o f power in political communities'. Further, the study o f 'the 
political aspect o f social associations and social aspects o f political 
associations' provided new grounds to understand para-political 
processes at the local level (ibid.: 159-61). Accepting the Weberian 
concept of power as an individual's ability to force others to do 
things, Adams (1975) identifies two types o f power - independent 
and dependent Independent power is the abilities and capabilities 
related to knowledge, skills and systematic attributes o f social units 
to control relations of dominance. Dependent power is when 
someone gives another a right to make decisions on their behalf. 
However, in politics, according to Adams, power is constituted by 
resources and hence is directly dependent on an agent's access to 
various resources. Kurtz (2001) discusses how 'political agents 
create, compete for, and use power to attain public goals that, at 
least on the surface, are presumed to be for the common good of 
a political community. Yet just as often and more covertly, political 
power is used to attain private goals for the good of the agents 
involved. Without power, political agents are ineffective and 
probably ephemeral' (ibid: 21). 
Operational definitions of power in India came from a number 
o f empirical studies that defined how it is constituted in society. 
Chakravarti (2001), in a study of class relations in north Bihar, 
define three kinds o f power - economic (class), coercive and social. 
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According to him, 'class power is derived from preponderant 
control over means of production that is intertwined with the 
social power derived from belongingness to a dominant caste. The 
coercive power exercised by the community is inextricably 
connected with these two dimensions o f power and together they 
form the capacity to exercise decisive control over the village 
community' (Ibid: 286-93). Ruud (2003) studied village politics in 
West Bengal and documented the changes brought about in rural 
society through leftist political development The study investigated 
the interaction o f cultural changes and the mechanisms and tools 
o f village politics, showing how these politics affect and was 
affected by political and ideological changes in larger society. 
Critically looking at the 'traditional' studies o f village politics that 
focused on concepts such as caste, faction and patron-client 
relationships, Ruud worked through the 'everyday village politics' 
where society consisted of many layers and groups o f individuals 
engaged in political relationships. Politics for him is 'all activities 
related to struggles over material, social or symbolic resources and 
is merely a set o f social mechanisms for the daily regulation o f 
community affairs and distribution o f scarce resources' (Ibid: 4-5). 
In her study of tank irrigation technology and agrarian 
transformation, Shah (2003) defined power that 'reproduces itself 
by reproducing the societal ability to produce, but not without 
reconstitution and displacements' (ibid: 18). According to her, 
power not only shapes the social phenomenon of reproduction and 
transformation in the relations o f power but also, on the contrary 
constitutes i t In Sangpura too, politics is a sphere o f activity 
connected with relations between castes and social groups that 
constitute the basis for deriving social power. In order to 
understand this, I first illustrate castes and their strategy o f 
organisation in Sangpura, describing how different social groups 
organise themselves to derive and exert social power through 
everyday politics. Control of three important institutions in the 
village the panchayat, dairy and credit cooperative is part of 
everyday politics to maintain and sustain the level of control over 
various village resources and in turn derive more power to 
manoeuvre them. 
Strategic Alliances and Everyday Village Politics 175 
Castes and the Strategy of Organisation 
Prior to Independence in 1947, Sangpura, along with other villages 
in the region, was ruled by the Baroda State (see chapter 2). 
Darbars in those days were feudal lords under the Ryotntari system 
while the Thakores were Padi (footman soldiers) employed by the 
Baroda State Army. Being in the army, they also looked after the 
revenue collection and served as cbaukidars (watchmen) o f land and 
property. The Thakore's role as chaukidars enabled them to 
appropriate part o f the property that was considered fallow. The 
population pressure on land was not very high during the pre-
independence era. Hence, Thakores could appropriate land without 
much opposition from other communities. Patels were the 
landowning caste ancestrally, but in Sangpura and other 
surrounding villages, Thakores and Patels were at par in terms o f 
landholdings. Thakore claimed to be the descendants of Rajput 
rulers and hence adopted their rituals. The Patels argued that 
Thakores made merry by engaging in clrinking, gambling and eating 
meat like Rajputs! In a largely vegetarian society they were thus 
considered polluted and disgraced in public. 2 
Soon after independence and with the end of the British Raj, the 
services of Thakores were terminated and the power associated 
with them slowly got lost. Agriculturist Patels took advantage of 
their skills in the booming agricultural sector, a situation for which 
Thakores were not prepared. This was the time when irrigated 
agriculture was introduced and the Patels along with Prajapatis 
went ahead with it in a determined way. This was the time when 
dug wells were drying up and farmers were losing access to water 
due to increasingly mechanised irrigation. During the early 1980s 
when dug wells were replaced by deep tubewells, the Patels and 
Prajapatis had the initial advantage over the Thakores because they 
owned significant numbers of wells. 
Agriculturist Patels 3 came to Sangpura from Dholka and 
Viratnagar in Ahmedabad District around eight generations back. 
Having an agriculturist background, Patels had the skills and knack 
for generating profit from agriculture. They were also very 
cognisant about their economic and social standing. As described 
by one o f the Patels of Sangpura, they worked on the principles o f 
being organised, saving money and working hard to earn more 
money. Patels organised themselves through caste and kinship 
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institutions. They started some of the early informal credit 
cooperatives within their caste, which used to give loans to other 
Patels through self-help groups. The organization around savings 
and credit institutions, coupled with investment in agriculture, led 
them to prosper in the village. Patels also took advantage of the 
loans given by the Gaekwad State for shallow wells. They had 
started growing cash crops such as sugarcane and cotton at the 
time of independence. The mechanization o f dug wells also earned 
them money through limited sales o f water. 4 By 1960-70, Patels 
generated enough surpluses from agriculture to advance 
consumption loans to people of other castes such as Thakores. The 
condition o f such loans was to extend the right to cultivate their 
land till the loan amount was repaid. In most cases the repayment 
did not happen and the land stayed with the Patels. Slowly, part of 
others' land was transferred to Patels. When the dug wells dried up 
in the early 1980s, Patels were the first ones to invest in deep 
tubewells, followed by Prajapatis who went along with the Patels 
on a similar path. Thakores on the other hand did not organise 
themselves in similar ways and were not able to acquire credit in 
the market due to their convivial image. This became advantageous 
for the Patels, who dominated in the socio-poUtical arena. 
As against the Thakores, Prajapatis were more organized, 
confident and on an equal footing with Patels. Though their 
traditional occupation was pottery, there were two basic divisions 
among them. While one group took up pottery as a profession, the 
other group was engaged in agriculture. Though initially they had 
little land in the village, Prajapatis became landowners through 
diversifying their occupations. They took up the profession o f 
brick making, which was close to their traditional occupation. Brick 
production exposed them to urban areas in Mehsana and 
Ahmedabad where demand for bricks was increasing due to city 
expansion. This exposure also showed them opportunities to work 
in the textile mills of Ahmedabad. Back home, they became close 
to Patels who taught them the skills o f commercial agriculture. 
They bought shares in tubewells and benefited from the 
agricultural boom and water markets. Apart from benefiting from 
increased income in agriculture and surplus created through work 
in the textile mills o f Ahmedabad, they also gained employment in 
diamond polishing industries in Mehsana and Surat Tribhuvandas 
Madhavlal Prajapati was one o f the many people who went to 
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Ahmedabad to work in the cotton mills during the peak of 
mdustrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. The timing coincided with 
technological changes in agriculture. According to him, Prajapatis 
and Patels went to Ahmedabad to work as industrial labourers and 
stayed in slums and chatvls (one-room houses). This had an effect 
on the household economy as the pressure on land reduced. These 
industrial workers pooled money for the external inputs that were 
required for the new technology. The non-residents supported 
many mechanized pumps that were purchased at that time. This 
made life easier for the ones who stayed in the village, as there was 
increased production from agriculture on one hand, and fewer 
people to support on the other. But this was not the case for all the 
people in the village. Only 25 per cent o f families had a member 
working in the mills at Ahmedabad and in nearby brick kilns. 
The Parmars o f Sangpura came from neighbouring Aakhaj 
village around a century and half ago. In Sangpura and elsewhere, 
they are organised through a lineage-based system. Though they 
occupy the lowest position in the social hierarchy in the village, 
some of them do hold economic power. This power also flows 
from the larger political organisations that helped them in accessing 
reservations in government jobs for scheduled castes provided 
under government Within the community, there has been other 
social action, which provided impetus to their upward move. The 
majority of Parmars in Sangpura have become Kabirpanthi, the 
followers o f the famous sufi Saint Kabir, who is part of the popular 
Bhakti movement, which challenged orthodox Hindu religion for 
the right to worship. Kabirpanth became popular among lower 
caste families in the movement of social upUftment, who derived 
cultural legitimacy by being vegetarian and practicing non-violence 
as advocated by the sect The Kabirpanthi group in Sangpura has 
its followers largely among Parmars. A few Thakores also observe 
the regulated life o f offering prayers, and denouncing non-
vegetarianism. A second element of social mobility is related to the 
caste-based organization and search for political identity o f 
Parmars. In Sangpura, they are a part o f 282 nath (conglomeration 
o f families) who are traditionally organised and further divided 
between the collective o f 60, 42, 27 and 27 families spread over the 
district These families have their traditional leaders who meet 
whenever any critical decision has to be made. The nath has 
developed its own code o f conduct for marriage and death 
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ceremonies and other social activities that are binding for all. I f 
they do not abide by them, a fine is levied, which may be followed 
by casting out from the community and social ostracism. U p to 
2002, there had been no case o f deviation from these rules. The 
nath is a traditional social organisation, but it is conscious of the 
new challenges that the community is facing. Their rules therefore 
are changed according to the circumstances that are in the interest 
o f the larger community. For example, earlier a death ceremony 
used to involve lots o f money. Many families in the community 
were indebted by repaying loan incurred when trying to fulfil their 
social obligations. The nath took note o f this and a new rule has 
been enforced that does not allow any individual or family to have 
rituals during a death ceremony. Similar rules restricting dowry and 
gifts have been evolved for marriage and other social gatherings. 
Similar caste-based organisations have been found among Patels 
and Prajapatis, but are not very strong among Thakores. Although 
many Parmar families in the village are landless and live below the 
poverty line, some families have taken advantage o f reservations 
and have accessed government jobs. Since they did not hold much 
land, there was not much emotional binding to place. Hence they 
could easily leave the village. The government jobs provided the 
much needed economic independence that in turn helped them to 
have a sustained income. N o t all Parmars could procure 
government jobs but a significant number did manage this. By 
2002, these Parmars families can align with other social groups to 
add to their power. 
One question therefore is how these caste groups organize 
themselves to increase their control over resources. I describe some 
of these strategies through the accounts of prominent individuals 
and power-wielders o f four prominent castes — Thakore, PateL 
Prajapati and Parmar. 
Case 1: Somarji Lilaji Thakore 
Somarji (48) is one o f the prominent opinion makers for Thakores 
in the village. This is primarily because o f his position as a manager 
in a government insurance company in Mehsana. Having a 
government job, he earns a steady income. H e has invested in 
buying land and shares in a tubewell from the income. Over the 
years, he has become one o f the few people from the Thakore 
caste who is well off. In the year 2001, Somarji invested in a deep 
Strategic Alliances and Everyday Village Politics 179 
tubewell where he is a 50 per cent partner and which irrigates 
around 10.5 hectares o f land including his 3.5 hectares. This 
tubewell is 220 meters deep and is powered by a 52 hp engine. The 
total cost o f the tubewell came to Rs. 650000 out of which Somarji 
spent Rs. 325000 as 50 per cent partner. Though the tubewell has 
the capacity to irrigate more than 10.5 hectares o f land, there are no 
water buyers in this part o f the village due to the high density o f 
tubewells. H e recounts, *My father held only 1.15 hectares o f land 
out o f which I sold 0.5 due to economic need in the beginning. We 
are two brothers out o f which I am serving outside and my brother 
is engaged in agriculture in the village. I was good in studies and I 
studied up to 1 1 * standard at the school in Jagudhan. We were 
poor, so it was with a lot o f difficulty that I could get admission in 
the college due to lack of money. It was the time when Chimanbhai 
Patel was the Chief Minister of Gujarat and the state was 
witnessing N a v Nirman Abhiyan (approximately during 1974-75 -
see foot note 10 for details). For three months, the schools were 
closed and examinations withheld. When the schools resumed, I 
stood first in the class. I went to college and after finishing college, 
I saw an advertisement in the paper for the post that I am holding 
now. I filled in the form and got through. I am a self-made person. 
I have made a new tubewell this year with five other bhagidars. 
There was a person who sold the electricity connection that we 
bought for our tubewell as the government is not providing new 
electricity connections now. This connection was closed for some 
years and the government policy stated that it will be re-registered 
only on a pro-rata basis and not on a flat rate basis. The rate is 50 
paisa per unit, which is expensive compared to the flat rate charges 
based on horsepower. The electricity charge for a general tubewell 
is around Rs. 25000 per year. For us it is Rs . 50000 per year, due to 
which the cost o f water is higher from our tubewell. We will have 
to pay the Gujarat Electricity Board every month but the sale o f 
water is charged on a season-to-season basis. Therefore we have to 
pay that much money every month from our own pocket and then 
get it from people at the end of the season. In the peak season, the 
tubewell runs for around 20000 kilowatt units costing up to Rs . 
10000. Altogether, now it is a no profit no loss business but if the 
electricity charges go up, it may be difficult for us to survive. As of 
now, we are surviving due to the dairy farming as the agricultural 
residue goes back to catfie as fodder and provides us cash every 15 
180 The Dark Zone 
days. Having a new tubewell is almost impossible for people and 
only the rich can afford it now 5. 
T h e r e are around 225 Thakore families in this village that make 
two-thirds o f the village population. According to our ancestors, 
Sangpura is around 1200 years old and was fully destroyed three 
times in history. The recent history o f destruction dates back to the 
Mughal period when they invaded the village and three people 
from the Thakore caste died in the clashes. The village was first 
inhabited by the families o f Saukabhai Desai, and Sangpura derives 
its name from him. The next set of settlers were Patidars (today's 
Patels) and Thakores. Two families of Thakores came from villages 
called Meu and Padhana. The Thakores o f Sangpura thus have two 
differentiations within them - Mehua and Padharia, deriving from 
the parental village that they came from. Padharia Thakores were 
pagi (footman soldier) o f the Gaekwads while Mehua's were 
agriculturists. Gaekwads also appointed Mukhi (headman) for the 
village, who were Thakore by caste. The mukhis were appointed by 
the Gaekwads, and helped the villagers and administration at the 
time of conflict The mukhi also had executive power, could 
prosecute the people for theft and petty crime, and were 
responsible for tax collection. Due to a Thakore being a mukhi, the 
community was well regarded in the village. When the Gaekwads 
left after independence, they gave large tracts o f land to the families 
of pagi and mukhi as compensation. Before independence, 
Sangpura belonged to Thakores and Patels had very litde land. 
Agriculture was rainfed and the rule of Mehsul (tax collection) was 
very stringent At that time, if any one was not able to pay tax for a 
year then the Gaekwads would do araji (selling the land through 
bidding) to others who were interested and thus derived the tax 
from the sale. Thakores lost around 50 per cent o f their land to 
Patels during 1940-50. During those times, Vaniyas who held 
economic power joined with Patels and together they bought the 
land. Jus t before independence, Dayalal Shah, father o f Manilala 
Shah was the main wielder o f power in the village but the 
government's legislation to redistribute land made them lose some 
of the land after distributing it within their families. Since 
independence, there have been many changes in the policy o f the 
government due to which the Vaniyas left the village and settled in 
Surat and Mumbai. They sold their land to Patels. After 1970, when 
the water in the open wells was receding, the crude oil engine was 
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introduced This was followed by the mono-block pump and deep 
tubewells. In the time when tubeweUs were introduced in the 
village, Patels were more organised and knowledgeable to 
understand the benefits o f investing into them. At that time, the 
electricity rate was very low as compared to now and the total 
investment required to have a tubewell was around Rs. 80000 to 
100000. When Thakores wanted to invest, the cost went up to 
around Rs. 700000 and hence we could not afford Patels invested 
at the time when the 'price was right' and made money. During 
those days, the government also provided easy loans for 
constructing tubewells including subsidy, but due to social 
networks o f Patels the loan amount only went to their near and 
dear ones. They took advantage and we were left behind. During 
the early 1980s, electricity was provided for 18 to 20 hours per day 
and hence every tubewell had a surplus. This surplus water was 
available to us but only during night time as the shareholders prefer 
to irrigate in the day time. Their tubewells made huge profit due to 
sale o f water but the money largely came from the pocket of 
Thakores. N o w the electricity is available for only eight hours. 
Even if we install a tubewell, we can not sell water to the extent 
that was possible before and hence we cannot make profif. 
'Out o f 225 families o f Thakore, only five are rich in terms o f 
landholdings and have around 5.75 hectares o f land. Most of the 
Thakore land is un-irrigated and have no value as you can have 
only a monsoon crop. Around 46 hectares o f Thakore land is un-
irrigated while most of Patels have irrigated land. Those who have 
irrigated land have also been having less production now. Crops are 
failing every year and the land needs some rest. We have been over-
cultivating the land. Nevertheless, we cannot help, as there is 
increased pressure on the land due to the increase in population 
and changing lifestyle o f the people. A s o f now, the dairy 
cooperative is preventing us from becoming wage labourers. 
Without the dairy cooperative, this village would have been drained 
by now. It is not that alternatives to agriculture are not sought 
Young people from the village worked in the diamond polishing 
industry but that has also been going through a slump and there are 
no jobs available. Even those that are available are given to Patels 
as they have strong social networks. Thakore is a mehnatkash kaum 
(a caste that believes in hard work) and if given proper guidance we 
can do wonders. We do not go for swarth (greed) but for parmarth 
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(working for others more than one's own self). Unlike other castes, 
Thakores are more loyal. Though we are less educated and so we 
do not have our own doctors and lawyers like Patels and Prajapatis, 
we are not opposed to the growth of other castes. In our village 
around 25 years ago, we had a postmaster who was PateL Being a 
Patel, he would tear up the appointment letters o f other castes that 
came to the village. We were young at that time and he used to tell 
us " i f you would be educated then who would work as labourer in 
our fields". When I was a kid studying in the village school, the 
Patels used to grow onions and chillies. Almost all the teachers in 
the village were Patels and they used to send us to their fields to 
work there plucking onions and chillies. A t that time, we did not 
have a flourmill in our village and so the teacher used to send us to 
the mills in the neighbouring village for getting the wheat flour 
ground. We plucked vegetables from the field for our teachers 
during the time when we had to study. Until we reached seventh 
standard we did not open a book in the class room'. 
Case 2: Vervabhai Govinddas Patel 
Vervabhai (49) comes into the category o f big landlords and 
opinion makers of the village. H e stays in the new Patel colony 
along with his wife and two sons. Vervabhai is one o f two brothers 
and his father Govinddas Patel was also an agriculturist Earlier, 
they owned three dugwells in different locations through which the 
land was irrigated. After 1970 these dugwells were slowly converted 
into tubewells and so Vervabhai became a shareholder in one of 
the tubewells. Vervabhai has more than 3.5 hectares o f land, half of 
which is under horticulture such as orchards o f lemon and guava. 
These orchards have been leased out on yearly terms while the 
agricultural land is under sharecropping. During the year 2001-02 
his land was under sharecropping to three different Thakore 
sharecroppers. T o be on the safe side, he changes his sharecropper 
every alternate year. I f the sharecropper is 'good' then according to 
him 1 can consider giving him land on lease for one more year but 
never more than three years'. Asking the reason, he laughs loudly 
as if I can not understand T am here to save the land that my 
father and forefathers have accumulated over the years. D o you 
think I should distribute it among Thakores?' In his opinion, the 
recent spurt in sharecropping is a boon for Thakores, most o f 
whom are landless or marginal farmers without any irrigation 
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facility. Taking land on a share basis ensures that they get wages as 
shared agricultural produce at the end of the season. H e puts it, 
Thakores do not have to invest anything apart from their labour. 
All the cash money that is needed for cultivation is taken from us 
as a loan that we deduct at the end of the cropping season. This is a 
win-win situation for Thakore and Patel'. Surprisingly, Vervabhai 
does not 'own' a tubewell but has major shares in the tubewells that 
come near his agricultural land. The reason is again simple — 'Who 
is interested in day-to-day keeping o f all the records. When you 
have a share in a tubewell, it ensures profit and so let it be done by 
others who do not have any other job'. However, Vervabhai is not 
as careless as he make others believe. For the last 20 years, he has 
meticulously carried out agriculture and slowly half o f his land has 
been diverted to horticulture. For a family of five, half of the total 
land was sufficient for food security and hence investment in 
horticulture was done to earn more income through cash crops 
such as lemon and guava. Through the investment in tubewell 
shares he ensured the availability o f water. The income from 
horticulture is around Rs. 100000 per year. In 1993, another 
strategic decision taken by Varvabhai and his family was to catch 
up with the 'going to the USA' brigade. His brother migrated to the 
U S A in the same year through the extensive Patel network working 
in Ahmedabad and Mehsana, paying Rs . 700000. H e was newly 
married at that time and after three years, his wife was also sent to 
the U S A through a similar network. The 3.5 hectares o f land that 
Vervabhai shared with his brother is under his supervision now. 
His brother being in the USA has helped Vervabhai in more than 
one way. After reaching the USA his brother took up a job and 
repaid the loan taken to pay the agent for sending him there. His 
wife then also migrated and now there is a steady income for 
Vervabhai. In 2000 when all the tubewells were failing one by one, 
Vervabhai bought a share in one o f the new tubewells that was 
initiated by one of the Patel families from USA money. With 
income from agriculture and horticulture, Vervabhai does not have 
to worry about the future o f his family. Both his sons are married 
and he is now thinking of opening a shop in Mehsana for them. 
Since Vervabhai has assured income from abroad as well as from 
the land and the share in water, he likes to experiment with new 
varieties of crops. For many years, the farmers o f Sangpura did not 
take tobacco as it is a high-input crop and people were not ready to 
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take risk. During 2002-03, Vervabhai heard that the price o f 
tobacco was going to be high, as the farmers from neighbouring 
Vijapur taluka (sub-district) were not sowing tobacco. Earlier, the 
Vijapur farmers used to sow tobacco as the area is under the 
command area of Dharoi multipurpose irrigation project, and 
irrigation there was cheaper compared to the groundwater-irrigated 
areas. However, during the year the water level was down at Dharoi 
reservoir and farmers anticipated that there would be insufficient 
water supply in the canal. Many farmers thus opted out o f sowing 
tobacco. Vervabhai anticipated that the prices might go up due to 
shortage o f produce. Keeping an eye on the market, Vervabhai 
decided to take a risk and planted tobacco on his one hectare o f 
land through sharecropping. An agreement was made with the 
Thakore sharecropper that if the crop failed, the tenant would be 
compensated. The four months crop (sown early November and 
harvested in March) needed ten irrigations and also consumed huge 
amounts o f pesticide. The investment in tobacco was much higher 
than for other winter crops such as wheat. However, Vervabahi 
could afford and absorb risk as he had income from the USA. In 
the one hectare o f land, the total production of tobacco was worth 
Rs. 130000 and after deducting the total investment o f Rs . 30000 
the net profit from the land was around Rs. 100000. 
As one of the rich persons of the village, many respect 
Vervabhai. Who knows when they require money and so they can 
borrow if they have good relations with him? Apart from this, 
many people from the Patel and Prajapati castes will sit around him 
in the evening to listen to his views on what is happening in India, 
the U S A or in Gujarat. After all, Vervabhai has studied until class 
12 t h , reads the newspapers with interest, and watches the news very 
carefully. His analysis o f the political situation is something that 
creates opinion in the village. H e is also a contact person for the 
political parties who come to the village for meetings. His house is 
double-storied with tiled flooring and facilities such as a colour 
television, cordless phone and satellite dish antenna. These facilities 
are available to people who are close to him. His two sons are also 
popular amongst their peers as they enable access to watching 
satellite T V and cricket matches and that too in coloured television. 
Vervabhai has never contested an election, whether it is o f 
panchayat, credit or dairy cooperative. Nevertheless, he ensures 
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that l i is people' are elected in these positions so that he can have 
easy access to all these institutions if he needs them. 
Case 3: Chaganbhai Nathabhai Prajapati 
Chaganbhai is a middle-aged farmer clad in white Dhoti and Kurta 
with a white Gandhi topi (cap) on his head. H e stays at the new 
Prajapati colony in the village, and can be spotted in the evening 
when he sits in his verandah on the swing with the help o f 
cushions, entertaining visitors and friends. Confidence comes 
naturally in his face when he talks to people and his sense o f pride 
can always be felt This sense of pride is rooted in a number of 
things such as belonging to one o f the five families o f Sangpura 
who own a tractor, having more than seven hectares o f land and a 
family tubewell. In the era of shared tubewells, Chaganbhai stands 
out with a tubewell that his family owns exclusively and sells water 
to others. However, according to Changanbhai, his wealth has 
come by building up their ancestral property. According to him, he 
had made wealth in the last thirty years but it was all the product of 
hard work o f his family. In 1967, he owned only 1.15 hectares o f 
land that had increased to seven hectares in 2002. H o w did this 
transformation come about? Before installing a tubewell in 1983, 
he had been doing the business o f brick selling while his wife 
looked after the field operations. Slowly, his business picked up 
and Chaganbhai used to go around villages where he took orders 
for bricks and supplied them from the brick kilns. His business was 
expanding and he used to travel in the day and then replace his 
wife in the evening in the field, to look after the standing crops. 
According to him, with his hard work, he could accumulate money 
for investing in the tubewell on his own. In the early 1980s, after 
mstalling the tubewell, he stopped the brick business as the 
business o f agriculture and water selling was profitable. In the year 
1983 when he installed the tubewell, it cost around Rs. 75000. The 
investment in the tubewell was recovered in the first few years after 
installation. At present, the tubewell irrigates seven hectares o f his 
land and three and half hectares of his neighbours to whom he sells 
water. Apart from a tubewell, he also invested money in cattle 
rearing as the milk cooperative had been opened in the village. At 
present, he has five buffaloes and the net earning from them is 
around Rs. 10000 per month. Chaganbhai has two sons, who are 
also engaged in agricultural operations. H e also owns a tractor, 
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which is rented out during the peak agricultural season. In order to 
buy the tractor, Chaganbhai took a loan from the cooperative bank 
where he has an account H e is still repaying the loan but does not 
find it difficult as there are only five tractors in the village. During 
the peak agricultural season, the tractor works day and night 
earning handsome money. 
Having a strong economic background, Chaganbhai is also an 
opinion maker o f the Prajapati community. According to him, 'the 
Prajapatis were not a landed class. Most o f the families had 
marginal landholdings but there was an emphasis amongst them to 
be organised and invest in agriculture and education. Chaganbhai is 
proud that today in the school the Prajapati children are sitting next 
to Patels and also compete with them. Last year, a Prajapati boy 
stood first in the higher secondary exams, rather than a Patel. The 
Prajapati samaj (caste-based organisation) gave him a scholarship to 
attend college in Mehsana. According to him, 'our strategy was to 
go slow but be on firm footing. We knew that since we are in 
minority, we can not take on Patels or any other caste people in 
numbers. Our approach was to first consolidate our position in 
economic terms. Today, we are well off in the village and therefore 
we can now have say in all spheres o f life. N o w we have our own 
doctors and lawyers who help us when we need them. I f we have 
any land dispute with a Patel, we do not need to go to a Patel 
lawyer who helps the other Patels despite taking money from us. 
We have Prajapati lawyers and also people working in key 
positions. We can take on Patels now on all terms. However, since 
we have the power, we do not want to confront them because if 
you are together with Patels you can actually rule the village. So we 
have aligned with Patels in the village and have a say in almost all 
matters. This achievement was impossible in the early 1980s 
because we were not equal to Patels at that time. Today, they also 
know that we have our strong network and if they can institute a 
prize for a Patel student, we can also boost Prajapati students to 
rub shoulders with them. Since we were a little late in coming at 
par with Patels, we also lost out to them on sending our people to 
the USA. Now, when more than 100 Patels are in the USA, only 
two Prajapatis are in the USA. This was mainly because of the 
networks they had which gave them an initial advantage. Two 
people from Prajapati caste who went to the USA from our village 
have used the support from Patels only. But since the regulation 
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for going to the USA is so stringent that even if we have money, 
now we cannot go to the USA. It is extremely difficult for us now 
and hence I feel that we have lost out to Patels in these terms. N o w 
the agricultural production is going down and the cost o f water is 
increasing due to the supply of electricity curtailed to eight hours 
per day. Patels could foresee the problem and hence they now do 
not worry much about the declining productivity and increasing 
c o s t We have to worry as our children have studied but they are 
not getting jobs here. All the jobs are for English speaking people 
and our children have studied in Gujarati medium. There are no 
government jobs available and so we are forced to be trapped into 
agriculture'. 
Case 4: Govindbhai Joitaram Parmar 
Govindbhai Parmar (64) is the leader o f Parmars in Sangpura. In 
Sangpura, Parmars own only one tubewell and the major share in 
that is o f Govindbhai. He worked as a 'fitter' in the Indian Railways 
in Mehsana. H e has three sons, o f whom two are employed in a 
government job in Mehsana and one looks after agricultural 
operations in Sangpura. The eldest son Prahladbhai works for the 
General Insurance Company in Mehsana town and is one of the 
opinion makers for second generation Parmars in the village. 
Prahladbhai's name is spoken with a lot o f respect among the 
Parmars as well as others in the village due to his position in the 
company where he works. His monthly earning is around Rs. 
17000. In Sangpura, out o f 60 Parmar families, only 35 per cent 
have access to irrigation while 25 per cent live below the poverty 
line and work as agricultural labourers. In this situation, the family 
o f Govindbhai is among the very few who have some landholdings 
and are engaged in agriculture. This situation has come mainly 
through the government policy o f reserving some seats in 
government jobs for people coming under the scheduled caste 
category. Several people have taken advantage of the policy and 
hence got government jobs. While in a government job, a fixed 
income was assured which was then diverted towards buying land 
in the village from poorer households. The first generation worker 
in the government departments then invested in the education of 
his sons and hence could again take advantage for procuring jobs. 
Prahaladbhai is a successful example o f this strategy. The surplus 
generated from government jobs was put into agriculture and 
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tubewells so that household food security was ensured and there is 
an income through the sale o f water. 
However, the journey was also full of problems as Govindbhai 
puts it 'from the day we are b o m we face discrimination. Even 
today the situation has not changed much. You can imagine what 
would have been the situation been 50 years ago. I myself and one 
other boy were the only two students from Parmar families who 
went to school at that time. We were asked to sit on the last row o f 
the school and were not allowed to drink water from the earthen 
pot o f the school. I have studied until seventh standard and when I 
grew a bit to understand the ciiscrimination, I left the school. I used 
to feel bad about the way we were treated in the school. Luckily, 
one o f our relatives was working in the Railways, and he informed 
me that there was a post exclusively reserved for people belonging 
to scheduled castes. I went and applied there and due to my 
education, I got the job. After I got the job there, I used to travel 
from Sangpura to Mehsana. I used to walk until Jagudhan village 
(around five kilometres away from Sangpura) where the train used 
to come from Ahmedabad. I used to board the train there and then 
come back the same way in the evening. My sons were studying at 
the school and when they grew up, we shifted to Mehsana for 
providing better educational opportunities for them. It is through 
education that my sons have been able to take advantage of the 
government policy and now work as officers in Mehsana. My 
youngest son could not study and so he now works in the village 
looking after the agricultural operations. We also have buffaloes 
and therefore through the milk cooperative, we are able to have 
good income'. 
Giving his opinion on the village politics, Govindbhai says *we 
know that we can not beat Patels in wealth and power but we can 
organize ourselves and at least be economically independent from 
upper caste people. This is our goal but it is a difficult one. Half o f 
our population (Parmars) do not possess land or have as litde as a 
quarter o f a hectare o f land. N o w that there is opportunity for 
them to work as labourers in the industrial zones, it is not difficult 
for us to be independent Even then, our women work in the farms 
of the upper castes and so we have to obey some of the rules even 
though we know that it is not in our favour. Till very recently, we 
have been voting for the Patels but for the last 20 years or so, 
Thakores have become the sarpanch. Even then, the main 
Strategic Alliances and Everyday Village Politics 189 
Strategic Alliances and Pontics of Formal Institutions 
Like many other villages, Sangpura is divided between groups. 
However, the political alliances have been changing over a period 
o f time reflecting the needs and strategies o f various social groups 
within the village. At the time of the field work (2002-03), the first 
group consisted o f the majority of Patels, Prajapatis, several 
Thakores and Parmars. The second group had the majority o f 
Thakores, Parmars, other castes small in numbers and several 
Patels. In both cases, the group was led by a Patel. The supremacy 
of each group depends upon its representatives getting higher 
offices in the panchayat and dairy and credit cooperatives. In this 
section, I study these three formal institutions o f the village to 
analyse the politics of their control by the dominant group. 
The village panchayat 
From 1960 onwards, after the formation o f a separate Gujarat 
state, formal village panchayats were instituted. Representation in 
the panchayat clearly reflected the major political alliances in the 
village. From the beginning of the formal panchayat system after 
1960, the village was headed by Venabhai Patel. After he had been 
in power for almost two decades, many believed that Venabhai 
started to think that he was indispensable and so would continue as 
the sarpanch in all the coming elections. Patels had always 
dominated village life both economically and poUtically and 
Venabhai had a large base among them. Other castes did not have 
sufficient strength to challenge the authority of Venabhai. Once 
institutions of the dairy and credit cooperative are still in their 
hands. We know this but we cannot challenge them because they 
are economically and numerically powerful. We decide from 
election to election if voting for someone is in our interest or n o t 
In our caste, we have people in high positions in the Police and in 
other government departments. Even when there is some problem, 
Patels and Prajapatis come to us for help. We help each other 
knowing but helping people from our own caste comes first as we 
know that others also do the same.' 
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Venabhai remarked in public that the village would be ruled by 
Patels forever. This remark boosted the anti-Patel campaign in the 
village. Venabhai did not only have enemies outside but also within 
his caste group. A small fraction of Patels felt that Venabhai was 
appropriating too much wealth from the panchayat account 
without providing much benefit for others. This group was led by 
Kantibhai Patel who was the teacher in the village school. 
Kantibhai aligned with the Prajapatis and Thakores and proposed 
Mangaji Bhagaji Mukhi, a Thakore, as the candidate for election in 
1984-85. Venabhai supported Mangalbhai Atmaram Patel but 
ultimately, Mangaji won. Mangaji was a mukhi (the village headman 
during Gaekwad era) and so was a 'natural' leader o f Thakores. All 
Thakore families supported him because they could see that it 
would be the first time that a Thakore would become sarpanch of 
the formal village panchayat Mangaji was sarpanch for 2 terms 
(from 1985 to 1995) followed by Athaji Thakore (from 1995-2000). 
In the year 2001, the election was won by Kantibhai Patel. 
During the panchayat election o f 2001, the village was politically 
divided between two groups supported by different castes. On one 
side were the newly-rich Patels (whose relatives are in the USA), 
Prajapatis and almost half o f Thakores and Parmars. The second, 
less influential side were the group of Rambhai Patel whose father 
was the first sarpanch of the village. Rambhai is one o f the big 
landlords and is proud of his past, saying 'our family has ruled the 
village'. However, some of the Patels confess in private that 'this 
pride only brought him down as a section o f us felt that his family 
was becoming too arrogant and accountable to none'. They blame 
that due to his hegemony, an alternative force was created and the 
panchayat headman post went to the Thakores. The election in the 
year 2001 was important for Patels, as they wanted the position 
back in their court. This move was supported by almost half of the 
Thakore families who were not happy with the way Athaji had 
functioned as sarpanch. 
The 2001 elections o f panchayats were also very important from 
the point o f view of state politics. From 1960 to 1995 the Indian 
National Congress (LNC) dominated die political arena in Gujarat 
However, the upsurge o f Hindu nationalism in 1989 and its 
culmination in the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in 
1992 gave rise to the right wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). The 
B J P came to power in Gujarat for the first time in 1995. The BJP , 
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except for a one-and-a-half month break, has managed to stay in 
power ever since despite the storms o f world-wide criticism over 
irregularities in the January 2001 earthquake relief work With the 
state election around the corner in 2002, the central leadership 
replaced the then chief minister Keshubhai Patel with Narendra 
Modi on the allegation of 'sheer inegularities' in the relief works 
after the January 26, 2001 earthquake that killed thousands o f 
people in the state. Also the ruling B J P was losing all municipal and 
panchayat elections to the I N C . 5 Narendra Modi was brought in to 
re-organise the party and to help them win the next election in the 
state. Modi started with the panchayat elections as a 'semi-final' for 
the general election o f the state to be held in 2002. In order to win 
the panchayat elections, he took advantage o f a clause in the State 
Panchayat Act wherein the government can give awards to the 
gram panchayats who elect their representatives in consensus. The 
primary reason for awarding such panchayats as stated by the 
government is that consensus candidates save costs o f an election 
and hence should be promoted. Many commented on this clause in 
the Panchayat Act on the ground that it helps in reconfirmation o f 
the power structure of the village and the fact that most of the 
times lower caste candidates can not get elected if it is based on 
consensus. However, this clause was well suited for the BJP, whose 
electoral base was more in the upper and middle castes rather than 
among dalits, Muslims and other backward classes. As a strategy to 
win the panchayat elections, the compensation amount was 
increased from Rs. 5000 to 60000 in case village panchayat 
members were declared elected through consensus. 
In Sangpura also the fact that the village would receive Rs. 
60000 helped in bringing a broad consensus among dominant 
individuals that they should help make the panchayat be elected on 
a consensus basis. For days the mighty o f Sangpura discussed this 
among themselves and convinced others. Consensus also meant 
those in favour o f the 'consensus' option would have to ensure that 
no one from the village filed nomination papers. I f there was even 
one nomination for the post of sarpanch, it would mean that there 
would be an election. For the politically powerful people, it was 
something that was in their favour, as their candidate would be 
elected without any opposition. This meant that the aspiring 
candidate would not even have to campaign for the election or 
make any promises. The group decided that Kantibhai Patel, the 
192 The Dark Zone 
former teacher would be their candidate for the sarpanch. They 
also decided on the names o f the members o f the panchayat which 
had representatives from all major castes of the village and as per 
the reservation guidelines o f the A c t The other group in the 
village, which wanted to oppose this, was not gaining any support 
as getting Rs. 60000 for the village gave an advantage to the 
dominant group on issues o f village development It was discussed 
how the village could have a new road with the money received 
and those who planned to oppose this were called immoral as they 
did not think about the development o f the village. However, the 
opposing group managed to float the name of Jayantibhai Prajapati, 
a Prajapati leader who stayed in Surat but whose name was in the 
electoral list o f the village. This also showed that for the first time 
the Prajapatis, who always aligned with Patels, were informally 
divided within their group. The leadership o f Prajapati tried to talk 
to Jayantibhai, who was called from Surat (around 500 kilometres 
away from Sangpura), but in vain. The opposition group asked 
Jayantibhai to go to Mehsana panchayat office directly for filing his 
nomination instead of visiting the village. The opposing group kept 
the news o f Jayantibhai filing his nomination a secret However, 
some people from the dominant group had already sensed the 
opposition. As a counter strategy, the leaders of the dominant 
group camped outside the panchayat office to check whether 
anyone from their village or from the opposite camp was visiting 
the panchayat office to file a nomination. They could spot 
Jayantibhai coming with other people from the opposite camp and 
stopped them. There was a heated argument among the groups and 
Jayantibhai was given a threat to his life in case he filed his 
nomination. With this pressure from the dominant group, 
Jayantibhai returned back to Surat without even visiting the village 
and filing a nomination. At the end, the village was declared a 
consensus panchayat with Kantibhai Patel as the sarpanch of the 
village. 
The above process clearly shows how power works in some of 
the so-called democratic institutions where domination o f certain 
social groups is maintained through formal and informal ways. In 
the 40 years of formal panchayat politics in Sangpura, Patels and 
Thakores have become sarpanch. The power has shifted from one 
group to another in recent years, but Patels have always 
spearheaded i t For 15 years (1985-2000), Thakores headed the 
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The milk cooperative 
The milk cooperative is one o f the prominent institutions of 
Sangpura. The cooperative was initiated in 1965 under the apex 
institution Mehsana Doodh Sagar Dairy. 6 Prior to the initiation o f 
the cooperative, milk production was predominantly for household 
consumption. Rabbaris, a caste traditionally engaged in the business 
o f catde rearing and milk vending, used to collect surplus milk 
from the households and sell it in Mehsana town. The milk 
cooperative provided a ready market in the village and therefore 
the number o f people engaged in catde rearing slowly increased. 
The milk cooperative became successful for two reasons. First, the 
milk cooperative built on the already available skill o f the people 
Dairying was an mtrinsic part o f agriculture and so it was not 
difficult for people to expand this activity for the market The 
investment was low due to the use of agricultural residues as 
fodder. Second, the cooperative provided much needed cash flow 
for the farmers twice in a month. This was needed under the new 
technology in agriculture, which was based on external inputs to be 
bought from the market Availability o f cash provided access to 
these inputs that helped raising productivity o f agriculture in the 
village but due to lack o f social support and standing, Patels only 
used them in the process of gaining more power and control. 
However, in recent years, some of the Thakores have raised issues 
o f actualising real power. They believed that if any one from their 
caste group becomes a sarpanch in the present time, they could use 
the opportunity to access resources in their favour. Some of the 
newly-rich Thakores who could align with Parmars and other 
smaller groups spearheaded these aspirations to challenge the 
authority o f the Patel-Prajapati combine. These groups had raised 
issues o f domination in the milk and credit cooperatives, which 
deal with large economic resources. There was nothing much to 
manipulate in the panchayat as it did not have a very large budget 
and hence the power associated with it was largely symbolic For 
Patels, it was a time when the power should come back to them in 
actual terms as they were not clear if any protege leader would 
comply with them this time. The choice for consensus was a step 
towards this objective 
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initial years. However, the new arrangement was largely suited for 
the landed class as keeping catde was directly related to agricultural 
production and the resource base o f the farmer. The white 
revolution was thus based on the success o f the green revolution 
and vice versa. Slowly, as the green revolution picked up, die 
marginal farmers also became part o f the milk cooperative as 
production increased. 
The milk cooperative is an economic institution and its 
membership and management reflects that interest The 
membership o f the cooperative was extended to all with paying a 
nominal fee. Membership was given on individual rather than 
household basis. All adults of Sangpura can be a member of the 
cooperative. Voting rights are given to those wdividual members 
who contribute a minimum of 700 litres o f milk per annum. In the 
year 2000-2001, the Sangpura milk cooperative contributed more 
than 600000 litres of milk worth more than Rs. 7600000 (see Table 
6.1). Apart from the direct economic benefit, the milk cooperative 
also provided life insurance. The premium of the insurance is 
equally paid by cooperative, member and the federation. In 
Sangpura, the member's premium is paid by the cooperative. The 
insurance is provided on a yearly basis but to qualify, a member has 
to contribute at least 200 litres per annum. The coverage of die 
insurance is Rs. 20000. Apart from the insurance, the cooperative 
also provides loans to buy buffaloes or cows. The members in the 
annual meeting generally decide this. 
The large annual turnover of the cooperative raises interest in its 
control. From the beginning, the governance of the dairy 
cooperative was with the Patels, who constituted the board 
according to the specified norms. Their leadership went 
unchallenged for almost three decades. With the economic rise o f 
Prajapatis over the years, a demand emerged from them to share 
power in the cooperative. It was decided between the Patels and 
Prajapatis that they would head the dairy and credit cooperative 
alternatively. This meant that if a Patel is chairperson of the dairy 
cooperative, the secretary should be a Prajapati so as to balance the 
power. Simultaneously, the credit cooperative would have a 
Prajapati as chairperson and a Patel as secretary. Darbars, an upper 
caste, agreed to this combination and did not ask any post, as they 
were few in number. The collaboration excluded Thakore and 
other castes from power sharing. As seen from the data collected 
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for 2000-01, the Patel-Prajapati-Darbar combine had 58 per cent o f 
the members voting for them while the Thakore and others could 
manage only 42 per cent Since Thakore and others were 
economically not well off, even though they might have more 
members, they might not qualify for voting rights because they 
could not always contribute a minimum of 700 litres per annum. 
The question is how do Patels and Prajapatis manage to get more 
voting rights? The Patel or Prajapati households produce more 
milk per family than others do. Since the membership is on 
individual basis, one household generally has an average o f three to 
four members. In order to gain more voting rights, the first 700 
litres o f milk is contributed in the name of first family member, 
followed by the others. With the average milk production being 
much more than 700 litres per year per household in these families, 
more voting rights are obtained. An analysis o f Table 6.1 shows 
that among castes such as Patel, Prajapati and Darbar, the 
percentage of voting members to that of total members is more 
than 60 per cent while it is less than 50 per cent for Thakores and 
Parmars. Other castes are too small in number to make a 
significant change in the combine. This means that even though 
Thakores and other castes can increase their number o f members 
in the milk cooperative, it is difficult for them to challenge the 
Patel-Prajapati-Darbar combine due to their economic power to 
produce more milk. The struggle for control of the milk 
cooperative also stems from the way agriculture has changed its 
course in north Gujarat In the 1980s agriculture used to support 
animal husbandry, but in recent years animal husbandry supports 
agriculture. With the declining agricultural productivity in general 
and water productivity in particular, the gains from agriculture are 
shrinking. The dairying cooperative has come to the rescue, as the 
return from dairy has superseded agriculture in recent years. 7 
However, diversification from agriculture to dairy farming 
primarily took place among resourceful farmers. For marginal and 
small farmers household food security comes first, as small 
landholdings barely sustain the grain requirement o f the family. A 
Patel farmer puts it concisely, 'earlier, agriculture used to 
complement animal husbandry but now it is up side down. 
However, not everyone can afford to have a buffalo. The land 
TABLE 6.1 : T H E MILK COOPERATIVE MEMBERS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION, CHARACTERISED BY CASTE 
Caste Total Year 1998-99 Year2000-2001 
Eligible 
membersfor 
voting 
Total milk 
production 
in litres 
Rupees 
equivalent 
Eligible 
members 
for voting 
Total milk 
production 
in Stres 
Rupees 
equivalent 
Patel 170 126 227651.80 2847936.00 111 209618.00 2605871.00 
Thakore 193 84 163605.30 1777714.00 89 146076.70 1719360.00 
Prajapati 90 64 115380.20 1419034.00 60 125888.60 1532308.00 
Darbar 32 16 39739.60 503663.80 24 45200.40 569232.10 
Parmar 40 18 34927.40 453106.00 19 41207.40 496774.20 
Vaghari 30 11 22668.00 272983.20 10 17720.80 207726.60 
Rabbari 18 13 37052.10 337857.60 13 43434.70 366543.70 
Bawa 5 4 6196.4 78448.1 3 5308.9 66759.02 
Rawal 3 2 2466.80 24660.02 2 1477.70 15622.66 
Suthar 4 2 1234.20 17015.19 2 2556.30 33573.83 
Nai 2 2 1954.70 24452.68 2 3704.60 44011.98 
Total 587 342 652876.50 7756870.59 335 642194.10 7657783.09 
Source: Records of Sangpura milk cooperative, 1998-99 & 2000-2001 
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T A B L E 6.2: MEMBERSHIP COVERAGE O F T H E MILK COOPERATIVE 
Caste Number of Total members Percent 'age of milk 
adults in the milk coopère ttive members to the 
cooperative total number of adults 
Patel 552 170 31 
Thakore 584 193 33 
Prajapati 217 90 41 
Darbar 65 32 49 
Parmar 107 40 37 
Bawa 22 5 23 
Vaghari 118 30 25 
Nai 10 2 20 
Rabari 31 18 58 
Suthar 34 4 12 
Rawal 25 3 12 
Luhar 4 0 0 
Senma 11 0 0 
Darji 14 0 0 
Salat 10 0 0 
Total 1804 587 33 
Source: Records of Sangpura milk cooperative 
Note: For column one, data was collected from the village voter list 
holding and ability to divert a piece o f land for grass production 
determines the capacity to have cattle. Rearing one buffalo means 
one should have at least one hectare o f land. One can also keep a 
buffalo by buying green fodder from the market, but in that case, it 
becomes uneconomic. Buffalos eat dry fodder (Bajri) and green 
fodder everyday and for this, one has to cultivate alfalfa (a grass 
crop) in the farmland. It is believed that alfalfa increases the fat 
content in the milk and thus helps in earning more money per litre 
o f milk sold in the cooperative. I f one has only a quarter o f a 
hectare of land, it will not be sufficient even for growing food 
crops. In this case, one cannot divert land for growing fodder 
crops except when the income from the buffalo allows purchase of 
food grains from the market instead of growing these in one's own 
farm. In Sangpura, this is not the case. For most people if they do 
not have anything to eat, what will they give to the buffalo? It is 
like rearing a child; the more you give them to eat, the stronger 
they are. Similarly, the more green fodder you give to buffalo, the 
more milk they produce'. 
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Table 6.2 shows caste-wise membership o f the milk cooperative. 
On average, the milk cooperative covers only two-thirds o f the 
village. Among different castes, the figure fluctuates between a 
minimum of 12 to a maximum 58 per cent o f adult members. The 
highest 58 per cent is among Rabbaris who traditionally are 
engaged in cattle rearing. The reason for the differentiation in the 
coverage is the interrelations o f clairy with agricultural production. 
With the rise o f sharecropping it was expected by sharecroppers 
that the fodder crops would also be covered, which would bring 
economic benefit to them as they could also rear cattle for milk 
production. However, the sharecropping arrangement excludes 
fodder crops on the ground that it does not require extensive 
labour. In addition, since the fodder crops cover a small portion o f 
the total cropped area, it is generally grown using household 
labour. With the rise in sharecropping, the sharecroppers had some 
hope to keep cattle for milk production but that is excluded from 
the contracts. The milk production system thus builds on the 
prevalent social relations of production. 
The agricultural credit society 
The agricultural cooperative society was established in the year 
1965 under the primary agricultural cooperative structure. The 
'credit cooperative' as it is popularly called in the village, works to 
extend credit to farmers and non-farmers and runs the fair price 
shop. The crop loans are given to landowners at the beginning o f 
the agricultural season. Landless workers and farmers falling under 
scheduled caste are provided a fixed amount The amount o f loan 
given to the landowners depends on the area that the farmer will 
cultivate and crop to be cultivated. For example if someone 
proposes to cultivate cotton, the amount o f loan extended would 
be the highest as cotton is considered a high value crop wherein 
high investment is needed. The district cooperative bank issues a 
list o f all the crops and the maximum amount that can be 
sanctioned under those crops. Accordingly, farmers fill the form 
and apply for the loan before a particular season. Sangpura is 
among the villages where there has been no defaulter to date. D u e 
to this, the primary agriculture cooperative society o f the village has 
been given 'A' certificate every year by the audit department Apart 
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from sanctioning loans to farmers, the cooperative runs the fair 
price shop in the village and distributes wheat, rice, oil (rapeseed 
and groundnut), sugar, tea and fertilizers such as urea and D A P . 
Out o f these, only wheat, rice and sugar are subsidised and the rest 
is obtained from the open market 
T o become a member o f the cooperative, every adult member 
o f the village has to buy at least a share o f Rs. 10. The cooperative 
has 361 members and is managed by an executive committee 
headed by a chairperson. The secretary of the cooperative looks 
after day- to-day functioning of the cooperative and is accountable 
to the committee and the chairperson. Until April 2002, the 
cooperative followed a system where the executive committee of 
the cooperative had nine members and every year three new 
members were be nominated to replace three old members. These 
nominations were 'one-off, which meant that none of the 
nominated members could be resubmitted until all the members of 
the cooperative had a chance o f becoming a member of the 
executive committee. The rule was to ensure that no dominant 
group took over the functions o f the cooperative. However, this 
has been changed and according to the new rule, the executive 
committee is elected for a period of three years. The executive 
committee will have 11 members who are elected or nominated. 
The committee works for 3 years after which a new election takes 
place. The new rule does not prevent people from standing if they 
have been elected before. Therefore, a person can now become a 
member of the executive committee as many times as the members 
vote for him or her. Though women are also members of the 
cooperative and there is a reservation for them in the executive 
committee, there is no history of a woman chairperson in the 
cooperative. The committee provides loans to people categorised 
as farmers and non-farmers. There is a special provision to give 
loans to lower caste farmers. During the financial year 1999-2000, 
the cooperative sanctioned more than Rs. 1000000 to the people o f 
Sangpura. The loan amount is based on the land holding and hence 
the landed farmers get amounts up to Rs. 25000 while the 
minimum sanctioned amount is Rs. 4500 for a landless farmer. 
Loans are given twice a year, and have to be repaid before the next 
agricultural season. Due to the amount o f money the cooperative 
deals with, different groups in the village want to control it through 
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various means. However, this is a game that the dominant castes 
have always won. 
In January 2002 a Prajapati chaired Sangpura's agricultural 
cooperative and the post of the secretary had gone to a PateL The 
committee was all male It included five Patels and one 
representative each from Prajapati, Thakore and Parmar caste. 
H o w did this dominance o f Patel-Prajapati actually come about and 
what are its 
T A B L E 6.3: SHARES HELD BY INDIVIDUALS IN T H E CREDIT COOPERATIVE 
Caste Total numb 
members 
vr of Total share in rupees % of total 
share 
Patel 130 106081 48 
Prajapati 49 33000 15 
Thakore 112 48600 22 
Parmar 36 15010 7 
Darbar 11 7220 3 
Others 23 9010 4 
Total 350 218921 99 
Source: Records of the Sangpura Sewa Sahkari Mandali, 1999- March 2000 
Note: Percentages rounded to zero decimals 
implications? As Joitaram Prajapati puts it, 'there is an unwritten 
agreement between Patels and Prajapatis to have their 
representatives on the board of the milk and credit cooperative 
alternatively. Since the milk cooperative is chaired by a Patel and 
assisted by a Prajapati (secretary), the credit cooperative should 
have a Prajapati chairperson and a Patel secretary to balance' the 
act.' 
A subsequent question is how could a group of people dominate 
in a membership-based institution? This is more so as the 
membership can be granted for paying Rs. 10 only. The basis o f 
dominance o f the cooperative is the dependence o f the voting right 
o f the member on the share they own. The record o f shares owned 
by mdividuals during April 1999 to March 2000 showed that 48 per 
cent o f the total share was with Patels while 22 per cent o f it was in 
the possession o f Thakores. Prajapati owned only 15 per cent o f 
the total share (Table 6.3). Here, the numerical combination o f 
Patels and Prajapati outnumbered others and hence they win in the 
number game. However, in the history o f the cooperative there 
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have never been elections and till now the executive committee 
members are nominated by powerful individuals. The selection o f 
members means that the dominant group will have a say in who 
should be on the board. Patels have always had a larger share in 
this decision making body without even contesting elections. As 
one o f the member o f the executive committee puts it, 'if you can 
control the cooperative without elections, why do you have to ask 
for it? In fact election brings many uncertainties and one never 
knows who is going to align with whom. So selections are always 
better as no one generally comes out in the open to oppose others 
as they also have to live in the village'. The control over the 
cooperative is thus maintained in two ways. First, to follow a 
selection procedure to avoid any direct confrontation with other 
groups. Second, through the shares it is ensured that the 
dominance is always in the hands of Patel and Prajapati together in 
case an election takes place. I f someone approaches the 
cooperative for new membership and if they are not part o f the 
combine, they are ridiculed and the move is looked on as 
opposition to the dominant group. Since people from other castes 
also have economic and non-economic relations with the dominant 
group members, there are very few who can openly oppose this 
situation o f control. It shows how dominant groups work through 
the social structure to be in authority and maintain control over 
institutions that may have a bearing on their life. 
Caste, Alliances and the 'Everyday Politics of Sangpura 
For almost 30 years one powerful alliance dominated by Patels 
governed Sangpura's politics. Others did not have sufficient 
economic and social influence to challenge them. However, as the 
local economy started to experience new opportunities, it also 
provided economic uplift to other social groups. The green 
revolution has contributed significantly to this. Due to increased 
irrigation facilities, agricultural operations amplified. Employment 
was available for at least two seasons in the beginning, which 
increased up to three seasons. Patels did not have the labour power 
to cultivate such large areas and therefore provided wage 
employment to others who were landless or marginal farmers in 
the initial years. Thakores, Parmars and others started to work as 
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labourers in the Patel land while Prajapatis mostly employed family 
labour. Though the gains from agriculture directly benefited the 
landed class, the poor also benefited through increased availability 
of employment Further, in the late 1980s most o f the families 
from a lower economic background started to consolidate their 
political power and hence their alignment challenged the 
supremacy of Patels. This alliance was not without the support o f 
newly-rich Patels who had their families in the USA. The money 
that came from the USA made them rather independent o f the rest 
of the society, as otherwise they would have been dependent on 
others for carrying out agriculture. This independence had paid for 
the new alliances along -with the support from Thakores who were 
in majority. The population o f the Thakore caste had overtaken the 
Patels in 30 years. This was attributed to the illiteracy and 
economic backwardness o f Thakores who needed more Svorking 
hands' for the family. Even though the Panchayat leadership was in 
the hands o f Thakores, it largely became symbolic, as Panchayats 
did not have many economic funds and great power. 
Prajapatis remain at an intermediate level seeking support from 
the new power group of Patels. However, as a social group, they 
were largely organised into one single unit so that their numbers 
would be intact They often discussed that there were only 70 
families. Hence, if they stayed together, they could bargain with the 
rest o f the community on any matter. I f one goes by the 
government categorisation o f castes in different classes, Patels are 
the only upper classes in the village. Prajapatis and Thakores come 
under the official category of Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and 
the rest are categorised as Scheduled Castes (SCs). However, while 
Prajapatis are officially categorised as OBCs , they consider 
themselves as part of the upper class. They like to mingle more 
with Patels than with Thakores. According to them, as a potter 
caste, historically they were lower in the caste hierarchy than the 
Patels but when they slowly became agriculturists and economically 
well off, the occupational difference disappeared and so they 
became closer to Patels. Now, Patels accept food in Prajapati 
houses and are invited to social occasions such as marriages and 
funerals.8 The history o f the political alliances suggests that the 
powerful coalitions in Sangpura closely follow caste identifications, 
and these are historically changing. There is no doubt that caste has 
been one of the prominent bases that provides 'natural' superiority 
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o f one group over another. Caste is crucially concerned with 
determining access to the means o f production, control over 
resources and institutions and forms of surplus extraction 
(Chakravarti 2001). However, the everyday persistence of caste 
hierarchy is not as continuous and discrete as professed by 
D u m o n t 9 Instead, 'the rule of caste obeys the rule o f powe^ 
(Gupta 1991: 118) and together it forms a system of hierarchy. 
Social power is derived by maintaining the hierarchy and in some 
cases even nurtured by i t However, the question is, how social 
power generated through village politics feeds into the larger 
political process of the state, and vice versa. 
The village level political alliances also influence the voting 
pattern o f the people in state-level elections. This voting pattern 
also sides with popular alliances and caste identities. In Sangpura, 
in 2002, the upper castes vote for the right wing Bhartiya Janata 
Party (BJP), the ruling political party o f Gujarat The BJP has a 
strong base among the upper castes. Thakores, Parmars and 
Vagharis vote for Indian National Congress (LNC). However, the 
voting pattern has not remained the same in the history o f politics 
in Gujarat where power struggles has paved the way for different 
alliances. Since the formation of a separate Gujarat state in 1960, 
the I N C worked with the popular Bhrahmin-Baniya-Patel alliance 
until the Navnirman movement of early 1970s that challenged the 
political combination o f the castes. The movement was a sign of 
the up welling aspirations of the middle and intermediate classes. 1 0 
A number o f communities from the intermediate castes and 
socially and educationally backward castes, as well as scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes, have moved upwards and become part 
o f the middle class, sharing its aspirations and worldview. 
In order to encapsulate the newer aspirations, the K H A M 
(Khsatriya, Harijan, Adivasi and Muslim combine) politics came 
into place (Yagnik 2002). This arrangement partiy transferred 
power from the erstwhile Bralimin-Baniya-Patel combine to the 
more prosperous strata o f lower castes and adiposis (indigenous 
people). This transfer was not without its problems, as the riots 
that rocked Gujarat in 1981 and 1985 demonstrated. However, B JP 
took note of this division o f Hindus along caste lines and crafted a 
common Hindutva strategy to unite the majority community 
against Muslims. The dalit identity gave way, in the face o f 
urbanisation and sanskritisation in Gujarat, making the state a 
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breeding ground for communal hatred. The loss of identity assisted 
this assimilation process by buUding up an aversion to Muslims. 
The post-Babri Masjid riots in 1992 accelerated this process and 
changed the social geography of urban Gujarat, creating 
increasingly sharp distinctions along communal lines (Prakash 
2002). 
The new Hindutva strategy worked well in some of the urban 
locations o f Gujarat where to some extent, caste identities merged 
with the economic upsurge to widen the definitions o f middle 
class. In rural Gujarat, however, the Hindutva ideology meant the 
domination by the 'provincial bourgeoisie 1 1 that rose from the 
dominant landed caste o f Patels supported by newly-rich artisans 
such as Prajapatis (Roy 2002). The dominant landed class sensed 
power again, which seemed to have been lost to the K H A M 
combine. At the village level these changes were articulated in 
altering voting patterns. The dominant group that voted for I N C in 
the past found their aspirations being articulated by B J P and hence 
moved towards strengthening their hands. The Prajapatis, with 
their new-found ambitions, followed Patels. It is interesting to note 
that the Thakores and Prajapatis belong to the same government 
class o f O B C s but their voting pattern is concerned with the 
interest o f the class they represent The changing caste and class 
identities o f Prajapatt are articulated in some of the rituals. Earlier, 
the Thakores were associated with the Gaekwads, had higher ritual 
status than Prajapatis. During the time of marriage in Thakore 
households the Prajapatis, a potter caste, had to provide new 
earthen pots to be used in marriage rituals. For this, the Prajapatt 
women used to go to the house where a marriage would take place 
and the pots were accepted by Thakore women by performing a 
ritual at the front door of the house. Since the earthen pots were to 
be used in a marriage ritual, they were considered sacred. In return, 
the Prajapatt women were rewarded with money and clothes. The 
same ritual is operational now also but with a small change. N o w 
the Prajapati women do not go to Thakore houses but instead the 
Thakore women come in procession to take the earthen p o t T h e 
Prajapati also do not make the pots but they buy them in advance if 
any o f the Thakore families want to come for the ritual The 
incident speaks volumes about the changing status o f castes in the 
social hierarchy and the feedback mechanisms that work from the 
micro-to-macro level, responding to the changing times. 
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Notes 
1 For a historical review of the concept, see Beteille 2002. 
2 Thakores and the scheduled castes such as Chamars, Vagharis, Senmas 
and Rawals are non-vegetarian. In Gujarat and elsewhere, there is a stigma 
attached to being non-vegetarian as meat eating is related to being impure 
The meat-eating Thakores are looked at by Patels and Prajapatis from this 
angle. 
3 The word Patelhas been derived from another word Patidar that means 
people who own land. The word Patidar has now become extinct. The 
Patidars in Gujarat are divided in four sub-castes- kadvas, levas, anjanas 
and mafias (Vyas 1998: 279). 
4 The sale of water during those days was based on crop sharing rather 
than an hourly basis. The rationale for this was that because the land 
productivity was much higher during those days, there was not much of 
risk involved in selling of water based on crop sharing. Slowly when crop 
failure became rampant, the hourly charge for water was institutionalized. 
In this chapter, through the everyday village politics, I showed 
how power extends beyond the structures of domination in the 
village to cover the larger arena o f socio-political, economic and 
ideological spheres. In the protracted process of increased control 
over resources, the upper class seems to be winning on all major 
fronts. The working class tried to work through the democratic 
processes. However, the so-called democratic institutions reflected 
the social structure where the powerful groups dominated the 
village. These structures of power were reflected in the virtually 
unchallenged control over three formal institutions- panchayat, 
dairy and credit cooperatives. The social power generated through 
this political and economic control was challenged through 
electoral struggle by the working class but this largely did not 
succeed. The majority o f the socially and economically oppressed 
were also working class and their organisation was subject to 
various levels o f subjugation by the upper classes. The changing 
nature o f state politics also gave power to the dominant class and 
provided legitimacy to their combines. Political domination 
together with economic and social power facilitated increasing 
control over critical resources for the upper class. 
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5 Tolitical history: How a Congress bastion went the BJP wa / . News 
article appeared at Hindustan Times dated November 23, 2002. Sourced 
athttp://ww.rmidustantimes.com/news/5905_105647,00160005Jitm 
6 Mehsana Doodh Sagar Dairy, located in Mehsana town, is considered as 
Asia's largest dairy plant with a daily processing capacity of 1.5 million 
liters (Singh and Kishore, 2004). 
7 According to a study undertaken by the IWMI-Tata Water Policy 
Program in north Gujarat, the effective net water productivity of a buffalo 
and crossed-breed cow calculated from the farmer's point of view came 
up to Rs 5.22 and Rs 5.57 respectively. This is more than all the crops 
grown (cotton - 0.68, mustard - 2.01, potato - 2.98 and tobacco- 4.04) in 
the sample village except for castor whose water productivity was 
calculated as 7.21. The study showed that farmers were increasingly 
moving towards dairying even with increased water scarcity due to returns 
being much higher than agriculture (Singh and Kishore 2004:4-7) 
8 Here the caste identities go along with the relation of Beti (daughter) and 
Rati (literal translation is flat bread). This means that there can be 
marriages (marrying Beti) within the same caste if they have similar or 
higher ritual status than their own. The relation of Rati means accepting 
food from other caste groups. The upper castes do not eat or drink in 
lower caste households. A major breakthrough in caste barriers is that the 
two castes start eating together on social occasions or otherwise. This 
relation is maintained among Patels, Prajapatis, Darbars and some 
Thakores but has not been observed among other caste groups such as 
Chamars and Vagharis. Another indicator of caste restrictions is in 
entering each other's houses. There are some castes such as Patels, 
Prajapatis, Darbars and Thakores that can enter each others' houses. 
However there is a restriction of entry in all the above four castes for 
people belonging to Parmar, Rawad and Vaghari castes who are 
considered lower in the caste hierarchy. 
9 Here I reject Dumonfs understanding of caste as 'discrete systems 
where political and economic aspects are relatively secondary and isolated' 
(Dumont 1998: 21-32, 235). For a detailed critique, see Gupta 1991 and 
Das 1982. 
1 0 The Navnirman movement started in 1974 as a students movement 
with the increase of canteen bills in the engineering college hostels. Soon 
it took more political overtones against the Chimanbhai Patel's 
government that were considered corrupt. At the heart of the agitation 
was the issue of rising food prices. The protesters demanded fresh 
elections initiating the issue of 'right to recall' a corrupt government. The 
opposition party was quick to pick up on this and fully supported the 
agitations. The word nav-riirman symbolised the new order of the state 
free from corruption. As a result, for the first time, Gujarat elected a non-
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INC government, the Janata Morcha (a conglomeration of many political 
parties mduding today's BJP), which became the base for anti-emergency 
activities in 1975. Largely, nav-nirman was an urban movement espousing 
the rising aspirations of the middle class (Babu 2002). (Also based on 
personal communication with Bhanubhai Mstry, UNNATI, Ahmedabad, 
February 17, 2004 and interview of Mukesh PateL the then leader of Nav 
Nirman Movement sourced at www.in.rediff.com/news/1999/aug 
/13guja.htm) 
1 1 At the state level, the rise of a business class from the dominant peasant 
caste and the artisan shudra castes developed into an expanding 
propertied class. In Gujarat, it was from the peasant patidars and the 
artisan castes like panchals and prajapatis. Their caste cohesion remained 
embedded in the emerging secular economic and political organizations, 
becoming a means of enabling formation of new capital from money 
income, a social agency for breaking economic barriers and creating 
economic space and creating political support for state assistance for 
economic expansion and the accumulation of capital In the initial period 
of economic expansion, the competition between this upwardly mobile 
propertied class and the existent vamya-brahmin forces remained 
subdued, and gradually evolved into a core of the forward caste — the 
savarna identity. These forward caste communities constituted more than 
three fourths of the middle class and overwhelmingly of the provincial 
bourgeoisie (Roy 2002). 
7 
'Groundwater is a dry topic unless you happen to have a dry welf (Moench 2000) 
Maintaining a tubewell is like rearing an elephanf said an old 
woman while discussing the problems related to groundwater 
irrigation in Sangpura village. Using this metaphor, she explained 
how deep tubewells are difficult, particularly expensive to own and 
maintain. This is chiefly because everything concerned with a 
tubewell is as big as an elephant and not everyone has the resources 
and capacity to own them. An individual's access to groundwater in 
Sangpura is determined by having a share in a tubewell. Fxpating 
tubewells with elephants speaks volumes about who can own one 
and who cannot. This book has dealt with these concerns through 
an intensive case study of the Sangpura village, closely looking at its 
patterns o f agrarian transformation. Sangpura's irrigation and 
livelihood needs rely on access to groundwater. This resource has 
been overexploited in recent years. The overexploitation threatens 
the livelihood support systems especially for people who directly 
depend on it for their survival. This book focused on the process 
o f groundwater development as characterised by differential access 
and inequity in resource distribution. Looking at the triadic 
framework of agrarian institutions, ecological variables in agrarian 
change and state functioning, the book explains the process 
o f social change taking place in a village in north Gujarat The 
problem of groundwater depletion and its social consequences 
were placed in the broader socio-economic landscape, of which 
irrigated agriculture and socio-political institutions are an mtrinsic 
part 
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This conducting chapter summarises the arguments of the book. 
It divides into three sections. The first section recapitulates the 
issues o f agrarian transformation in Sangpura and asks the question 
who wins and who loses in the process and why. The second 
section deliberates on the role o f the groundwater market, which 
contributed to and mediated the process o f agrarian 
transformation. The last section discusses the politics o f 
groundwater irrigation. This politics of interlocking triadic control 
o f agrarian institutions, socio-ecological variables in crop 
production system and social characteristic o f the state defines and 
reproduces the course o f groundwater exploitation. 
A Some-Win All-hose Game 
In Sangpura, in 2002 groundwater irrigation built on the inequality 
in ownership of land and helped the large farmers. The gains from 
agriculture flowed more towards people who were already well off 
and socio-politically powerful. Few benefits reached down the 
hierarchy. This study showed that the ownership o f land and 
groundwater was skewed towards the higher castes. The caste 
structure closely correlated with the class hierarchy in the village, 
determining an individual's access to the means o f production. 
While the access to land, to a considerable extent, was historically 
determined, the access to irrigation in Sangpura is based on either 
having shares in the tubewells or through buying water from the 
groundwater market The household-level analysis showed that 
around 40 per cent of the households did not have any access to 
irrigation. Groundwater access has largely tilted towards Patels who 
belonged to the higher caste. A large majority of them fell in the 
economically higher class. Constituting a little over 30 per cent of 
the total village households, Patels had shares in 29 out o f the total 
34 tubewells, amounting to 65 per cent of total tubewell shares of 
the village (Chapter 3). Their control over groundwater not only 
contributed to their economic domination but also added to the 
unrestrained use of groundwater. This was because the control 
added to an individual's resource base, which strengthened their 
capacity to drill deeper and deeper. With depleted aquifers, the 
resource poor and marginal farmers lost access to groundwater and 
became more dependent on upper classes for work and survival 
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Government intervention to check groundwater 
overexploitation largely concentrated on indirect forms of 
regulation such as cutting the supply o f electricity and controlling 
institutional finance (Chapter 2). This electricity cut was largely due 
to the inability o f the government to increase the price for 
electricity use in agriculture. The electricity charges could not be 
increased because o f the compulsions to sustain the interests o f 
large farmers, who also constituted the political base o f the ruling 
political party. However, the government was also under pressure 
from civil society institutions to check groundwater extraction, 
together with demands from international financial institutions for 
cutting agricultural subsidies. An escape route for the government, 
which avoided direct confrontation with farmers, was to reduce the 
electricity supply rather than increase the tariff. The reduction in 
electricity supply drastically curtailed the operation of water 
markets. The reduced hours o f electricity supply led to a drop in 
the availability of water. This curtailed the command areas o f 
tubewells and the sale of excess water. Another cause of shrinking 
groundwater markets was the drawdown of the aquifer leading to 
increased cost of pumping. Access to water was redefined in the 
changed scenario. With command areas shrinking, the first 
preference to irrigate rested with well owners, pushing out water 
buyers from the market Controlling institutional finance did not 
deter the new installation o f tubewells and neither did it help in 
checking the wells from going deeper and deeper to access 
groundwater. Farmers could access funds from other sources and 
hence controlling institutional finance only affected the late 
entrants. They were mostiy small farmers who generated some 
resources and tried to have a tubewell o f their own. These indirect 
forms of regulations came into force only when groundwater had 
become inaccessible to the majority o f the population. 
Agricultural productivity in Mehsana district and in Sangpura 
declined in the late 1990s. The major causes of this were intensive 
cultivation resulting in fertility loss of the soi l declining 
groundwater and reduced hours o f electricity supply leading to 
increased irrigation costs and reduced availability of water, and lack 
o f innovation in agriculture suitable to dry-land ecology. The case 
study o f four tubewells (Chapter 4) showed how tubewell 
cooperatives were dealing with increasing groundwater prices and 
how only well-resourced farmers were able to cope with the 
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changes. The unsustainable resource use did not generate 
contestation in relation to the declining groundwater, as one might 
intuitively expect but shaped and structured responses in the 
direction o f water mining. The strategies of the farmers did not 
address or confront ecological concerns, but aimed at avoiding and 
postponing them. With the depletion o f groundwater, declining 
productivity o f agriculture and shrinking o f water markets, a sharp 
rise in sharecropping contracts was observed in Sangpura. For the 
upper class, the sharecropping system was cheaper than cultivating 
through hired labour as it saved them the transaction costs o f 
supervising and managing labourers. With productivity decline and 
irrigation prices increased, the sharecropping system was 
introduced to share this burden. N o matter how unfavourable an 
arrangement, the lower classes did take up land under the new 
sharecropping arrangements, as most of them were excluded from 
water markets and hence needed work to survive. Farming was 
necessary as it ensured household food security. This aspect 
explains why sharecropping in Sangpura was not only a technical 
arrangement for allocating productive resources but also a product 
o f changing social relationships. 
A s a strategy to combat declining productivity, upper class 
farmers, mainly Patels, started migrating to the USA in the early 
1990s. They paid huge sums o f money to agents and used social 
networks to settle there. The money generated in the USA travelled 
back making them partially independent of the agricultural 
production system. Due to the new source of income, Patels were 
in a position to take more risks and did not defer from investing in 
tubewells or going deeper to chase the water table. It also increased 
their bargaining power in day-to-day management of agriculture, 
controlling and deriving surplus in extreme scarcity situations. The 
marginal and near-landless farmers could not cope with this and 
were trapped in a situation o f land degradation, water scarcity and 
increasing irrigation prices. It resulted in lower profit margins in 
agriculture threatening their household food security (Chapter 5). 
The struggles over resources between different social groups 
were also negotiated through the control over socio-political 
institutions and their strategies to cope with the changing scenario. 
A close examination o f everyday village politics showed how 
political power extended beyond the structures o f domination in 
the village. The broad social characteristics o f the state provided 
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strength to local power structures and defined the course o f 
everyday politics in Sangpura. Political domination facilitated an 
increased and sustained control over resources for powerful 
people. The working class worked through democratic institutions 
and contested the power structure through various means. 
However, the democratic institutions reflected the social structure 
dominated by powerful social groups. The everyday politics in 
Sangpura contributed to increase in the social power o f the 
dominant classes, which was generated through their control over 
economic resources and by maintaining the socio-political 
hierarchy (Chapter 6). 
The case o f Sangpura showed that the development of 
groundwater irrigation led to differential access and control over a 
productive resource such as groundwater. The water markets 
helped the upper class farmers in extracting surplus from the sale 
o f water in the early 1980s and 1990s, which was maintained 
through the new institutional arrangement o f sharecropping. It 
showed that local water use was embedded in the social hierarchy, 
structures o f power and accumulation and distribution of 
productive resources such as land and groundwater. All together, 
the prevalent property relations contributed to a small minority o f 
dominant social groups winning over a sizable majority o f middle 
and lower class farmers. The upper classes also defined the course 
o f the agrarian production systems and flows o f surplus in an 
extreme water scarcity situation. Access to groundwater and other 
material and symbolic resources are part of this process o f social 
change taking place in the villages o f north Gujarat 
Market and Social Differentiation 
The case o f Sangpura points towards a complex web o f regulation, 
market and social relationships that led to emergence o f a class o f 
people controlling and redefining the course o f production 
relations in a situation o f water scarcity. Social ditferentiation 
clearly divided those with and those without the ability to escape 
the agrarian trap and political influence to defy regulation. This 
differentiation is defined as the power and ability o f the dominant 
classes to shift the cost o f irrigation to others whenever necessary. 
This process also emphasises the dynamic mterlinkage between the 
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physical nature o f the groundwater and the larger social-economic, 
political and institutional context within which it is presently 
managed. 
T w o major generalisations can be made looking at the case o f 
Sangpura. The first relates to the loopholes in the regulatory nature 
o f the formal groundwater legislation. This legislation does not 
capture the socio-economic realities or understanding o f how water 
rights are defined at the local level In the existing legal framework 
o f 2002, the rights are in a private regime: the groundwater belongs 
to the person -who owns land. In this legal framework, the 
landowners have all the rights while landless are left o u t One of 
the consequences o f this law is that it gives power to the rich 
property owners to become water-lords and indulge in water sales 
(Singh 1995). However, having a land right does not ensure access 
to groundwater in areas such as that of Sangpura. Ownership of 
the means of water extraction is much more important in ensuring 
this right to be exercised than access to land alone. The case o f 
Mahendrabhai and Lakhaji (Chapter 1) elaborate this point Both 
had access to land, but the latter lacked the means to access 
groundwater and hence was in a dependency relationship to the 
former. The absence of a clear-cut groundwater rights initially led 
to a spurt in the groundwater markets leading resourceful farmers to 
acquire tradable rights. The differential access to groundwater leads to 
situation of social conflict 
Secondly, the transactions in groundwater markets are socially 
contested and embedded in the way societies are organized 
historically. In Sangpura the introduction of new irrigation 
technology supported by material and financial subsidy by the state 
resulted in an increasingly unequal distribution o f irrigation 
resources. The phrase of 'irrigation against rural poverty' 
(Chambers 1986) applied only temporarily in Sangpura. Irrigation 
access was defined though water markets, which built upon the 
inequality in resource allocation. It created differential access to 
irrigation for water buyers and sellers. The caste-based system of 
hierarchy and disproportionate access to economic resources such 
as land and water represented the prevalent production relations, 
which were reinforced through water markets. Meinzen-Dick 
(2000) documents a similar situation in Pakistan. Similar to 
Sangpura, in Pakistan, the control over groundwater is with those 
who can afford to invest in the tubewells. Under groundwater 
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market conditions, water purchasers cannot always obtain access to 
groundwater especially at times o f peak demand, when tubewell 
owners use much of the well's capacity for their own fields. This 
unreliable access o f subordinates limits agricultural productivity for 
those who must depend upon water from other people's wells. 
Janakarajan (1994, 1997) and Bhatia (1992) narrate similar 
situations (see chapter 1) pointing towards unequal resource access 
and exploitation o f small and marginal farmers by dominant 
classes. These issues are said to be one o f the 'important causes o f 
the agricultural stagnation in the south Asian region where 
intervention through existing market channels reinforces the 
iniquitous impacts of policies. Intervention in one market produces 
a chain reaction that frustrates the original design or, far worse, 
upsets the precarious initial production balances. 'Commercializing' 
or 'modernizing' one segment o f the complex web of production 
and exchange relations, if not followed by commensurate 
supportive changes in others, can frustrate the policy objectives o f 
such interventions' (Bharadwaj 1985: 345-46). 
The proponents of water markets advance two basic arguments. 
The first relates to the demand for reallocation o f water to the 
highest valued uses, considering that groundwater is a scarce 
resource. It is argued that water markets allocate the resource to the 
Toighest valued uses' (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994: 1616). 
Water is allocated to the sector with the highest marginal benefit 
and is considered a useful means o f achieving efficient water 
allocation if it is given a right price tag (Tsur and Dinar 1997). 
Under the 'efficient' water market system, competitive water sellers 
would bring down the cost per unit of water and hence water 
would be available for a more competitive price. Further, the water 
sellers would cut the water price close to the average cost of 
pumping which would generate a larger irrigation surplus and more 
livelihoods for the resource poor and landless. Referring to 
efficiency arguments, Shah (1993) argues for charging dectridty for 
pumping at a flat rate, which would create competitive markets. In 
the competitive water market, the forces of demand and supply 
determine prices and the highest bidder gets water. It is assumed 
that the price paid for the resource reflects the value o f the 
resource to the person. From the case o f Sangpura, we have seen 
that this argument ignores the implications o f the existing 
distribution o f income wherein the price at which water is bought 
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does not reflect the use value of the resource. The analysis of 
groundwater pricing in sample tubewefls in Sangpura showed that 
there is no 'marginal' value o f water that informs price. Instead, 
water prices are determined by, and embedded in a variety o f other 
social factors (Chapter 4). Further, market allocations of 
groundwater generated externalities such as a declining water table. 
These externalities are not reflected in market transactions and are 
poor indicators o f value for commodities for which property rights 
are not concisely defined (Brajer et al. 1989). Many also believe that 
the water markets are responsible for depleting aquifers, due to 
competition among farmers to overexploit an open access 
resource, and therefore create negative equity impacts (Bhatia 1992, 
Janakarajan 1993, Saleth 1994). In the process, resource poor and 
marginal farmers are losing access to groundwater and finding it 
hard to cope with the declining water table. 
The second argument pertains to groundwater markets being an 
appropriate way to increase control over resources and reduce 
constraints in irrigation supply (Rinaudo et aL 1997). Water markets 
are considered equitable because the sale o f water in the open market 
benefit many farmers who otherwise do not have access to the 
resource. It is also argued that buyers are minimizing their risk by not 
investing in the modem water extracting mechanisms (Shah 1993). As 
we have seen in Sangpura, the accessibility of groundwater to the 
farmers has increased due to the water markets in the early stage o f 
tubewell expansion However, in a short span of time, the resource 
poor farmers were at a distinct disadvantage in their inability to 
compete in chasing the water table, which involved high costs 
(Moench undated). The water buyers became dependent on the 
sellers for irrigation access who had resources to go deeper with the 
aquifer. A new class of water lords emerged, which benefited from 
the sale of and direct access to water. These water lords accumulated 
large surpluses from the sale of water. Thus, the argument of 
increased accessibility of the groundwater resource through water 
markets undermines the prevalent social relations of production. 
They are characterised by the dominance of resource-abundant upper 
caste farmers. The inequitable distribution of resources contributes to 
a structural pattern that underpins a mechanism towards increased 
social differentiation. The argument that groundwater markets 
increase accessibility to the resource does not hold true in the end. As 
we have seen in Sangpura, the groundwater markets are no longer 
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expanding, even decreasing and are hardly existent The sellers are 
not affected by this as they still enjoy accessibility and have 
diversified from agriculture through the surplus generated in the 
process. 
Groundwater Irrigation, Pontics and Social Power 
A s described, Sangpura's case clearly demonstrated changing 
relations between production technology and socio-political 
institutions. The rise in groundwater irrigation was an immediate 
response to technological changes in agriculture, which created a 
demand for irrigation. Numerous wells and tubewells were installed 
to meet this demand. Water markets further mediated in this 
process o f providing initial access to the resource. However, as 
discussed, groundwater markets not only built on existing social 
relations to production but also reproduced inequaUty in resource 
access and distribution. The control o f groundwater by the 
privileged few was not limited to the agricultural production system 
but spilled over into other arenas o f social life defining the course 
o f agrarian change. It helped in consoUdating the power positions 
o f dominating classes, feeding back into political linkages and 
working against regulatory mechanisms for checking groundwater 
overexploitation. These factors define the political economy of 
groundwater governance of north Gujarat, which is detrimental to 
its limited groundwater resources. In the next section, I summarise 
these trends while looking at the interlocking triadic control o f 
social power, (which defines access to resource for different social 
groups), socio-ecological variables in crop production systems, 
(which determines level of surplus generation for households) and 
domains of state functioning, (which reproduce unequal and 
unsustainable pattern o f groundwater utilisation). These 
interlocking control systems are detrimental to the livelihood and 
survival strategies o f the poor and marginalised sections o f the rural 
population in north Gujarat 
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Social power and distribution o f groundwater 
Politics is about the mediation o f social power and the strategic 
action related to that negotiation. It is the process through which 
the social relations o f power are constituted, negotiated, 
reproduced, transformed or otherwise shaped. In the context o f 
resource use, four levels o f power are identified. The first level 
consists of the everyday struggle over access and use of resources. 
The second level includes die political nature o f policy 
formulations contested by different interest groups. The third level 
deals with the state and party politics alternatively identified as 
hydropolitics. The fourth level refers to institutions, agreements 
and conventions at global level that shape and influence water use 
(Mollinga and Bolding 2004). This book showed a great deal of 
mterlinkage between the first, second and third level o f 
groundwater politics. I showed that the contestations over 
groundwater resources are linked to the everyday village politics 
and political power, which extend beyond the structures of 
domination in the village into the larger state politics. The 
democratic process operates at different territorial levels and works 
through the social structure linking various structures of power 
occupied by different social groups within the society. It also leads 
to organised articulations o f social, economic and political power in 
favour of the dominant classes. The politics of domination enhance 
the control over resources for powerful social groups. The 
distribution o f groundwater in the village is intertwined with the 
distribution of power, which leads to the mining o f groundwater. 
This is due to the ability o f dominant classes to generate a surplus 
from agriculture and elsewhere and reinvest in drilling deeper down 
the aquifer. The fact that Sangpura is situated in an alluvial area 
with a large aquifer enables the process o f exploitation to continue 
unhindered. 
One of the important questions leading this analysis regards the 
mechanisms that reproduce class/caste domination and provide 
power and legitimacy for dominant groups to define the level of 
surplus extraction. I showed that groundwater irrigation in 
Sangpura built on the pre-existing inequality in land distribution, 
which provided economic power to some social groups over others 
to access a productive resource. The link between land and 
tubewell ownership is established to a very large extent These 
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linkages defined the level o f household surplus extraction from 
booming agriculture and water markets in the early stages o f their 
growth. The large farmers, mainly Patels, were able to mobilise 
caste ties to access institutional finance and inputs needed for 
commercial agriculture. The unbridled access to groundwater along 
with the mobilisation o f material, financial, and symbolic resources 
reinforced the economic and political dominations o f upper classes. 
However, the arena o f access and control over groundwater 
resource did not go uncontested. Other social groups challenged 
the dominant alliances in more than one way but did not succeed. 
This is mainly due to two reasons. First, the upper classes have 
constandy strategised ways to reproduce the domination and tried 
to have control over the process through various means. These 
strategies also included sharing o f limited profit from institutional 
arrangements such as sharecropping so that the conflict does not 
lead to the level o f organised contestation. I showed that the 
relations o f exploitation in Sangpura are embedded in the 
class/caste structure and the ability o f dominant classes to control 
the labour process. The strategies o f upper castes are quite visible 
in various alliances that can form collective consciousness, 
behaviour and organisation for achieving and defending their 
interests. The upper castes form dominant alliances to transform 
'class-in-themselves' to 'dass-for-themselves'. Their alliances result 
in conscious strategies, which have both planned and unintended 
consequences in everyday politics and day-to-day decision-making 
by dominant classes to keep control. The choices made are part o f 
a much broader political agenda closely coinciding with the present 
social characteristics o f the state. The control over groundwater 
resources is result of this larger consciousness-making. Second, the 
cultural dimension of caste diffuses the economic inequalities and 
subordination as they are seen more as 'given' or 'natural' facts. 
This implies that the castes lower in the present social hierarchy do 
not form a 'class-for-themselves'. However, this does not downplay 
their strategies in devising plans for resisting this process o f 
domination. In fact, their resistance includes various exit options 
and a search for alternative livelihoods rather than confronting and 
questioning unequal distribution o f resources. 
Conclusions 219 
Sotioecological variables and crop production systems 
I have shown that ecology has a role in defining the course of 
agrarian change. The very existence of a deep aquifer that can be 
mined in Sangpura provided avenues for not confronting the 
ecological problem of a declining water table. In 2002, Sangpura 
was situated in a 'dark' zone o f groundwater utilisation with an 
ecological crisis manifested in declining productivity o f agriculture 
in recent years. I showed that the crop production base in the 
village was reaching a threshold due to intensive agriculture and 
other ecological factors, which undermined dry land agriculture. 
However, the declining profitability has not led to agriculture 
becoming uneconomic at least for the dominant and economically 
powerful classes. These people still derived a surplus even in case 
o f declining agricultural growth due to their ability to control the 
labour process and increase in input use under new production 
systems. The large area that came under sharecropping was also 
used as an instrument to control labour and ensuring that the water 
markets take a new form. In the early stages o f water market 
development, the water charges were based on crop sharing. This 
gave away when profit from the sale o f water superseded the profit 
from crop sharing. Crop sharing also shared the risk in agriculture 
between tenant and landlord. When the productivity o f the land 
was highest, this risk was minimal and hence water charges were 
collected on an hourly basis and in cash. With decline in 
agricultural productivity and shrinking o f water markets, the risk in 
agriculture went up many-fold. The rise in the institution o f 
sharecropping during this time was a response to share this risk by 
creating a stake for tenants. Water charges were again calculated 
against crop share while labour costs were minimised by using 
lower-caste women tenants and keeping the wage rate constant for 
over a decade. This power of the dominant classes to shift the risk 
and pricing of groundwater whenever necessary as suited to their 
class interest throws light on the social relations in Sangpura. 
A pertinent question is what farmers' strategies can be to restore 
productivity, and why new technological changes are not adopted 
in Sangpura. Out o f all the measures to maintain the productivity, 
using compost is most popular among farmers. This is largely 
because o f its availability in the village due to dairy farming 
activities and its time-tested result in keeping up productivity 
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without any harmful effect to crops. Regarding new technological 
choices, there has been litde innovation suited to the requirements 
o f the present day agriculture in Sangpura. Even if the technology 
exists, information is not widely available. In the era o f productivity 
decline only a few rich farmers have been able to experiment with 
different varieties o f crop and some of them who experimented in 
the past benefited. The case o f Vervabhai Patel (Chapter 6) 
illustrated this. Vervabhai could experiment with the new high 
input tobacco crop and reaped a large profit However, Vervabhai 
is one o f the most resourceful farmers o f Sangpura and not 
everyone has capacities to experiment as he did. Therefore, 
experimentation is limited to a few people and to their 'capability' 
to take the risk to experiment The increasing irrigation cost is not 
complemented by using water efficiency devices such as drip 
irrigation systems. This is chiefly because under the largely popular 
one-third sharecropping system, the gain from the land and water 
component goes to the landlord. A drip irrigation system reduces 
the labour cost for irrigation but the cost of installing a drip system 
is much greater than the cost o f total labour charge in irrigating the 
field. Under the flat rate electricity system, accessing water is still 
economic in combination with cheap labour under sharecropping 
and profits from milk production systems. The landlord hence 
rationalises to use manual labour over drip irrigation. These aspects 
show how technological adoption is the product of changing social 
relationships. Policy prescriptions to popularise a particular 
technology can have very limited effects if they are not backed by 
sound understanding of prevalent social relations. 
The declining productivity does not have a universal effect on all 
social groups, as the case suggests. The large farmers could cope 
with these situations through partial diversification from agriculture 
and have been able to derive surplus. It is the small and marginal 
farmers that have been at the receiving end of these changes. This 
aspect makes a case for devising strategies to protect the interest of 
historically marginalised groups in the wake of extreme scarcity 
situations. The answers to the productivity question lie in devising 
strategies and promoting technology that consider the present 
resource constraints and innovation suiting the particular ecology. 
This may include water-use efficiency measures and recharging 
shallow water aquifers. The concept o f water use efficiency needs 
to be broadened to incorporate issues of productivity, equity and 
Conclusions 221 
sustainability in resource management (Hussain, Yokoyama and 
Hunzai, 2001). North Gujarat has numerous ponds and tanks that 
have silted up over the years due to neglect and non-dependability. 
Restoring these tanks could be used as a long-term strategy for 
recharging shallow aquifers. The other aspect o f productivity is to 
innovate and sustain seed varieties. As the case of Sangpura shows, 
indigenous wheat provides almost similar yield with less external 
inputs while the H Y V seeds have lost their genetic potential due to 
repeated use. There is a dire need for research and development in 
ecologically suitable agricultural technology for input efficiency, 
especially for water-starved areas such as north Gujarat. Stabilising 
agricultural production and the environmental system is 
fundamental: if they are affected badly in an irreversible manner, as 
the case largely suggests, this will lead to larger social consequences. 
However, productivity-enhancing measures do not guarantee that 
the rich and the powerful classes will not siphon off the benefits. 
The social characteristics o f the state have to be adapted for 
realising such benefits to cover historically marginalised groups 
through special efforts and affirmative actions. This is what I turn 
to next 
The social characteristics o f die state 
While defining the functioning o f the state, Abrams (1988) referred 
it as a structure or agency, which is hidden behind a set of 
institutions. This hidden entity is difficult to study because o f the 
•backstage institutionalisation o f political power behind the on-
stage agencies o f government' (ibid: 63). He analysed the 
functioning o f the state as an ideological power, which introduced 
the study o f relationships between the state-system and the state-
idea and other forms of power in understanding the characteristics 
o f the state. In this section, I discuss the state-system represented 
by a set of institutions and public agencies and the overall ideology 
o f the political system ruling the state of Gujarat I seek to answer 
how different institutions o f the state interacted and played a role 
in controlling agrarian institutions and socio-ecological variables at 
the local level defining the course of groundwater distribution and 
exploitation in north Gujarat 
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I have shown that the present form of groundwater distribution 
and control is based on the ability o f individuals to afford the costs 
o f investing and deepening the tubewells. This gives economically 
powerful sections o f society an edge to monopolise control over 
groundwater, which has larger socio-political consequences. At the 
local leveL this manifests itself in control by dominant classes over 
various arms o f the state institutions such as the panchayat, dairy 
and credit cooperatives. This is not a unidirectional agenda for 
controlling groundwater but part o f the broader agenda of 
dominant social groups to manipulate material, financial and 
symbolic resources, which helps in reproducing their sodo-pblitical 
and economic domination. These agendas are also set and driven 
by the overall ideology of the political party ruling the state. In 
Gujarat, except for the brief period o f K H A M (Khsatriya, Harijan, 
Adivasi and Muslim) politics, which allied the marginalised groups 
with the dominant Khsatriya caste, politics has been dominated by 
the coalition o f what Bardhan (1984) calls the dominant 
'proprietary classes'. They include the industrial capitalists, rich 
farmers and a class o f bureaucrats and professionals. The state's 
ideology was directed by the interest of these classes and their 
balance of power. The replacement of K H A M with Hindutva 
politics post-1980s was part o f the broader social engineering by 
the BJP to diffuse the dissention among caste-divided Hindus o f 
Gujarat The differences between upper and lower caste Hindus 
were dearly visible in the 1981 riots in Gujarat, which erupted 
against affirmative action and public policy designed to benefit 
lower castes. Dalits and lower caste people were brutally killed and 
burned alive showing the sharp divisions on caste lines. Hindutva 
politics inevitably dispersed the divisions on caste identities and 
instead combined the Hindus against Veil-defined enemies' 
identified as Muslim and Christian minorities (Yagnik 2002, Babu 
2002). As shown among the voting behaviour of different classes in 
Sangpura, the Hindutva base was largdy concentrated in the 
propertied class o f Patels and Prajapatis (Chapter 6). The ruling 
political party thus provided impetus to local politics where the rich 
and powerful could consolidate and maintain their class positions 
and define the course o f agrarian change. I asked a Patel farmer 
who was installing a new tubewell why he should not be 
prosecuted in defying the law as no new installation o f tubewell is 
allowed in Mehsana without permission. H e replied, 'no one dares 
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to touch a Patel and put them behind bars as the majority of MLAs 
(member o f legislative assembly) are Patels. N o t only this, we also 
have a hold over police, bureaucracy and institution of justice'. The 
answer clearly shows die mterlinkages between local social power 
and the various arms o f the state machinery. 
Several observers document this connivance of social power and 
state power. Chakravarti (2001) showed how the local or village-
based agrarian power structures are interwoven with the power o f 
the state. At the local level, it leads to exploitation o f working class 
by the dominant social groups resulting in l o n g working day, 
rigorous surveillance, lower wages and the ever present possibility 
o f being subjugated to taunts and physical abuse'(ibid.: 287). The 
linkages have also been powerfully projected in the course o f 
agrarian violence against the organisation o f the working class. T h e 
critical factor in the struggles of the rural working class against their 
opponents is the capacity o f the political party or agency that is 
instrumental in organising them to breach the nexus between social 
power and state power" (ibid: 288). Providing evidence from the 
study o f tank irrigation in south India, Shah (2003) illustrated how 
state policies are made in a politically contested field in which 
sections o f society actively participate. Farmers' politics at the state 
level indirecdy influenced the new tank designs. Her study showed 
how the landed farmers' alliances have influenced state policy on 
paddy price, decentralisation of administrative power and tank 
irrigation. These policies affect diverse sections o f the peasantry 
differently. Some of them have been detrimental to the situations 
o f small and marginal farmers. Prahladachar (1994) studied the 
innovations in the use and management o f groundwater in the hard 
rock regions of India and indicated that because o f advantageous 
resource position and bureaucratic-political influence, owners of 
large farms have appropriated the gains o f lift irrigation 
disproportionately more than small farmers. H e called for 
innovative institutional arrangements to improve access of water to 
small farmers especially in the water scarce hard rock regions. 
Analysing the relationship between the state and local agrarian 
communities in a canal-irrigated region o f south India, 
Ramamurthy (1995) showed local irrigation organisations cannot 
and do not change the local power structure. In fact, the strategies 
o f the local collective organisations, politicians and government 
bureaucrats compromised the efficiency and long-term 
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susfainability of the canal system. 'Given the structural disability o f 
their class positions, small farmers just could not afford to opt out 
if they wanted to continue to be economically viable. The ties 
interlocking different classes included not only water but also 
employment, sharecropping, credit, loans, and brokerage o f 
concessionary green revolution inputs such as fertiliser. These ties 
were legitimated by both the cultural ideology and the real or 
threatened use o f force' (ibid.: 283). Studying the landless classes o f 
Halpatis in south Gujarat, Breman (1993) observed limited 
improvements in their pitiable conditions. This was in the 
framework of society's institutional and governance structure. The 
affirmative action o f support to the underprivileged class through 
reservation policies had resulted in violent protests by middle and 
upper classes. Though, Halpatis derived little advantage from the 
policy, 'even that little is too much in the eyes o f their former 
masters' (ibid.: 361). H e concluded that though the traditional 
legitimacy o f inequality was non-existent, Halpatis would have to 
fight a long battle due to lack of political visibility. 
These cases clearly show the link between local power structure 
and the social characteristic o f the state, providing evidence to 
draw parallels for the case o f north Gujarat I showed that the 
state's inability to enforce strict laws and regulations to check the 
exploitation of groundwater rests largely on its political 
unwillingness. The political leadership of the state does not want to 
go against the large farmers' lobby, which is an important vote 
bank, and hence sustains their interest for mining deep aquifers. 
This process is not limited to Gujarat but has been part o f populist 
agricultural policies all over India in mobilising vote banks. While 
farmers have long been dependent on the state for essential inputs 
to agriculture, in recent years politicians in the state governments 
have also become dependent on farmers' (Dubash 2002: 251). It 
brings us to the fact that resource exploitation is not apolitical. One 
o f the ways to resolve this is to work on approaches based on 
balance o f power concepts with explicit recognition o f the political 
nature of management needs (Moench 2000). As shown, dominant 
classes in Sangpura have been effective in controlling productive 
resources without much affirmative action by the state to provide a 
safety net for people lowest in the class hierarchy. In addition, there 
is a particular way in which the state has identified the problem and 
created programs reflecting their political constituency. This 
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includes building a large dam on the river Narmada and the 
political rhetoric associated with how it will solve the problems o f 
water scarcity in Gujarat 'State-directed technocentric 
development projects which do not involve the people but treat 
them simply as objects o f the development process often end up 
primarily as conduits o f largesse for elite groups, middlemen, 
contractors, officials, politicians and favoured special interest 
groups and very little reaches the intended beneficiaries. Even 
when a significant amount reaches the latter, the benefits are 
sometimes o f the wrong kind, inappropriate technologically, and 
environmentally unsustainable, corrosive of local institutions o f 
community bonding and self-help and always leaving untapped the 
large reservoir of local potential, ingenuity and information' 
(Bardhan 2003: 291-292). The state, thus, is doing very little to stop 
groundwater exploitation, deliver technological options, choice, 
and access to resources for the empowerment of the working class. 
This defines the social characteristics o f the state in present day 
Gujarat. 
Through the case o f Sangpura, I captured the changes in 
production relations through the introduction o f deep tubewells. 
The initial expansion and demise of water markets and the level of 
surplus generation changed social relationships and an individual's 
access to groundwater resource. Dominant social groups devised 
strategies to control material and financial resources through 
various means. This control did not go uncontested. However, the 
contest was heavily weighted in favour of dominant classes chiefly 
because o f their ability to cope with changes. Groundwater was an 
important part o f the interlocking control where agrarian 
institutions, sodo-ecological variables and domains of state 
functionally interacted. This is chiefly because of the characteristics 
o f groundwater, which transformed agriculture based on an 
individual's level of accessibility. Further, this accessibility got 
translated in to ways o f surplus extraction for the farming 
households. The social characteristics o f the state provided 
strength for the local power structure to control access to 
groundwater. Together, they led to unchecked exploitation of 
groundwater, which only benefited the small minority o f upper 
class farmers. Through the shift in labour contract according to the 
groundwater pricing, the risk o f agriculture was spread through 
sharecropping contracts. As accessibility reduced and the market 
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shrunk, upper classes maintained their relative social and economic 
positions and brought the working classes into a new dependency 
relationship, defining the course o f agrarian change in north 
Gujarat 
Though, this book tried to capture some aspects o f the 
relationships between technological variables and the reproduction 
o f power and inequality, it could be further captured through a 
detailed study focusing on the changing forms o f contacts and 
markets. This includes the multi- dimensionality o f patron-client 
relationship in favour o f market driven prices and wages. The 
information asymmetry in the market is reinforced by the relative 
diversification option of different players in these contracts, 
especially in relation to exit options. The transactions o f these 
evolving markets are a matter o f further analysis. 
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From the second half of the last century, agriculture in India has 
gone through enormous changes because o f the introduction of 
green revolution technology. The technology demanded more 
control over irrigation, which the large canal systems were unable 
to provide. Groundwater irrigation was seen as a feasible 
alternative to the bureaucracy controlled canal systems. In addition, 
groundwater irrigation could cover areas that were historically not 
part o f the surface irrigation schemes. These advantages of 
groundwater over surface irrigation led to sharp increase in its use. 
However, due to the large areas being irrigated by groundwater, 
over-development and depletion o f aquifer systems is becoming 
common. Gujarat is no exception to this process where 
groundwater supports more than seventy-seven per cent o f its 
irrigation water requirements. Due to the increased dependence on 
groundwater, many regions in Gujarat have become water scarce 
from water abundant areas in just four decades. Increased 
groundwater use coupled with rising pollution level in surface water 
bodies has resulted in water scarcity further leading to groundwater 
exploitation. With the increased groundwater use, a spurt in water 
markets has been reported in the early 1980s. Dense markets 
developed in alluvial central and northern regions o f Gujarat, 
which were suitable for sinking deep tubewells. The rise in water 
markets led to debates often to the level of rhetoric, over its nature 
and way of functioning. A group of academician advocated for 
having dense and competitive groundwater markets on the ground 
o f efficiency and accessibility to the resource without unpacking 
nuances o f unequal social relationships, natural and historical 
functions that shaped and determine groundwater access and use. 
Apart from few very recent studies, the debate lacked detailed 
methodological and empirical inputs in understanding how 
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groundwater irrigation and markets functions at the level o f ground 
zero. 
The present study fills this gap while focussing on the politics o f 
groundwater markets and its interrelation with social differentiation 
and class-caste relations. It is based on an intensive case study o f 
Sangpura village situated in the Mehsana district o f north Gujarat 
Mehsana district is famous for its widely developed groundwater 
markets and depletion o f aquifer system due to excessive pumping. 
The study seeks to understand how groundwater depletion and 
inequity have become mtrinsically related elements of this process. 
First, it investigates the factors that shaped unrestrained use o f 
groundwater and the responses o f various social groups 
characterised by class and caste, to this process o f social change. 
These factors range from the issues of access and control over 
productive resources such as land and groundwater, a local ecology 
that endorsed groundwater development and institutions such as 
groundwater markets and sharecropping that mediated the change 
process. Together they present a new social differentiation between 
those who are able to escape the agrarian trap and the ones who 
are forced to bear the consequences. It also examines the ability of 
dominant classes to maintain control over groundwater in such a 
way that it allows transfer of surpluses even in case o f water 
scarcity. Second, the overexploitation of groundwater and its social 
consequences are the result of certain processes o f development in 
irrigated agriculture occurred at the cost o f depleting aquifers and 
sustainable farming systems. The state intervened initially through 
agrarian reforms and later by providing credit facilities and 
indirectly supporting milk and tubewell cooperatives. It has also 
interceded in creating law for limiting groundwater 
overexploitation. However, the state also became inefficient and 
ineffective in checking depletion o f resources largely due to 
keeping the interest o f large farmers' lobby that feeds into the 
political system. The various institutions o f the state and their 
control provide impetus to an agrarian politics that tilts toward the 
interest of dominant social groups. These mechanisms work right 
from the lowest panchayat and dairy cooperative level to the level 
of the state reflecting the overall political economy. O n the ground, 
they help the dominant classes to consolidate their position and 
determine differential access to groundwater resources through 
various sources o f legitimacy and power. 
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The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 maps the 
social-geography of the village while locating them in the 
theoretical arena. It reviews the literature on groundwater irrigation 
from the perspective o f agrarian change showing the lack o f 
detailed information on internal characteristics o f groundwater 
irrigation institutions. Through a triadic framework of the theory of 
agrarian institutions, ecological variables in agrarian change and the 
domain o f the state in influencing institutions, nature and society, 
the study locates the context o f present study. In addition, it 
introduces the focus o f research and the central research questions 
followed by the study design and an overview of the chapters. 
Chapter 2 sketches the distribution and causes o f groundwater 
scarcity in different eco-regions o f Gujarat, which is grounded in 
local ecology. The causes of water scarcity are seen in the historical 
context o f agricultural development that heavily relied on 
groundwater irrigation. The chapter looks into the various 
responses o f the state for the management o f groundwater. It also 
updates information on the famous Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) 
and its distribution networks and shows how it will not address the 
problem of groundwater scarcity in north Gujarat as it covers only 
part o f the scarcity zones. 
Chapter 3 analyses the organization o f tubewell irrigation 
cooperatives as shareholders and water buyers. It shows how the 
pattern o f groundwater irrigation is embedded in prevalent social 
relations o f production and where the class structure closely 
subsides with the caste structure. The small dominant minority 
controls the groundwater irrigation institutions and define the 
manner in which groundwater is accessed and distributed in the 
village. This control, which stems from the differential access and 
control over groundwater resource for different classes, leads to a 
much sharper social differentiation. 
Chapter 4 maps the responses of increasing irrigation costs due to 
decreasing supply of electricity and groundwater depletion. 
Through the entry point o f four tubewells, this chapter provides 
the worm eye view of the organisation o f tubewell cooperatives 
and their coping mechanisms in meddling with increasing 
groundwater prices. The cases provide information towards a 
broader dynamics and strategies o f different social groups in 
confronting the declining trend of groundwater and rising input 
costs in agriculture. It shows how unsustainable resource use does 
not generate contestation in relation o f declining groundwater but 
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shapes and structures responses towards the progression o f water 
mining. 
Chapter 5 documents the rise in sharecropping contracts in the 
village and illustrates how it is a part o f the changing history, 
rooted in social and economic contingencies. It also looks the 
aspects o f production relations where sharecropping becomes 
preferred form o f contract Powered by the new economic might 
generated through long distance migration, the dominant classes 
define the manner in which labour is appropriated. Through the 
description o f the basic features of sharecropping in Sangpura such 
as historical evolution, coverage and types o f contracts, the chapter 
outlines the social relations of production in sharecropping 
arrangements. It focuses on the rationale o f landlords and tenants 
for taking up sharecropping and shows how dominant classes 
transfer the burden of resource depletion to people other than 
them. 
Chapter 6 closely examines the every-day village politics o f 
Sangpura, which contributes to the social power generated at two 
levels, from the control over economic resources and by 
mamtaining and reproducing the social and economic hierarchy. It 
also leads to increased tussle over groups o f people claiming 
control by gaining more power and room to manoeuvre. The 
chapter shows how the structure o f power and politics o f the 
village is reflected in controlling institutions such as panchayat, 
dairy and credit cooperatives by dominant groups, which in turn 
reproduces legitimacy and power for them. These institutions and 
their control provide impetus to an agrarian politics helping 
dominant classes to consolidate their power positions and define 
the course of resource exploitation and agrarian change. 
Chapter 7 summarises the major arguments o f the thesis and 
revisits the key concepts. It opens up debate on the dynamics o f 
agrarian change and the process of social interaction in the context 
o f groundwater exploitation. Departing from the popular theories 
that looked at institutions and groundwater markets, the study 
shows a triadic rdationship where access to resources, crop 
production systems and social relations interact and define the 
course o f social change in groundwater dependent economies. It 
also looks into the feasibility of some of the solutions to the 
problem of groundwater depletion discussed by scholars and 
activists. 
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The case o f Sangpura clearly showed the changes in production 
relations through the introduction o f deep tubewells. The initial 
expansion and demise of water markets and the level o f surplus 
generation changed social relationships and an individual's access 
to groundwater resource. Dominant social groups devised 
strategies to control material and financial resources through 
various means. This control did not go uncontested but was heavily 
weighted in favour o f dominant classes chiefly because o f their 
ability to cope and resist with changes. Groundwater was an 
important part of the interlocking control where agrarian 
institutions, socio-ecological variables and domains o f state 
functioning interacted. This is mainly because o f the characteristics 
o f groundwater irrigation, which transforms agriculture and 
accessibility to groundwater in a village like Sangpura, determines 
the level o f surplus extraction for the households. The social 
characteristics o f the state provided strengths for local power 
structure to control access to groundwater. Together, it only led to 
unchecked exploitation o f groundwater, which benefited the small 
minority of upper class farmers. It brought small and marginal 
classes in a dependency relationship with the upper classes defining 
the course o f agrarian change in north Gujarat In sum, the study 
shows how social relationships shape and determine access and use 
o f groundwater in the context of specific agro-ecology, prevailing 
social relations of production, ineffective regulation of 
groundwater exploitation and large inequality in resource 
ownership. 
N e d e r l a n d s e Samenvatt ing 
D e Groene Revolutie heeft, sinds the tweede helft van de vorige 
eeuw, enorme veranderingen in de Indiase landbouw 
teweeggebracht Sommige van die veranderingen hebben te maken 
met water. D e nieuw geïntroduceerde zaadvariëteiten vereisten 
nauwgezettere watergiften, die moeilijk realiseerbaar waren met de 
aanwezige oppervlakte-irrigatiesystemen. Grondwater dat middels 
putten kon worden opgepompt vormde een aantrekkelijk 
alternatief voor deze bureaucratisch beheerde grootschalige 
systemen. Gebruik van grondwater maakte het bovendien mogelijk 
om nieuwe gebieden te bevloeien. D e aantrekkelijkheid van 
grondwater als bron voor irrigatie hebben geleid tot een scherpe 
stijging in het gebruik ervan. Enorme arealen worden geïrrigeerd 
met grondwater. Het gebruik van grondwater begint echter 
langzaam te leiden tot problemen van uitputting van de 
ondergrondse watervoorraden. Deze problemen doen zich ook 
voor in Gujarat, waar meer dan 70% van de irrigatie afhankelijk is 
van grondwater. Veel gebieden in Gujarat zijn in een periode van 
slechts 4 decennia veranderd van waterovervloedig in water 
schaars. D e sterk gestegen vervuiling van oppervlakte water heeft 
deze schaarste nog verergerd, doordat het nog meer mensen heeft 
genoopt hun toevlucht te nemen tot grondwater. Vanaf de vroege 
jaren tachtig heeft de stijging in het gebruik van grondwater ook 
geresulteerd in een enorme groei van watermarkten. In de alluviale 
vlaktes van Noord Gujarat, die uitermate geschikt zijn voor het 
slaan van diepe grondwaterputten, is een bloeiende handel in water 
ontslaan. Het feit dat water verhandeld wordt, en de zichtbare 
aanwezigheid van markten in water, is koren op de molen van een 
groep wetenschappers en beleidsmakers die pleiten voor de 
privatisering van water. Het stimuleren van competitieve water 
markten, zo luidt hun argumentatie, zou leiden tot het vergroten 
van de efficiëntie van het gebruik van water evenals tot een 
effectievere en efficiëntere verdeling ervan. D e voorstanders van 
water privatisering laten zich over het algemeen weinig gelegen 
liggen aan bestaande ongelijke sociale verhoudingen, noch 
bekommeren ze zich erom dat de toegang tot en het gebruik van 
grondwater mede bepaald worden door natuurlijke en historische 
omstandigheden. Met uitzondering van een paar recente studies, 
wordt het privatiseringsdebat gevoerd op basis van simplistische en 
foutieve aannames over hoe de toegang tot en het gebruik van 
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grondwater georganiseerd. 
D e analyse in dit boek probeert deze lacune op te vullen 
door aandacht voor de organisatie van het gebruik van grondwater 
op het niveau van de alledaagse werkelijkheid. D e studie hanteert 
een poUtiek-economische benadering van grondwater markten en 
onderzoekt hoe deze markten samenhangen met sociale 
differentiatie en kaste en klassenverhoudingen. D e analyse is 
gebaseerd op een intensieve casus van het dorp Sangpura, in het 
Mehsana district in Noord Gujarat. Het Mehsana district staat 
bekend om zijn goed ontwikkelde grondwatermarkten en vanwege 
de waterschaarste die het gevolg is van uitputting van de 
watervoerende grondlaag door overbepomping. D e studie probeert 
de processen die geleid hebben tot de uitputting van grondwater te 
begrijpen als mtrinsiek samenhangend met processen van sociale 
differentiatie. Als eerste wordt een historische beschrijving gegeven 
van de processen die hebben geleid tot het ongebreidelde gebruik 
van grondwater. Tevens wordt een inventarisatie gemaakt van hoe 
verschillende sociale groepen, geordend naar kaste en klasse, zijn 
omgegaan met de veranderende watersituatie. D e analyse kijkt naar 
de toegang tot en de controle over hulpbronnen als land en water, 
de locale ecologische omstandigheden die gunstig waren voor het 
gebruik van grondwater voor irrigatie, en naar instituties zoals 
watermarkten en deelpacht die het veranderingsproces mede 
vormgaven. Samen leidden deze tot een nieuwe sociale 
differentiatie, met aan één kant degenen die profiteren en aan de 
andere kant degenen die slachtoffer zijn van de veranderingen. D e 
studie laat zien hoe de heersende klasse in staat is geweest controle 
over grondwater te behouden. Deze controle was dusdanig dat 
deze landbezittende groep, zelfs in tijden van waterschaarste, het 
water dat ze zelf niet nodig hadden konden verhandelen. D e studie 
vervolgt met een analyse van de overexploitatie van grondwater die 
laat zien hoe de sociale gevolgen ervan voortvloeien uit bepaalde 
historische ontwikkelingsprocessen in de geïrrigeerde landbouw. 
Aanvankelijk trachtte de staat sociale differentiatie binnen de 
perken te houden middels landhervormingen, en later door 
kredietvoorzieningen en indirecte steun aan melk- en 
watercoöperaties. D e staat voorzag tevens in een wet die de 
overexploitatie van grondwater moest tegengaan. E r kon echter 
weinig effectief gebruik worden gemaakt van deze wet, doordat 
deze werd tegengehouden door enkele succesvolle allianties van 
grotere boeren. D e politieke macht van grote boeren was 
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aanzienlijk, en heeft ertoe geleid dat de diverse staatsinstituties 
feitelijk een politiek in stand houden die vooral de belangen van 
deze groep behartigde. Dit gebeurde middels mechanismen die 
werken vanaf de laagste niveaus van bestuur, op panchayat en 
melkcoöperatie niveau, tot op het hoogste niveau van de staat O p 
het laagste niveau gebruikte de heersende klasse de regels en 
instituties van de staat ter bestendiging van de eigen positie, en 
maakte gebruik van deze regels om gedifferentieerde toegang tot 
grondwater verder te legitimeren. 
Het boek bestaat uit zeven hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 1 
brengt de sociale geografie van het dorp in kaart, en positioneert 
het boek in theoretische zin. Het geeft een overzicht van de 
bestaande literatuur over grondwater irrigatie vanuit het perspectief 
van landbouw ontwikkeling, en laat zien hoe weinig er bekend is 
over de interne karakteristieken van grondwater irrigatie instituties. 
Middels een driekantig raamwerk bestaande uit theorieën over 
agrarische instituties, theorieën over de rol van ecologie in 
agrarische veranderingen, en een theorie over de staat helpt dit 
hoofdstuk de rest van het onderzoek theoretisch te kaderen. Het 
hoofdstuk gaat verder kort in op het gekozen 
onderzoeksperspectief, presenteert de belangrijkste 
onderzoeksvragen en geeft een overzicht van de hoofdstukken. 
Hoofdstuk 2 schetst, vanuit een ecologisch perspectief, de 
verdeling en oorzaken van grondwaterschaarste in de verschillende 
ecologische regio's van Gujarat D e oorzaken van waterschaarste 
worden gezocht in de historie van een agrarische ontwikkeling die 
zwaar afhankelijk was van grondwater irrigatie. Het hoofdstuk 
bekijkt de verschillende manieren waarop de staat heeft getracht 
het beheer van grondwater te reguleren. Het geeft ook de stand van 
zaken weer over het beroemde Sardar Sarovar project (SSP) en de 
daaraan gekoppelde waterdistributienetwerken, en laat zien dat dit 
project geen oplossing zal bieden voor de grondwaterschaarste in 
Noord Gujarat, omdat het slechts een klein gedeelte bestrijkt van 
de gebieden waar schaarste heerst 
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert de organisatie van grondwater 
irrigatiecoöperaties als belangrijke aandeelhouders in en kopers van 
water. Het laat zien hoe grondwaterirrigatie patronen ingebed zijn 
in de bestaande sociale productieverhoudingen waarin klasse 
structuren neigen te overlappen met kaste structuren. Een kleine 
heersende minderheid heeft de controle over grondwaterirrigatie 
instituties en bepaalt de manier waarop de toegang tot en de 
verdeling van grondwater geregeld is in het dorp. Deze controle is 
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geworteld in de sterk gedifferentieerde toegang tot grondwater en 
leidt op haar beurt tot een steeds groter wordende kloof tussen arm 
en rijk. 
Hoofdstuk 4 brengt in kaart hoe de kosten van irrigatie 
steeds zijn blijven stijgen door het afnemende aanbod van 
elektriciteit en de uitputting van grondwater. Middels een 
gedetailleerde analyse van 4 diepe grondwaterpompen geeft dit 
hoofdstuk een beschrijving van de organisatie van grondwater 
coöperaties en laat zien hoe deze omgaan met stijgende 
grondwaterprijzen. D e beschreven voorbeelden illustreren de 
algemenere dynamiek en strategieën van verschillende sociale 
groepen in het omgaan met de afnemende beschikbaarheid van 
grondwater en met de stijgende productiekosten van de 
geïrrigeerde landbouw. Ze laten zien dat onduurzaam gebruik van 
een natuurlijke hulpbron niet hoeft te leiden tot protesten waarin 
dit gebruik aangeklaagd wordt, maar in tegendeel gedrag kan 
genereren dat de verdere uitputting van de grondwaterbronnen tot 
gevolg heeft. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt verslag gedaan van de toename in 
deelpachtcontracten in het dorp, en wordt aangetoond hoe deze 
toename deel uitmaakt van een veranderende geschiedenis die is 
geworteld in sociale en economische samenlopen van 
omstandigheden. Het hoofdstuk kijkt ook naar veranderingen in 
productieverhoudingen doordat deelpacht de meest favoriete 
manier wordt om arbeid te organiseren. Economische gesteund 
door inkomens afkomstig uit overzeese migratie van familieleden, 
is de heersende klasse in staat de manier te bepalen waarop arbeid 
gerekruteerd en beloond wordt Middels de beschrijving van de 
basiskenmerken van deelpacht in Sangpura (de historische evolutie, 
verspreiding en types contracten) geeft het hoofdstuk een indruk 
van de sociale productieverhoudingen die besloten liggen in 
deelpachtafspraken. Het hoofdstuk legt de nadruk op de motieven 
van landbezitters en pachters om deelpachtrelaties aan te gaan, en 
k a t zien hoe de heersende klasse erin slaagt de kosten van de 
uitputting van natuurlijke hulpbronnen af te wentelen op anderen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt van dichtbij de alledaagse 
dorpspolitiek van Sangpura, waarbij de werking van sociale macht 
op twee niveaus wordt geanalyseerd. Ten eerste op het niveau van 
de controle over economische bronnen, en ten tweede op het 
niveau van het in standhouden en reproduceren van de sociale en 
economische hiërarchie. D e dorpspolitiek manifesteert zich ook in 
toenemend geharrewar veroorzaakt door groepen mensen die meer 
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zeggenschap eisen als ze meer macht en onderhandelmgsruimte 
krijgen. Het hoofdstuk laat zien hoe de politieke en 
machtsstructuren in het dorp worden weerspiegeld in het bestuur 
van officiële instanties zoals de panchayat en de melk- en krediet 
coöperaties. Deze instanties en hun macht spelen daardoor een 
belangrijke rol in de agrarische politiek bij het bestendigen van 
machtsposities, bij het bepalen van de manier waarop natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen worden gebruikt en bij het bepalen van de loop van 
de agrarische ontwikkeling. 
Hoofdstuk 7 vat de belangrijkste argumenten van het 
proefschrift nog eens samen, en herhaalt de belangrijkste 
bevindingen. Het gaat het debat aan over de dynamiek van 
agrarische verandering en processen van sociale differentiatie in de 
context van grondwater gebruik D e studie neemt afstand van de 
gangbare theorieën over instituties en grondwatermarkten en laat 
een driezijdige verhouding zien waarin toegang tot hulpbronnen, 
gewasproductiesystemen en sociale relaties elkaar wederzijds 
beïnvloeden en gezamenlijk de loop van sociale veranderingen 
bepalen in economieën die afhankelijk zijn van grondwater. Het 
hoofdstuk neemt ook een aantal van de voorgestelde oplossingen 
voor de grondwaterproblematiek, zoals voorgesteld door 
wetenschappers en beleidsmakers, kritisch onder de loep. 
D e Sangpura casus heeft duidelijk aangetoond welke 
veranderingen productieverhoudingen ondergaan door de 
invoering van diepe grondwaterpompen. D e aanvankelijke 
uitbreiding en vervolgens het ter ziele gaan van watermarkten, 
samen met de manier waarop meerwaarde gegenereerd werd, 
hebben diepgaande gevolgen gehad voor sociale verhoudingen en 
de toegang van individuen tot grondwater. Heersende sociale 
groepen ontwikkelden verschillende strategieën om te kunnen 
beschikken over materiële en financiële middelen die hen in staat 
stelden blijvend toegang tot grondwater te houden. Dit leidde tot 
protesten, maar uiteindelijk bleek de heersende klasse toch in staat 
te overleven en om te gaan met veranderingen. Grondwater was 
een belangrijke schakel in het instandhouden en versterken van de 
macht van deze klassen, een schakel tussen agrarische instituties, 
sodo-ecologische variabelen en verschillende domeinen van 
staatsinvloed. Het belang van grondwater hangt voornamelijk 
samen met de kenmerken van grondwater irrigatie, met de 
historische karakteristieken van de landbouwontwikkeling, met de 
manier waarop toegang tot water is georganiseerd in een dorp als 
Sangpura, en met het niveau van meerwaarde onttrekking voor 
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huishoudens. D e sociale kenmerken van de staat hielpen de locale 
machthebbers hun greep op water verder te verstevigen. Dit alles 
samen leidde tot een ongecontroleerde ontginning van grondwater 
waar een kleine minderheid van boeren uit de hogere klassen van 
profiteerde. Kleinere en marginale klassen werden in toenemende 
mate afhankelijk van de hogere klassen, die de loop van de 
agrarische veranderingen in Noord Gujarat bepaalden. 
Samenvattend, de studie laat zien hoe sociale verhoudingen de 
toegang tot en het gebruik van grondwater kunnen bepalen, in de 
context van een specifieke agro-ecologie, de aanwezige sociale 
productieverhoudingen, weinig effectieve regulering van 
grondwater gebruik en grote ongelijkheid in bezitsverhoudingen. 
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